PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXIII. No. 85 APRIL 1948

DUTY[1]

PROFESSOR A. MACBEATH

THE tendency towards analysis and criticism, realism and pluralism, which has been evident in general philosophy during the present century has had important effects on recent ethical discussion. Its influence is to be seen in the two theories which on account of their prominence and the number of their disciples may be said to be most characteristic of the period—Ideal Utilitarianism and the New Intuitionism—theories which no less an authority than Sir David Ross described as the rival theories. However different these theories are in many respects they have a tendency towards ethical pluralism, if not atomism—a tendency not only to emphasize distinctions but even to harden the distinguishable elements into independent, if not even unrelated, entities. The one leaves us with a series of independent goods and the other with a series of *prima facie* duties, with the result that neither gives us any unitary principle to help us in one of the principal tasks of the moral life, the attempt to discover what in particular circumstances we ought to do.

It seems to me not without significance in this connexion that these two theories, though by very different routes, arrive at the common conclusion that doing one's duty has as such no value, that indeed a man who has done his duty may in doing it have shown himself a morally bad man, and that for doing the action, which it was his duty to do, he may be morally blameworthy. The Ideal Utilitarian, whose appreciation of the value of moral goodness leaves something to be desired, says we have just to accept this paradox. The New Intuitionist, who recognizes the uniqueness of the value of moral goodness, is rather more uneasy about the position, but he sees no way of escape from it. To me such a conclusion seems not only paradoxical but in direct contradiction to the deliverance of the unsophisticated moral consciousness. For if there is anything

[1] Paper read before the Metaphysical Society of Trinity College, Dublin.

about which men who are not out to support a theory are agreed, it is this: To say of an action that in doing it a man has done his duty is to attribute moral value or worth to it. Some would go further and say that it is to attribute the highest or even the only moral worth to it. And while, as Aristotle tells us, we have in discussing ethical questions something to learn from both the many and the wise, when the two are in conflict, as they seem to be in this matter, the final appeal is to the many.

In this paper I propose to consider certain questions regarding the nature of duty and its relation to the other fundamental ethical concept, the good, questions which I think have largely arisen from the tendencies I have mentioned, and which have been prominent in recent ethical discussions. I want to submit tentatively, and without much elaboration, a view which seems to me to leave room for the distinctions and truths explained by recent theories, and at the same time to provide a principle which brings order and coherence into the moral life, a principle which, however difficult to apply in detail, gives us hope that the more we reflect the more likely we are to arrive at a right decision as to what we ought to do. That there is such a principle seems to be implied in our strong conviction of the reasonableness of moral action. It may be that monistic and idealistic ethics arrived at such a principle too easily, but, if we are not to be content to regard the moral life as a disorderly chaos, there seems to be no alternative to the belief that there is such a principle.

While construction rather than controversy is my aim, I shall develop my positive contentions by contrasting them with the New Intuitionism of Sir David Ross, not only because no one writing on ethics to-day can hope or deserve to carry conviction unless he comes to terms with the positions which Ross has explained and defended with such clarity and candour, but also because the theory which I wish to propound became much clearer for myself through this contrast, and especially because I wish to acknowledge how much I have learned from his stimulating treatment of ethical questions and his insight into moral facts, however much I may dissent from some of his conclusions.

In my discussion I shall try as far as possible to take the point of view of the moral agent faced with a practical situation calling for decision and action, rather than that of the external observer passing judgement on the actions of other people. Too much reliance on the latter point of view is apt to lead to the atomism which is characteristic of so much recent ethical theory. Only a person who adopts it, or so at least it seems to me, could come to the conclusion that actions performed with different motives are the same, provided the change initiated by them is the same.

Let us begin with the idea of good, and confine ourselves to what

is good not merely as a means but as an end or in itself. Of anything good in this sense we can, at least, say that it is an object of the pro-attitude, that is, it is an object enjoyed when present (taking enjoyment as the common element in admiration, approval, satisfaction and liking), longed for when absent and desired when absent and believed to be capable of being achieved by our efforts. Among things good in this sense are the pursuit and attainment of knowledge, the promotion and enjoyment of friendship, the production and experience of beauty, the enjoyment of health and some measure of the conditions of material well-being. The goodness which we attribute to such things seems to me incapable of being understood except in relation to the nature, the needs, and the interests of human beings. For example, if man were not a social being, the production of friendship would not be good. If he were not curious, the pursuit of knowledge would not be good. If he did not dislike pain, there would be no goodness in attempts to alleviate it. The goodness of such things is a relational property depending on their capacity to satisfy certain elements in human nature.

But, on account of the limitations of our nature, we cannot pursue all these goods at once, nor should we pursue any of them all the time; nor yet can we decide which of them we ought to pursue here and now merely by considering which of them taken by itself in isolation is best. In this connexion, there seems to me to be a serious defect in such a comparison of goods as that made by Ross in his *Foundations of Ethics*. According to such a comparison one good, e.g. knowledge, is considered intrinsically better than another, e.g. pleasure, with the suggestion that in any circumstances in which we have to choose between goods the intrinsically better should be chosen. But it seems to me that in actual life circumstances arise in which it is my duty to pursue, e.g. the conditions of material well-being rather than knowledge, even though I am satisfied that there is a sense in which knowledge when considered by itself is better than material well-being. How then am I to discover which good I ought to promote here and now?

When the self-conscious being reaches a certain level of maturity he builds up for himself a plan or policy of life which, as a whole and every element in which in its context, he believes will sustain the pro-attitude. I have no time to discuss the process by which the self builds up this ideal, but I think we can make the following assertions about it. (1) It is the result of experience—partly the experience of the race taken over by the individual, partly the experience of the individual himself. (2) It can be understood only in relation to the nature and needs of the individual: it is what he believes will enable him to realize his capacities and satisfy his needs. (3) Its unity is derived from the unity of the self's interests: it is

what he believes will satisfy his self as a whole. (4) As the self is social as well as rational, this ideal has a social as well as a personal side: it is an ideal of personal development in an ideal community. No doubt, at any given moment, this ideal or policy may be neither clearly articulated nor completely unified and the community to which it refers may be very circumscribed, but it is the nature of a self-conscious being to have such an ideal; and the more reflective and enlightened the individual, the more unified and comprehensive his ideal.

Now it seems to me that it is in the light of such an ideal or policy that we judge which goods we ought to promote here and now. What the realization of the ideal requires in particular circumstances we call right or fitting or suitable. It is not only good in the sense that, considered by itself, it is an object of the pro-attitude, but in the circumstances it is best; and in these circumstances anything else, even if considered by itself it is an object of the pro-attitude, is bad, and the pursuit of it is wrong. If this is so, consideration of the relative values of different goods in the abstract or apart from a plan of life is misleading. While all the goods I have mentioned are worthy of being pursued at some time or in some context, and while, human nature being what it is and having the needs and interests it has, the ideal which is to satisfy it must include these goods, nevertheless the limitations of our nature prevent us from realizing them or pursuing them all at once; and, therefore, in a given situation we may have to choose between one and others. We choose between them, not by considering their merits in the abstract, but by considering them in relation to a whole or system into which they do or do not fit and with which they are or are not harmonious. What should be realized here and now is not only good in the sense of being an object of the pro-attitude, that is, relative to the satisfaction of some element in human nature, but also suitable or fitting relative to the good of the self as a whole and relative to the requirements of an ideal social order. For, man (1) has particular needs, (2) is reasonable or self-conscious and (3) is social.

The goods, the objects of the pro-attitude, the elements in the ideal, which I have so far noticed, belong in the main to the personal side of the ideal; but there are others which are specially bound up with the relations of men to one another and so belong to the social rather than to the individual side of the ideal. Such are truth telling, benevolence, gratitude to benefactors, promise keeping, etc. These also considered by themselves are objects of the pro-attitude in the sense that, other things being equal, a community whose members act in these ways is considered good. Such actions, however, are good, not as the Utilitarians contend in the sense that their consequences considered in the abstract are good, but in the sense that

in relation to the whole situation, including what has happened in the past as well as their consequences, they are objects of the pro-attitude. For example, other things being equal, an act of giving ten pounds to a rich man when I might have used it to relieve the distress of a poor man, and when I am not able to do both, is not good in the sense that the state of affairs which results from my action is good. But, if the payment to the rich man is the fulfilment of a promise or the repayment of a loan, other things are not equal. As the Intuitionist contends, it is the fact that I have made a promise (not the consequences of the act of keeping it considered in the abstract) that makes the act of keeping it good or fitting; but if it were not for the fact that I had made the promise, my act now would not be an act of promise keeping but just the production of a state of affairs which could be considered by itself and judged good or bad. But when I have in fact made a promise the state of affairs in relation to which my act has to be considered is "promise made and kept by me,"—not the state of affairs produced by my act without relation to the fact that I made a promise. And, when we consider it in relation to the total actual situation, the act of promise keeping is good in the sense of being an object of the pro-attitude.

In the same way, my spending money on the education of a stranger may produce a state of affairs as good as my spending money on the education of members of my own family, and perhaps better if the stranger is likely to profit more by the education, but our attitude to the acts is different when we consider them in their contexts in relation to the whole state of affairs, that is, the relation of parent to his own children in the one case, and the relation of parent and stranger in the other; and perhaps also in relation to the present arrangements of our society in such matters.

It seems to me that it is only the atomizing tendency which considers such acts only in relation to one aspect of the situation, and not in relation to the total situation, which prevents the New Intuitionists from recognizing that the total state of affairs resulting from such acts is good as well as the acts themselves right.

And, just as in the case of personal goods, so in the case of these inter-personal goods, while each considered by itself is an object of the pro-attitude, it does not follow that it is so in every context or that it should be promoted on every occasion. We may have to choose between the promotion of different goods; and, then, which we should promote here and now can only be determined in the light of a policy or plan of life.

The same considerations apply to another class of goods which consist not so much in the promotion of positive goods as in the removal of evils and defects, such as, the relief of distress, the alleviation of pain, the removal of ignorance, the curing of disease;

though in many, if not most, such cases, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between them and the production of positive goods. For the same act often removes evil and promotes positive good. Such goods also, when considered in the abstract, are objects of the pro-attitude, but in particular circumstances we may have to choose between one and another; and our choice can only be determined in the light of an ideal or policy of life.

And, not only may any of the goods in the different classes of goods I have mentioned come into conflict with another of the same class; but, partly because of the limitations of our nature which make it impossible for us to promote all goods at once, partly because of defects in our own or other people's past conduct as, e.g. when we have made incompatible promises, and partly because of circumstances beyond our control such as the desire of a person who is seriously ill to know a truth which might prejudicially affect his health, similar conflicts arise between goods in the different classes. We may, e.g. have to choose between the pursuit of knowledge and the relief of distress, between the promotion of friendship and telling the truth, between the production of beauty and the alleviation of pain; and we cannot decide which we should promote in particular circumstances merely by considering the different goods in abstraction, but only by considering the requirements of the ideal or policy. In other words, none of these goods is good unconditionally in the sense that it is a suitable object of the pro-attitude in every context. They are all good in the sense that, considered by themselves, they are suitable objects of the pro-attitude; and, therefore, each has its place in the ideal. Only the ideal itself can continuously sustain the pro-attitude. Other goods can sustain it only in their context as what is required by the ideal in particular circumstances. The goodness which an act or state of affairs has as being here and now the expression of the ideal we call its rightness. Its rightness, thus, depends on its fitting into a scheme or policy, the conceived good of the self as a whole.

Now it may be said that what is right is not only fitting or suitable, but that it is so in a unique way, a way not further definable, which can only be described by saying that it is *morally* fitting or suitable. The uniqueness of this kind of fittingness I do not doubt, but its uniqueness does not seem to me to prevent us from describing it further. What I want to suggest is that by morally fitting we mean fitting into a whole which is good and ultimately into the good of the self as a whole, just as by aesthetically fitting we mean fitting into a whole which is beautiful, and by intellectually fitting we mean fitting into a whole which satisfies the intellect or a whole of truth. In other words, by morally right or fitting we mean fitting into or required by the good of the self as a whole. What is fitting in this

sense is not only good but best. The ideal, which we use as a criterion in determining what is right or fitting in this sense, we sometimes call the moral ideal or moral end; but there seem to me to be serious objections to these descriptions, and especially to the latter. One objection is that the term "end" suggests a condition of affairs which is in the future and can be attained all at once; whereas the realization of the good of the self as a whole cannot be attained all at once but has to be spread out in time, and it can be partially realized in the present as well as in the future. Another objection is to calling it the *moral* end, for this ideal seems to me to consist of non-moral elements and not to be itself morally good at all. It is rather the non-morally best. Its relation to moral goodness will appear later.

When we contemplate this non-morally best or the good of the self as a whole, we not only take the pro-attitude towards it but we recognize that it has a claim upon us that we should try to realize it, in so far as it is possible to do so by our action. This claim, especially when it is opposed by other elements in our nature, as, e.g., by some of our inclinations and desires, is what we call the sense of obligation or the sense of duty. The sense of duty is, thus, the recognition or belief that something, which is in our power and opposed to our inclination, is best in the circumstances, that is, the expression of the ideal, and therefore right or fitting; together with the feeling of obligation or the desire to do it which this recognition or belief produces in us. If this is so, our particular duties are the requirements of the ideal or best, the good of the self as a whole, in particular circumstances; and these duties cannot be understood except in relation to the nature and needs of man. If that nature or those needs were different, the ideal would be different, and our duties would be different. The better we understand the nature of man and his needs, the more adequate our ideal and the more enlightened our conception of our duties. This is not to say that the sense of duty is not unique or that it can be analysed without remainder into other experiences. It is unique in being itself, and it requires a special term or terms to describe it, such as ought, obligation, duty. We can only describe it as the experience which a self-conscious being, who is also a creature of desires and inclinations rooted in natural instincts, has in the situation which I described above. If we put ourselves actually or in imagination in a situation in which what we believe to be best, not in its consequences but as fitting into our policy or ideal, is within our power and opposed to our inclination, the experience which we have is a sense of duty.

As has often been pointed out, we use the term "duty" and other similar terms like "ought" and "obligation" in more than one sense. For example, when in a particular situation I am trying to discover

what my duty is, I am thinking of what is called my objective duty, that is, the act which would be the initiation of what is in fact the best or most fitting state of affairs in the circumstances. Duty in this sense is what I should recognize as best, if my knowledge of the circumstances and of the consequences of my action were entirely accurate, and if my insight into human nature and what it requires for its satisfaction were entirely adequate. It is what an omniscient and perfectly enlightened human being would regard as his duty. But I have complete knowledge neither of the facts of the objective situation nor of what my own nature requires for its satisfaction; and, for either or both of these reasons, I may make a mistake as to what my duty in this objective sense is. I may believe that something is my duty which in fact is not objectively best in the situation.

Now what I believe to be my objective duty is called my subjective duty; and my subjective duty is my actual duty here and now. What I believe to be objectively best is my operative ideal whose claim I recognize as binding on me. The difference between these two senses of duty is seen in the statement, "It is my duty to do what I believe to be my duty, even if I believe wrongly." In the first case duty means actual or subjective duty, whereas in the second case it means objective duty. So far I am glad to be able to claim the support of Sir David Ross, as against the position, which he once took and which others still take, that objective duty is actual duty; and, therefore, I do not propose to argue the question or to call attention to the paradoxes to which the latter position leads.

What I want to suggest is rather that both the meanings of duty, which we have so far considered and which are the only meanings which Ross recognizes, while quite normal and legitimate meanings of the term, are really elliptical and give us only one of the conditions which a dutiful act must satisfy. It is true that no act which does not satisfy this condition, that is, no act which does not aim at producing what is believed to be objectively best or to be objective duty, is a dutiful act; but an act may satisfy this condition and not be a dutiful act.

Moreover, it is true that, when I want to do my duty and am trying to discover what my duty is, this is the important condition; because in these circumstances the other condition, namely, the desire to do my duty and to do it because it is my duty, is normally satisfied. I am then, under the influence of the sense of duty, trying to discover the state of affairs which is objectively best and which my act should aim at initiating. This side of duty is the only one that can be seen by the external observer. It is the outward and visible side of duty, the side of duty with which alone the law is concerned, because it alone

can be enforced. But the act of duty has also an inner and spiritual side. It is the expression of a state of mind which is open only to the introspection of the agent. This side is what distinguishes an act from an event or occurrence which may also be the initiation of a state of affairs.

So much is common ground. It is also common ground that acts of duty are not only the expressions of states of mind but that they are consciously directed to ends. They are done with intentions and from motives. Where differences of opinion arise is when we ask what elements in these states of mind are included in the act of duty, in the sense of being relevant when we ask the question, "Have I done my duty?" Ross now admits, as we saw, that my *belief* as to what I ought to do is relevant. This is involved in his accepting the view that subjective duty is actual duty. Moreover, in reply to the criticism that his earlier view reduced the act of duty to an event or an occurrence, the initiation of a state of affairs, he admits the relevance of a further element in the agent's state of mind, namely, his *intention*. He points out that the act of duty is an intentional act, an act in which I consciously set myself to initiate a state of affairs. Accordingly, Ross's latest view admits that, when we are considering whether a person has done his duty, it is relevant to consider his belief and his intention; but he still denies that it is relevant to consider his motive; and he holds that, as long as the state of affairs intended by him is the same, the agent's act is the same whatever the motive.

This still seems to me unsatisfactory; and I would suggest that the line of argument which has led Ross to include belief and intention in the act of duty makes it necessary to include motive as well. It is, no doubt, true that it is difficult to get any satisfactory and generally accepted line of demarcation between motive and intention. The intention is sometimes said to be the foreseen consequences, the motive those of the foreseen consequences for the sake of which the action is done. At other times, the intention is said to be the nearer and the motive the more remote foreseen consequences. In either of these senses it is difficult to see why the intention and not the motive should be included in the act of duty. Sometimes, however, by motive is meant an emotion or feeling or desire, and then different considerations arise. But without going into these questions, we may for the present confine our attention to one motive—the sense of duty. If we consider a situation in which X which it is within my power to produce is right (i.e. my objective duty), Ross would describe my sense of duty, or my sense that X is my duty, as the belief (or recognition) that X is right, together with the desire to do X which this produces in me. If there is no such belief (or recognition) on my part, it is not my subjective or actual duty to do X. If with

this belief I do X which is an intentional act, I do it believing it to be right or my duty, that is, I do it as my duty. If, however, I do X, not as right or as my duty, but as the cause of Y, my act is a different act even if to the outside observer it appears the same; and I have not done my duty. If, for example, I pay a man ten pounds which I owe him as the payment of a debt, believing it to be right or my duty to do so, I have done one act; and I have done my duty. If, on the other hand, I pay the same ten pounds to the same man, to whom I owe it, not as the payment of a debt or a duty but as a means of inducing him to gamble, I have done a different act; and I have not done my duty. In other words, in order that I may be said to do my duty I must do the act which I believe to be my duty, as my duty, and not as a means to something else. If I do not believe an act to be my duty, I have no subjective or actual duty; and if I do not do it recognizing it to be what it is (i.e. my duty), I have not done my duty.

If an agent initiates a series of events or occurrences A, B, C, D, E, etc. the only way in which we can discover which of these are included in his act is by considering his state of mind at the time. His act may be A or B or C or D, etc. If I set myself to press the trigger of a rifle believing that it is not loaded, my act is A—pressing the trigger of a rifle. If I set myself to do A knowing that the rifle is loaded, my act is B—firing a rifle. If I set myself to do B believing that it will kill a man, my act is C—killing a man. If I set myself to do C believing that the man is a traitor, my act is D—killing a traitor. If I set myself to do D believing that it is right to kill a traitor, my act is E—an act of duty. From the point of view of the external observer, all these acts may be regarded as the same act, that is, the initiation of the same state of affairs, but from the point of view of the agent, the only point of view relevant to morality, each is a different act.

Now it seems to me that the minimum on which we can pass moral judgement is a whole act, that is, the initiation of the whole series of events foreseen by the agent. In the whole dutiful act in this sense there must be included the motive as well as the belief and intention. This I shall call the full sense of duty, as distinct from what I have called the elliptical sense. The latter is also a normal and legitimate sense, but it gives only one of the conditions which the complete act of duty must satisfy. The other condition which is equally necessary is that the act should be done from a sense of duty, that is, recognized as my duty and done for that reason.

The point on which I differ from Ross in this connexion may seem only a question of the use of the term "duty," but I think it is a great deal more. It is a question of the grounds on which we pass moral judgement. Even if there is a sense in which we might say that the

act irrespective of motive is right, I don't think we can say that it is morally right, as Ross does. Only the whole act, including motive, seems to me a proper subject of moral predicates of any kind; and an act done as my duty and the same act (i.e. the initiation of the same state of affairs) done for some other reason is not the same act, in any sense that is relevant for morality.

Duty in the full sense of the term seems to me to mean at least the minimum response to a situation that is required from a moral agent. I do not say it is all that is required of a moral agent (i.e., the ideal response of a moral agent) because, according to a commonly accepted sense of the term duty, it is my duty, e.g., to be just but not to be generous. Duty in this sense is what others have a right to expect of me; and, therefore, duties are roughly correlative with rights. If, however, we use the term duty, as we sometimes do, to mean the ideal response of a moral agent to a situation (or all that I should demand of myself) it may include more than others have a right to expect of me. For example, I may consider it my duty to forgive injuries, but others have no right to expect me to do so.

Now Ross refuses to accept either of these senses of duty (as either the minimum response that I can make to a situation and be moral or the ideal response of a moral agent) when he refuses to regard motive as part of the dutiful act. But both seem to me to be not only senses in which we regularly use the word but perfectly legitimate senses. Why then does Ross take the opposite view? He admits that there are certain facts, the natural interpretation of which seems to be that it is my duty not only to do a certain act but also to do it from a certain motive. "Suppose," he writes, "that a certain man pays a debt, but does it not from a sense of justice but solely in order to avoid a legal action against him; or suppose that he does it in order to tempt his creditor to reckless speculation with the money repaid; it seems natural to say that such a man has not done what he ought; that in the first case he has not done what he was obliged to do, and that in the second case he has done what he was definitely obliged not to do." (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 115.) Here the natural interpretation seems to be that I have not done my duty unless my motive is good as well as my act directed to bringing about that which is right. But Ross rejects this interpretation of the facts on the ground that it leads to certain awkward consequences. It is these consequences and these alone which lead him to reject the natural interpretation of the facts illustrated in the example which I have quoted from him.

I want to suggest (1) that if we distinguish between the different senses of duty which I have mentioned, and grant one further condition, these awkward consequences do not in fact follow; and (2) that still more awkward consequences follow from Ross's own

view that I have done my whole[1] duty if I have done the act which is my duty, even if I have done it from a bad motive. The chief of these is that, according to his view, I can be said to have done my whole duty in cases in which my acts in doing it are not merely valueless but morally reprehensible. With his usual candour Ross admits this consequence, but it seems to him less serious than those which seem to him to follow from making it my duty to act from a motive. What, then, are these awkward consequences? Ross mentions two.

The first is based on the generally accepted principle that "I ought implies I can," and that, therefore, it is never my duty to do what is impossible. Now at a given moment I either have a given motive or I don't have it; and if I don't have it I cannot call it into existence at a moment's notice by an act of will. Therefore, if I haven't got it, it cannot be my duty to act from it here and now.

With this argument I am in entire agreement (though I believe that in the process of deliberation we can at times influence our potential motives or even produce new ones), but what precisely does it prove in the present connexion? Nothing at all, it seems to me. For according to Ross's own theory, in any circumstances in which I have an actual duty I have the best of motives for doing it, namely, the sense of duty, which he himself rightly regards as the highest moral motive. His own description of the sense of duty is (1) the belief that a certain act is my duty (i.e., objective duty), together with (2) the desire, strong or weak, which this produces in me to do the act. I think that Ross would admit that where (1) is present (2) follows. Indeed he often uses the term "sense of duty" of (1) alone.

Now, we already saw that my actual duty here and now is my subjective duty, i.e., to do what I believe to be my objective duty. Unless, therefore, I have the belief that X is my duty I have no actual duty to do X. But if I have such a belief, I have a sense that it is my duty to do X. So that in any case in which I have an actual or subjective duty I have a sense of duty; and, therefore, it is not necessary for me by an act of will to produce a motive from which to act. The motive sense of duty is there already.

But Ross's argument seems to imply that, even if the sense of duty (or any other motive) is present, it may not be strong enough to stimulate me to action; and that if it isn't I cannot by an act of will so strengthen it as to make it prevail; so that it may remain a potential and not become an actual motive at all. That, in fact, is the position which Ross as a consistent determinist is bound to take,

[1] It is true that Ross admits (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 112) that the man who does his duty from a bad motive has not performed the whole duty of man: he has failed to do one of his most important duties, that of cultivating in himself the sense of duty. But that refers to the man's past. His whole duty here and now is to do an act irrespective of motive.

and when we combine with this position the principle that it is never my duty to do what is impossible, the conclusion follows that it is never my duty to act from a sense of duty (or from any other potential motive). This conclusion, however, follows not from the principle "I ought implies I can" but from that principle combined with the assumption of determinism; and to deny the conclusion it is enough to deny one of the premises. I am not, of course, going to discuss the question of freedom and determinism here; but the assumption of freedom in the sense of freedom called "the freedom of open alternatives" is the one condition which I referred to above as necessary, if the awkward consequences to which Ross has called attention are not to follow from the position which I am defending. For the minimum of such freedom which has ever been claimed by its defenders is freedom to make or not to make the effort of will required so to strengthen the sense of duty, when it is weak, as to enable it to prevail over other potential motives, that is, freedom to make or not to make the effort required to turn the potential motive sense of duty into an actual motive. Granted such freedom, there is nothing in Ross's first argument to prevent motive from being regarded as a part of duty. For whenever we have an actual duty the sense of duty is there to act as a motive. If, therefore, it is always possible for me by an effort of will to turn this potential motive into an actual motive, it is possible for me not only to do the act which is my duty but to do it from a sense of duty.

Ross's second argument to prove that it cannot be my duty to act from a motive applies only to the motive sense of duty. It runs as follows. If I say "It is my duty to act from a sense of duty" and make my statement definite, I find that it contradicts itself; and when I try to amend my statement so as to avoid the contradiction, the statement is found to involve an infinite regress. For it reads "It is my duty to do act X from the sense that it is my duty to do act X, from the sense that it is my duty to do act X, from the sense etc. . . . . ad infinitum." (*Foundations of Ethics*, pp. 117–18).

These difficulties, however, are based on the assumption that I am using the term "duty" in the same sense in the different parts of my statement, and they disappear if we distinguish between "my whole duty," "my subjective duty" and "my objective duty." For then the statement reads "It is my whole duty (i.e., what is morally required of me in the situation) to do my subjective duty (i.e., what I believe to be my objective duty) from the sense (i.e., my motive for doing it being the sense) that it is my objective duty." Here there is neither contradiction nor infinite regress but the simple statement that it is my duty to do what I believe to be right because[1] I believe

[1] "Because" here gives not my reason for believing it to be right but my motive for doing it.

it to be right. To recognise the distinctions mentioned above is only to carry one step further the line of argument used by Ross himself when he accepts the view that the belief of the agent enters into the act of duty. That view, too, appears to give rise to a contradiction and would in fact do so, if we were using the term "duty" in one sense only; as, for example, in the statement "It is my duty to do what I believe to be my duty." Ross avoids this contradiction by drawing a distinction between objective and subjective duty. A further distinction between these and whole duty avoids the contradiction to which he calls attention in the above argument.

The same distinction provides the answer to two other arguments which Ross puts forward in support of his view. (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 123.) In both of these arguments Ross is discussing considerations which arise when I am trying to discover what my duty is. He is, therefore, dealing with objective duty and easily shows that motive does not enter into the content of duty so understood. But if we make the distinction between objective duty and whole duty, we cannot argue from the fact that motive is not part of the former to the conclusion that it is not part of the latter, any more than we can argue, according to Ross's own doctrine, from the fact that belief is not part of objective duty to the conclusion that it is not part of subjective duty.

I conclude, therefore, that none of the awkward consequences that led Ross to reject the view that motive is a part of the dutiful act do in fact follow, provided only that man is free. Granted that proviso, we have no reason to reject what Ross himself regards as the natural interpretation of the facts, namely, that it is my duty not only to do a particular act but to do it from a sense of duty; and we are confirmed in this interpretation by the awkward consequence, already noted, which follows from the opposite view as worked out by Ross himself.

I want to conclude this paper by considering the relation of moral goodness to the dutiful act and to the ideal in the light of which we determine what our particular duties are, an ideal which I have hitherto described in non-moral terms. This ideal is usually called the moral ideal, and though, for reasons which I have already stated, I consider the description misleading I shall continue to use it. Moral goodness seems to me to stand in a quite different relation to this ideal from that in which other goods stand to it. Moral goodness is not something at which we aim directly, though we may aim at conditions which facilitate it. It is rather something which finds expression or is manifested in our pursuit of other goods. What is morally good is the good will, and the good will finds expression in the pursuit of the non-morally best, i.e. whatever is in the circumstances believed to be required by the good of the self as a whole.

If this is so, the dutiful act is good both in the moral and the non-moral sense. It is in fact the meeting point of the non-morally best, the good of the self as a whole, and the good will which alone is morally good and which alone is good in every context. The act of duty is directed towards or aims at producing the former; and it is an expression of the latter. It aims at initiating the state of affairs which is right or fitting—a state of affairs which is the best in the circumstances but the non-morally best; and it aims at initiating it from a sense of duty and so is morally good.

Such a reading of the situation seems to me not only to account for the main facts of the moral life in a way which avoids the difficulties and paradoxes of many other theories. It even helps us to see the sources of these difficulties and paradoxes. In the first place, it enables us to avoid the vicious circle which has often been pointed out in the teaching of Kant and Green and many idealists who hold that the object of the good will is the good will, or, as it is sometimes put, that the moral ideal is the pursuit of the moral ideal. As against this position, I suggest that the good will finds expression in the pursuit of non-moral goods, when these are pursued because they are best in the circumstances. There is a sense in which it is our duty to be morally good, but we cannot be morally good in the abstract. To be morally good is to perform our particular duties in the spirit of duty. In other words, to be morally good is to manifest a good will; and a good will is manifested in setting oneself to initiate the particular state of affairs which here and now seems best, in the sense of being what the moral ideal or the good of the self as a whole here and now requires. It may be an act of kindness, the fulfilment of a promise, the pursuit of knowledge, the relief of distress, the production of beauty, or whatever else the ideal here and now requires. Moreover, the good will does not derive its goodness from the particular goods or ends at which it aims but rather from its own nature as being the conscious pursuit of the best. But it is its nature to try to realize particular ends, though not as such but as the expression of the ideal.

In the second place, this view gives to moral goodness the unique position claimed for it by the moral consciousness and by most ethical writers. For, according to it, moral goodness not being part of the end aimed at, but rather realized in the pursuit of the end, does not come into conflict with other goods. We are not called upon to choose between the pursuit of knowledge or beauty or pleasure and moral goodness or virtue. We are called upon to choose between the different non-moral goods, that is, to choose between the different goods other than virtue or moral goodness; and when we choose whichever is best, and pursue it for that reason, we realize or express our moral goodness in the pursuit, and the pursuit is morally good.

There are, in fact, no duties which are not moral duties but there are no duties which are merely moral duties, that is, duties to be moral and nothing more. Our moral duties are also duties to do particular acts. This explains why a theory, like the New Intuitionism, which insists on comparing moral goodness with other forms of goodness, as if we had to choose between the different kinds, gets into the paradoxical situations to which Ross calls attention (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 284) but from which on his theory we cannot escape. The paradoxes arise from the fact that, according to such a theory, it is legitimate to ask such questions as "whether in any given situation it is rather our duty to promote some good moral activity or some good intellectual activity in ourselves." On the view which I am defending such a question is not legitimate. For, if in any given situation it is my duty to promote some good intellectual activity, it is my moral duty to do so; and, therefore, in promoting the good intellectual activity I am in the same act promoting a good moral activity. So that there can be no conflict between the two. The alternatives with which actual life presents us are, for example, between a good intellectual activity and doing an act of kindness or a piece of social service or taking a rest in the interests of our health. The alternatives are never between any of these and doing our moral duty. If in the circumstances it is best or right that I should engage in some intellectual activity, then it is my moral duty to do so; and the other so-called duties are not my actual duties at all but what would be my duties, if the circumstances were different and if it were not here and now my duty to engage in intellectual activity.

It seems to me no small advantage of the theory I am advocating that it saves us from unreal paradoxes of this kind, paradoxes which arise from theories which regard moral goodness as one among several goods between which we may be called on to choose. According to such theories, moral goodness must be comparable, if not even commensurable, with other goods; and yet the deliverance of the moral consciousness compels them to regard it as "infinitely superior" to all other goods. The present theory takes the view that no conflicts between moral goodness and other goods arise; so that no choice or comparison between it and them is necessary. It is good in a different sense or a good of a different order from all other goods.

In the third place, this theory enables us to reconcile two convictions of the moral consciousness which many theories seem to find in conflict. The one is that in the good life there are other goods besides moral goodness, that it includes, for example, such goods as knowledge, aesthetic experience, happiness, friendship, etc. The other is that morality is concerned with the whole of life and has jurisdiction over all of it. According to the present theory, moral

goodness and these other goods enter into the good life in different ways and not only do not conflict but are necessary to one another. The latter are the ends to which it is directed, the former is realized in the pursuit of them. On the other hand, in any set of circumstances there is something that is right or best, and the good will is revealed in the pursuit of that, whatever in detail it happens to be; so that there is no situation in which the good will cannot be realized, because there is none in which moral considerations are irrelevant.

In the fourth place, in the conception of the moral ideal as the conceived good of the self as a whole, this theory provides a unitary principle for the determination of our duties; and at the same time it leaves room for progress in the moral life; for, according to it, we are in the moral life engaged, in the spirit of adventure and experiment, on a task which can never be completed.

And, finally, it enables us to account for and understand the enormous differences between the things which different men and different nations at different stages in human history have regarded as good, and pursued in the confident belief that they were right, and in the no less confident belief that in pursuing them they were themselves being morally good—facts which are difficult to reconcile with the intuitionist theory.

BUDDHA AS A REVOLUTIONARY FORCE IN INDIAN CULTURE

Professor A. R. WADIA

Few people would care to deny, whether within India or without, that Buddha is the greatest Indian of all times. Whether from the standpoint of the purity of his life, the daring originality and novelty of his thought, or the extent of his influence in shaping the culture of the world, it would be hard to beat the record of Buddha. Even making every allowance for the common idea that no man is a prophet in his own land, it is difficult to believe that for the last thousand years Buddha has been practically an exile from the land of his birth. It is nothing short of an irony of history, and nothing short of a tragedy for India, that the great unifying force that he represented in his time and does represent even to-day has been allowed to run waste and the great moral stamina that he sought to supply failed in its historic mission.

It is the purpose of this essay to study this irony of history and to explain it in terms of the paradox that Buddha was too un-Indian for his thought to take root in India; in short, that his thought was so revolutionary that it came to be accepted for a time only by compromising with his fundamental ideas and sometimes even by giving them up altogether. And a time came in the history of Buddhism in India when the inner decay synchronized with the environmental forces, and a strangling of Buddhism in India became inevitable.

The history of every religion goes to show a certain continuity of thought, and the greatest prophets have come not so much as revolutionaries but as reformers. Zoroaster in ancient Iran claimed to revive the old faith in Ahura Mazda as the one and only God. The Old Testament goes to show how every Hebrew prophet only claims to protest against the worship of the false gods that had been insidiously corroding the life of the Israelites, and to lead them back again to the pure worship of Jahweh. Even Christ did not disclaim his Hebrew heritage. He was well versed in the Prophets and could quote them to justify his own teaching. He was conscious of his historic position when he frankly proclaimed: "I have come to fulfil, not to destroy." Mahomed the Arab drew his religious inspiration from the Jews and the Christians and the Zoroastrians. His teaching did mark a total revolt against the old Arabian paganism, but he could establish his religion in Arabia only by adapting his new religion to some of the old customs of Arabia. The sanctity of

the Kaaba, the limitation of polygamy to four wives, the continuance of slavery, the maintenance of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca are some of the features of Islam rooted in the history of pre-Islamic Arabia, and are intelligible only in the light of this history.

So too with Buddha. He was born a Hindu in the Kshatriya caste. He inherited the old belief in the doctrine of Karma and the transmigration of souls: the two main ideas on which he raised the superstructure of his own philosophy.

He accepted in a naive fashion the popular ideas of heavens and hells and gods, but without attaching the slightest importance to them. In fact, if any great teacher can be charged with agnosticism, not with definite atheism, it is Buddha. Whether he was the founder of a religion or of a philosophy is a vexed question and it turns very much on what exactly we mean by religion and philosophy. If by religion we mean faith in some power beyond us and a certain number of dogmas to be accepted as revealed truths, Buddha was certainly not the founder of a religion, though in subsequent centuries his followers did deify him and dogmatically accepted his dicta as unchallengeable truths. Buddhism did become a religion but this was the work of his followers, not of Buddha himself. He certainly sought to preach his own doctrines logically and as pure rationalism, and so he was certainly the founder of a philosophical system.

His early upbringing was on normal orthodox lines. By every law of psychology and eugenics he should have grown up a normal orthodox Hindu, but by all the undiscovered laws of the psychology of genius he did not. Through his own efforts he outgrew the limitations of his own education and attained Enlightenment and became the Buddha, a great thinker, but also a great rebel in the cultural history of India.

I

We shall now proceed to bring out the revolutionary nature of Buddha's teaching. The flame of the torch he lighted flickered and shone at times with intensity in India till it passed on its light to Eastern Asia, but died out in its own homeland. All his main teachings went against the grain of Hindu psychology and so could not take an abiding root in India.

(1) Orthodox Hinduism ultimately rests on the divine authority of the Vedas. In the last resort the *Śabda pramāṇa*—the authority of revelation as in the Vedas—is the basis of Hindu religion and of Hindu philosophy as well. Though a few thinkers may have tried to be purely logical in their arguments, at one stage or another they

would bring in the authority of the Vedas as the final rounding up of their logical conclusions. Even the Upanishads, which are so markedly different from the Vedas in their method and in their contents, are looked upon as a part of the Vedas. An orthodox Hindu expects every non-Hindu to take this at its face value, when it is not difficult to see that the Upanishads themselves have effected a silent revolution against the whole naive mentality of the Vedas. All the best systems of Hindu thought seek to establish themselves on the safe rocks of the Authorities, even when the original authors of the Authorities would not be able to recognize their own thought in the subtle commentaries of the philosophers, who are afraid to emphasize and proclaim openly the novelty of their own thought. Not so Buddha. From the very beginning he struck the note of revolt when he repudiated all authority and all traditions. In the *Aṅguttara* he is reported to have said: "Do not accept what you hear by report; do not accept tradition; do not accept a statement because it is found in our books, nor because it is in accord with your belief, nor because it is the saying of your teacher."[1] Buddha throws a heavy responsibility on his hearers when he expects them to think for themselves, when it is ever so much easier to quote some authority and avoid the trouble of thinking. The subsequent history of Buddhism shows how difficult this advice was found to be, and Buddhism itself became a mass of authority hardly distinguishable in its method from the orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy. In fact in this respect the Buddhism of the Buddhists marks a distinct reversion to the type of thought typically Indian.

(2) More than any other people in the world the Hindus are metaphysical. The Hindu mind revels in the subtleties of logic within the framework of the Authorities, and is never so happy as in discussing metaphysical problems, even though such discussions involve merely endless discussions of the original authorities. Oddly enough Buddha was not a Hindu enough to be interested in metaphysical questions. But his immediate environment was Hindu to the core, and his immediate followers were Hindus by birth with centuries of metaphysics ingrained in their blood. Their mind could not rest content without probing into the ultimate mysteries of the universe. They would go to Buddha as their ancestors had gone to the Upanishadic seers, but Buddha was no Janaka or Yājñavalkya. The metaphysical inquirers got a cold douche: "Of what use are these questions? How do they make a man more moral? How do they help a man to gain salvation (nirvāṇa)?" And so the Enlightened One brushed aside these inquiries as we tend to brush aside our children's perplexing queries, however natural they be. Buddha aimed at being scientific and precise, and preferred to have his feet

[1] As abridged by Pratt on p. 15 of his *Pilgrimage of Buddhism*.

on the terra firma of his own experience. Hence the great paradox that in the nation of metaphysicians its greatest teacher was content to be a non-metaphysician.

(3) The Vedas sing of gods, some intrinsically good and righteous, but all of them mighty, all of them liable to be cajoled through prayers, and at times even made subservient through the magical force of incantations, and *tapas* or ascetic religious devotion. Orthodox Hinduism, especially of the teeming masses, is inconceivable without its gods and goddesses, its temples and its priests. But now comes Buddha and he makes light work of all these mighty gods and goddesses: Do they exist at all: Indra with his Apsarases, the Asvins and the Maruts, Aditi and the Ādityas? Perhaps they do! Buddha is not concerned to deny their existence. So far as his recorded assertions are concerned, he cannot be said to have been a confirmed atheist. Perhaps he may be better described as an agnostic. Their existence or non-existence does not interest him, for man's salvation does not depend on them. For him man is literally the architect of his own fortune and in his last address to his disciples he boldly proclaimed: "Therefore be ye islands unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge unto yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as an island (of security). Look not for shelter to any one besides yourselves." If this was Buddha's teaching, what need was there to bother about the existence or non-existence of gods? Perhaps there is an element of exaggeration when Dahlke declares that "Buddhism stands in opposition to all other religions without distinction, in that these are only differently moulded forms of belief; it alone is unbelief, given a habitation and a name."[1] It is an exaggeration, because it is a case not so much of unbelief as of indifference. This attitude of indifference is reduced to a *reductio ad absurdum* in a later Buddhistic legend when the idols of Indra and Shiva and other gods are represented as leaving their pedestals to bow before the Buddha! It is open to anyone to conclude that gods that can bow before mortals cease to be gods. But it is also possible to conclude that the superiority of Buddha is brought out all the more effectually when the gods are not denied their existence, but are shorn of all their pride and glory.

A religion without a god is an impossibility, and if in theistic India Buddhism was to have any place at all, it had to develop into a religion, and it did so not by reinstating the old Vedic gods, but by creating a brand new god in Buddha himself. The deification of Buddha finds no justification in the life or teaching of Buddha himself. But the logic of religion necessitated this transformation when the human process of venerating the mortal relics of Buddha, his teeth and his bones, blossomed forth into Mahāyāna Buddhism It

[1] *Buddhist Essays*, p. 358.

means that the Buddhists lost faith in their own self-help, and in the agony of their helpless souls deified Buddha, raised colossal statues to him and bowed down before them to secure his grace. There was a certain logic in this process. The man that had taken birth an endless number of times as a Bodhisattva just to help, not merely human beings, but even hares and tigers and lions, cannot be looked upon as having lost all that old spirit of helpfulness merely because he had become a Buddha. Surely a Buddha should be more powerful and influential than a mere Bodhisattva. If so, what can be more natural than to pray to that unseen Buddha, made visible through the genius of painters and sculptors? And so the world has witnessed the most wonderful phenomenon in the history of religion: the transformation of the agnostic Buddhism of Buddha into the full-blooded theism of the Mahāyāna Buddhists. Buddhism has become a religion of deliverance: the Buddhist ceased to be a lamp unto himself. It was Buddha himself that had to be a lamp to all the world, to be the refuge of the ill and the suffering. Buddha the man of love and mercy became the god of love and mercy.

It remains an open question how long agnostic Buddhism could have survived. But through its theistic transformation it certainly gained a fairly long lease of life in India, and has survived as a vital force till this day in the lands of the rising sun. The humming of *OM MANI PADME OM* by the Buddhist monks makes us alive to the fact that Buddhism still lives, and in it the man Buddha, who was perhaps the greatest single force to free man from the fear of the gods. Even his erstwhile enemies, the orthodox Hindus, tried to make peace with him by honouring him as an *avatar* of Vishnu, but not to be worshipped. In the temple at *Gayā* and the rock-cut temples at Ajanta, bells rang and litanies were sung before the images of Buddha, but that was a thousand years ago. To-day the bats in their love for darkness haunt those sacred places, and the tourist pays his casual visit and wonders at the glory that was Buddha, at the nothingness that is Buddha in India to-day. Was this the Nirvāṇa that the Master hunted for through countless centuries of births and deaths? Anyway, through his beautiful images he seems to smile in benignity at the follies of men, who deified him against his will and clear teaching, and have now left him to the company of bats and the assiduous solicitude of the archaeologists.

(4) Ascetics have a tremendous fascination for the orthodox Hindu mind. The power of the *tapas* (austerities) and the wonders it can bring about even to the extent of making the gods in their heavens tremble with fright are all a part and parcel of the religious folklore of India. The ascetics are still a power in this ancient land of ours. The Vedic age was much nearer to the time of Buddha than it is to us. No wonder if even he felt the lure of asceticism and tried

to win his way to Enlightenment through the most austere practices that he could think of. The result, however, was a tremendous disappointment and is graphically described by Buddha himself:

> "I remember when a crab-apple was my only daily food. I remember when a single grain of rice was my only daily food. And by only partaking of a single grain of rice a day as my food, my body became extremely thin and lean; like dried-up withered reeds became my arms and legs; my hips like a camel's hoof; like a pleat of hair my spine. As project the rafters of a house's roof, so raggedly stuck out my ribs. As in a deep-lying brook the watery mirror beneath appears so small as almost to disappear, so the deep hollows of my eye-pits, my eye-balls, wellnigh wholly dis appeared. As a gourd becomes shrivelled up and hollow in the hot sun, so did the skin of my head become parched and withered. And pressing my stomach, my hand touched my spine, and feeling my spine, my hand felt through to the stomach in front. And when I rubbed my limbs, the hair upon them came out rotten at the roots. And yet with all this rigorous mortification I came no jot nearer to the rich supernatural felicity of clearness of knowledge."

It would be hard to beat such a wonderful word-picture. If, however, a man is so dense as not to be able to visualize what Buddha must have looked like after this diet of a single grain of rice a day, he has only to visit the museum at Lahore, and he will see there a small statue of emaciated Buddha, which must have been inspired by this wonderful word-picture of the Master himself.

Buddha was disillusioned by this extreme type of asceticism. It paved the way for his immortal discovery of the Middle Path, the beauty of the golden mean: neither too much nor too little. But he did not fail to grasp one important truth which underlies every ascetic endeavour: that it is a means to self-discipline, and to that extent it is a means of training the body to serve the higher purposes of the spirit. In one place he says: "Though my body is sick, my mind shall not be sick! Thus must you train yourself." Asceticism of the right kind is an attempt to conquer our lower self: "If one man conquer in battle a thousand times a thousand men, and if another conquers himself, he is the greatest of conquerors." "A knife, if it be caught by the blade, cuts the hand. Asceticism wrongly practised leads to the downward path," and so says Buddha: "I preach asceticism inasmuch as I preach the burning away of all conditions of the heart that are evil. One who so does is a true ascetic." And so in the *Dhammapada* the Bhikshu is thus described:

> "Restraint in the eye is good, good is the restraint in the ear, in the nose restraint is good, good is restraint in the tongue. In the

body restraint is good, and good is restraint in speech, in thought restraint is good, good is restraint in all things. A Bhikshu, restrained in all things, is freed from all pain. He who controls his hand, he who controls his feet, he who controls his speech, he who is well controlled, he who delights inwardly, who is collected, who is solitary and content, him they call Bhikshu. . . .

Let him live in charity, let him be perfect in his duties; then in the fullness of delight he will make an end of suffering."[1]

There are indeed certain passages in the *Dhammapada* which hover dangerously near a certain type of selfishness, may be enlightened selfishness, but selfishness all the same. The fact that Buddha did not write set essays, but propounded his teaching in the form of dialogues and parables, is apt to make for some apparent inconsistencies, such as we find in Plato's *Dialogues*. But in all such cases we have to look to the general spirit of a particular master's teaching, and in Buddha's case there can be no possible getting over the fact that his first and foremost interest was morality. Morality is essentially social, it can have no meaning for the solitary recluse, and this we find confirmed by the beautiful statement of Buddha: "The odour of flowers travels not against the wind, nor that of the sandal, nor the fragrant powder of frankincense or jasmine. But the sweet odour of good men travels with the wind and against it." We shall bring this out all the more clearly when we come to speak of Buddha's Ethics.

(5) Much as Buddha wished to avoid metaphysics, he could not completely do so, and we find this in his somewhat negative doctrine of self: *anatta*. That man has an immortal soul is one of the cardinal principles of all great religions. The Upanishadic doctrine of *Ātman* implies some sort of entity which does not die with the physical body, but which has the power of being reborn in other physical bodies. The nature of this rebirth is governed by one's past actions: as a man sows so must he reap. The Zoroastrian eschatology of heaven and hell has been borrowed by the Jews and Christians and the Muslims alike. The Vedic eschatology also provides for a *svarga* (heaven) and *naraka* (hell). But by the time of the Upanishads the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul came to be well established. The Upanishadic seers were alive to the sense of suffering and they sought a way out of this cycle of births and deaths. They proceeded on the assumption that there is an entity called an individual *ātman* which in the last analysis is identical with the ultimate *Ātman*. And when this identity is realized whether through jñāna (knowledge) or karma (actions) or bhakti (prayers and devotion), the travail of the individual soul or *ātman* is ended and there is *Moksha* (salvation).

[1] Max-Müller's translation.

Buddha accepted the idea of rebirth and it was open to him to follow the beaten path of accepting the soul entity as well. But he was nothing if not original and even revolutionary. Buddha in his attempt to avoid metaphysics tries to give a purely psychological account of self. He accepts the old Upanishadic account of the five *khandhas* ("aggregates of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us"[1]) comprising body, feeling, conceptual knowledge, *sankhāras* ("synthetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts"[2]), and lastly consciousness. Over and above all this is *taṇhā* or craving, which leads to actions, and the results of these actions are stored up as individual *karma*[3] and lead to rebirths. That the quality of rebirth is moral in the last resort there can be no question. But that this rebirth is not of an entity but of *karma* is the novel feature of Buddha's teaching. If it is argued that a continuity of births must necessarily imply the continuity of an entity we are confronted with the analogy of a torch lighting other torches or of a river flowing continuously, though the water is continually changing. So too, it is asserted, a man's *karma* determines the body it builds up for its abode. Buddha was conscious of the difficulty of making others grasp his meaning. "This *dhamma* is profound," says he, "recondite, hard to comprehend, rare, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, only to be understood by the wise." And even the wise have found it a difficult knot to unravel. He is questioned on this by one wandering ascetic, Vaccha, and Buddha asks him whether he knows where the fire goes after it goes out—does it go east or west, north or south? Vaccha protests that the question is not fairly put, for the fire goes out when there is no more fuel to sustain it. And the Enlightened One takes him at his word and discourses: "Just in the same way, Vaccha, all things material—feelings, perceptions, forces, consciousness—everything by which the Arahant might be denoted, has passed away from him. Profound, measureless, unfathomable is the Arahant (finally emancipated) even as the mighty ocean, reborn does not apply to him nor not-reborn, nor any combination of such terms." We seem to be lost in the proverbial mazes of metaphysics. Individual *karma* in the sense of actions may be as fleeting and transient as the flame of a torch or the waters of a river, but if it has to bear fruit in a moral rebirth, it must have some sort of unity, the actions cannot all be hanging loose, for after all they are the actions

[1] Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 93. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

[3] It should perhaps be explained to the European reader that "karma" is the Indian (Hindu as well as Buddhist) technical term for the sum total of the individual's actions *plus* their particular and general consequences. It is a *collective* term, properly used only in the singular in this sense. When the plural is used at all (Sanskrit *karmāns*) it refers to any actions of an individual without the specific impute of *fateful* actions.—Ed.

of one and the same individual, whom in his fleeting existence we call Rama or Gopal, John or George. We may not be able to describe that unity in terms intelligible to all, for even the idea of an immortal soul or *ātman* is a hypothesis necessitated by the demands of our moral and social life. That is why scholars like Pratt and Stcherbatsky are driven by the logic of life to admit that some sort of unity must be presupposed, if the doctrine of transmigration is to have any meaning. Sir Charles Eliot finds in the doctrine of *anatta* "not a speculative proposition, nor a sentimental lament over the transitoriness of the world, but a basis for religion and morals. You will never be happy unless you realize that you can make and remake your own soul."[1] But in this very justification of *anatta*, which literally means "not oneself," Sir Charles has been constrained to use the word *soul*, and the question immediately arises: is soul a mere summation of actions or is it something organic which has the power of welding together these actions into a unified whole? And the question takes us back to where we started. One wonders whether Buddha was trying to play a joke upon his metaphysical countrymen in order to drive home to them the futility of metaphysics. But one thing is certain that the whole idea of *karma* is central to his conception of self, and *karma* is to be understood only in terms of morality.

(6) A code of morality is a *sine qua non* for every society. No society can subsist without it. From this standpoint it would be foolish to deny to Hindu society the credit for a high code of morality. Yet in a sense it would not be incorrect to say that Hinduism does not allot to morality the same high place that theistic religions like Zoroastrianism, Christianity and Islam do. In the Vedantic schools the Hindu love of metaphysics is so dominant that morality as such finds a secondary place. It is forced to yield in importance sometimes to *jñāna* (knowledge), and sometimes to *bhakti* (prayer and devotion) and sometimes to *karma* in the sense of religious ritual. No student of Hindu culture can be blind to this fact. The Advaitin looks upon morality as phenomenal, as belonging to the world of *māyā* (appearance almost in the sense of illusion), and to the *jñānī*, who has attained perfection through knowledge, the moral distinctions between the good and evil come to be transcended. Hence the claim that some knaves do not hesitate to put forth that as they have attained *jñāna* or knowledge, they are above good and evil, which in plain language implies that they can literally take moral holidays, and can do whatever evil they like. It is, of course, a travesty of Advaita ethics, but as a bare fact it cannot be denied. Similarly, the Bhakti doctrine has often ended in erotic excesses, which are justified on the ground that the love of God purifies all relationships. This too

[1] *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. i, p. xxi.

may be a travesty, but as a bare fact of Hindu life it cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that so ritualistic a religion as Hinduism revels in ceremonies and measures the orthodoxy of a man in terms of the ceremonies he performs, not in terms of the good he does. Recently a case came to my notice where a man punctiliously has his cold-water bath early in the morning at four o'clock, spends two to three hours on religious ceremonies, and begins his worldly duties by beating his wife. He has now driven her away and married another without the slightest compunction. And he certainly passes for a pious man. This too may be a travesty of genuine morality, but unfortunately it is not uncommon. The *Bhagavadgītā* is usually regarded as the greatest book on Hindu Ethics, and yet it is much more metaphysical than ethical. The *Dharma Śāstras* are supposed to be moral treatises, and yet it is notorious that they are more legal codes than systems of pure morality.

It is necessary to mention all this, for only in the light of it can we be in a position to appreciate the real revolution sought to be effected by Buddha. The core of his philosophy is to be found in his sublime ethics revolving round the love of man, and in this respect he is perhaps the only great Indian teacher who has exalted morality above everything else. His example has indeed been followed by theistic teachers like Kabir and Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Gandhiji, all theists, but they can hardly be said to have had the same influence on the moral and religious life of the world that Buddha had.

As Buddha recognized no god, there is no room for ritualism in his ethics. His famous insistence on the Middle Path is a glorification of the golden mean in life. It expresses itself negatively in the five precepts: not to kill, not to steal, not to be unchaste, not to lie, and not to drink intoxicants. Positively it expresses itself in the Noble Eightfold Path, covering rightness in views, aspiration, speech, behaviour, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and concentration.

Attempts have been made indeed to show that his ethics is centred in his view of Nirvana, and that it is pessimistic in its endeavour to annihilate all craving. But these are attempts inspired by metaphysical motives. All such attempts, however, are doomed to failure, for nothing can tarnish the purity of Buddha's moral teaching. If we take away this teaching there remains really nothing worth treasuring in him. It is only in the light of his ethical teaching that we can ever hope to understand the abstruse portions of his psychology or of his metaphysics or whatever can be called metaphysics in his thought. Practically all the Jātaka stories seek to establish some moral principle. There is, for example, the parable of the quails and the fowler to show how the fowler was foiled in his work by the united cunning of the quails, but when they began to quarrel among themselves, the fowler has his chance and he could net them easily.

There is the story of how Dīghāvu reaped wealth and position by showing love to his enemy. And so it goes on birth after birth of the future Buddha, the very quintessence of morality. In spite of the intrinsic greatness of his teaching, for two centuries the Buddhists continued an obscure sect till the great Asoka felt its charm and made it a world movement. Asoka's edicts all go to show that what he valued most in Buddha's teaching was his emphasis on moral principles. The highest morality must always imply a love for others. That Buddha's ethics was not self-centred is abundantly proved by his historic life, even if we discard the tales of his previous births as mythological. He declared that he aimed at enlightenment not for his own sake but that he might enlighten others. The catholicity of his outlook has been equalled perhaps by Christ, but not surpassed by anyone. If there are a few passages here and there which point to the need of rooting out desires, let us not forget passages where he shows how "with the aid of craving does one eliminate craving." If Buddha taught an indiscriminate elimination of all desires, he should be held up as a dreamer ignorant of what life means or what morality means. But he was nothing of a mere dreamer. He knew that man does not and cannot live for himself. A man's love for his fellow-beings is the most redeeming feature of human life, and no teacher can claim to have probed the depths of humanity, who has not made this truth part and parcel of his own life and teaching. Buddha was among the earliest teachers of mankind to have mastered this truth, and in this sphere he reigns supreme with but few peers. There is no metaphysics about it, and if there is, it is possible to dissociate it for the purpose of appealing to the masses. The tone of high ethics that marked Buddha can be illustrated by nothing better than by his gentle, yet cutting, retort to the Brahmin that had come to abuse him.

BUDDHA: "When thou receivest visits from friends and colleagues, dost thou make food ready for them?"

BRAHMIN: "Yes, Master Gotama, sometimes I do."

BUDDHA: "But if they do not accept thy hospitality, whose do those things become?"

BRAHMIN: "If they do not accept them, those things are for us."

BUDDHA: "Even so, Brahmin. That wherewith thou revilest us, who revile not, wherewith thou scoldest us, who scold not, abusest us, who abuse not, that we accept not at thy hands. 'Tis for thee only, O Brahmin, only for thee."[1]

The atmosphere of good will and love that we find for all in the ethics of Buddha is something that we miss in the Hindu tales of the wrath of gods and cursing rishis, and the perpetual degradation of those people who had been reduced by the haughty Aryans to the

[1] Pratt's *Pilgrimage of Buddhism*, p. 11 footnote.

status of polluting Shūdras and Panchamas. This was the most revolutionary part of Buddha's teaching. If it had been accepted in its totality, India could have been a new country. But it was not to be, and India is what she is. Caste still rules. It has affected all who have come into touch with Hindus. Its unholy touch has corrupted every community in India, the Christians and the Muslims and the Zoroastrians not excepted.

(7) It has been a frequent charge against Buddhism that it overemphasizes sorrow and is therefore through and through pessimistic. That it is fully alive to the existence of sorrow and suffering cannot be gainsaid. Whether therefore it should be called pessimistic is an open question. In this respect it challenges comparison with Christianity. The religion of Christ too, at least as preached by missionaries, is acutely charged with a sense of sin, but Christ is presented as showing a way out of it, and if thereby Christianity can escape the charge of pessimism, the same logic must apply to Buddha, and he too must be absolved from the charge of pessimism, for he too shows the way out of the misery that is life. And here we come face to face with the most intriguing concept in Buddha: *Nirvāna.* If sorrow is the result of our attachments, and attachments lead to *karma* and *karma* leads to rebirths, it is surely a vicious circle to build up *karma* which can only end in rebirths. It is an easy temptation therefore to say that rebirths can end only with the cessation of *karma,* and therefore it is logical to put an end to *karma*—and the result would be *Nirvāna.* This easy path of interpretation has been followed and it has been argued that since life is evil, no-life or death must be good, and therefore cessation of life with no possibility of rebirth must be good, and this is what *Nirvāna* is made to mean: just nothingness, total extinction. If this interpretation is correct it exposes Buddha to a double criticism: (i) If the supreme end of life is no-life, or death without rebirth, what is the worth of morality? It may at best alleviate sorrow, it cannot extinguish it and therefore it only leads to a mere protraction of life and therefore of sorrow. If therefore in spite of this Buddha exhorts people to follow the Noble Eightfold Path, he is recommending a cure which protracts the disease of sorrow instead of curing it. (ii) If the end of life is nothingness, mere extinction, Buddhism must be dismissed as an essentially negative creed. How can anyone be content with the contemplation of so negative an end?

These two criticisms are mutually destructive, but each of them taken by itself has some point in it. It is doubtful if any person who sees any good in life will ever be content with the total annihilation of it. If life is partly evil, our moral practices should rid it of evil and make life worth living. The possibility of this negatives the fundamental assumption that life is wholly evil. Could so great a

teacher as Buddha have been guilty of so palpable a contradiction? The only solution of this impasse is to retrace our steps and restate the problem in its proper perspective. Both quantitatively and qualitatively Buddha's teaching is so charged with morality that we must make it the basic point in our examination of his philosophy. If we are exhorted to be moral, surely it must be for the good of mankind. It certainly makes life worth living, and gives a certain positive content to it, and to that extent it cannot all be *duḥkha*: sorrow and suffering. If morality implies an assertion of life, the end of morality cannot be something negative; it must be positive, and since Nirvāna is promised as the fruition of good life, Nirvāna itself must be positive, and not negative. It cannot be so negative as the complete extinction of life. This is just the conclusion which forces itself on a dispassionate student of Buddha's teaching. He himself has said: "The destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, the destruction of illusion—this, O friend, is what is called *Nibbāna.*" [1] The Buddhist formulation of Nirvāna emphasizes the consciousness that "birth is at an end, that the higher life has been fulfilled, that all that should be done has been done, and that after this present life there will be no more becoming." So Nirvāna does imply extinction, not of life, but of lust, ill-will, ignorance, anger, fear, and everything that makes life a burden. He who has attained this state is an *Arahant*, he has attained *Nirvāna*. The *Arahant* may go to heaven or not, that is a matter of very secondary importance, if of any importance at all. Mrs. Rhys Davids, one of the most outstanding European scholars in the field of Buddhism, analyses the state of Nirvāna and finds it involves mental enlightenment, mastery of self and equanimity of mind. The Upanishadic *Shānti* (peace) and *Ānanda* (bliss) are there. If it involves so many positive qualities, it cannot be mere nothingness. It is the consciousness of life's work done well and it carries its own reward. It sees the end of the cycle of births and deaths, and this has been the religious quest of India through the ages. It bears a likeness to the Advaitic conception of *Jīvan-mukti*, emancipation even in this life. Perhaps the Upanishadic *Moksha* means nothing more than Buddha's *Nirvāna*, but with this difference: it is achieved not as mere *jñāna* with morality as an adjunct, but through the hard toil of a moral life, through the forgetting of one's self in the sorrows and tribulations of others. Anyone imbued with this spirit can take up the burden of a Bodhisattva, face life and death again and again to be ever at the side of those that need his help. That is the lesson taught us by the Jātaka stories: Buddha was the willing bearer of the world's sorrows and postponed his Buddhahood for countless ages. Here in this concept of Nirvāna we touch the high watermark of Buddha's teaching.

[1] *Nibbāna* is the Pālin form of Saskrit *Nirvāna*.

(8) Buddha discovered the secret of life. In fact he was hunting for it to enlighten others. He must spread the knowledge he had gained, and he did spread it during his life. But what would happen after his death? His discovery must not die with himself or even with the death of his immediate disciples. He had to found an organization that could carry on his work and carry his gospel to the four corners of the earth. And so he issued his appeal:

> "Fare ye forth, brethren, on the mission that is for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, to take compassion on the world, to work profit and good and happiness to gods and men. Go no two of you the same way.[1] Teach ye the truth lovely in its origin, lovely in its progress, lovely in its consummation. Both in the spirit and the letter proclaim ye the higher life in all its fullness, in all its purity. Beings there are whose eyes are dimmed with dust, perishing because they hear not the truth."

If this was the settled intention of Buddha, he had to take steps to carry it out, and the idea of the *Saṅgha* was the result. That the *Saṅgha* as an organization of the Buddhists was actually brought into existence and that it did excellent work in the early history of Buddhism is all a matter of history. Its essential aim was to spread the doctrine, and this necessitated missions going to places far and near. This sort of life could be followed only by those who had no encumbrances in the form of wives and children. In other words, celibacy was inevitable. It was also logical that they should eschew all possible incentives to sexual life, e.g. dancing, singing, attending theatrical and similar performances. They had to avoid the use of garlands, scents and ornaments, comfortable beds and money, for the lure of money would lead to corruption. That the life of the monks was ascetic in the sense of rigorous discipline cannot be denied. That such a life had a purpose and that purpose was the spread of the gospel of morality and Nirvāna among the people at large is equally certain. That it was to serve as a refuge from the world and foster a life of laziness and dependence, was quite against the grain of Buddha, and if in later ages the *Saṅgha* did degenerate into such a gathering of idlers and social parasites, it could only be regarded as a most unfortunate perversion of Buddha's teaching. That Buddha was against the idea of beggary is beautifully illustrated in his parable which goes to show how a beggar is never loved by anyone.[2] It is shown equally by his own life of strenuous work: preaching and helping all and sundry. None was too low or abandoned for him, for,

[1] This passage is interesting from the comparative-religion point of view as illustrating the opposite of Christ's practice as mentioned at Mark vi. 7: "He began to send them forth by two and two."—Ed.

[2] Burlingame's *Buddhist Parables*, p. 68.

like Christ, he too saw that no one is so abandoned that he or she could not be reclaimed. This attitude, too, is in striking contrast to the haughty attitude of orthodox Hindus, the "holiest" of whom dread to lose their "holiness" through the touch of the impure, whereas genuinely holy people like Buddha and Christ were conscious of the redeeming power that they possessed whereby their touch could sanctify even sinners.

(9) The place of women in the *Saṅgha* constitutes an interesting chapter in the history of Buddhism. Buddha's own attitude to women was in marked contrast to the orthodox Hindu attitude. Hindu religion for good or for evil fully recognizes the feminine element in religion. No god is complete without his wife as his *śakti* (power) and is most easily approachable through her. Buddha knew no god and therefore the need to recognize his spouse did not arise at all. But it could not be denied that Buddha was always a little suspicious of women. His advice to Ānanda as to how he should avoid women amply bears this out, and he justifies his attitude thus:

> "Women are soon angered, Ānanda; women are full of passion, Ānanda; women are envious, Ānanda; women are stupid, Ānanda. That is the reason, Ānanda, that the cause, why women have no place in public assemblies, do not carry on a business; and do not earn their living by any profession."[1]

Ānanda was more chivalrous in his attitude towards women and it was only under his pressure that Buddha agreed to organize a *Saṅgha* for women, but not without the tragic premonition that their inclusion would hasten the decay of the religion by a good five hundred years, a premonition which was duly fulfilled, for when the *Saṅghas* became the haunts of laziness, the devil gave ample opportunities to the monks and nuns to make their celibacy a cruel farce.

But in spite of his low opinion of women, Buddha was always just and kind to them. He would befriend even a harlot and saw no wrong in accepting a prostitute's invitation to dinner. For he had the consciousness of his mission, and he could not keep out anyone from his mission without stultifying his own teaching. He did not deny the possibility of a woman rising above the infirmities of her sex and showing her worthiness to benefit through his teaching. Here again he showed the excellence of the Middle Path, for he neither deified woman as some Hindu cults have done, nor did he debase her and exploit her as so many of the later Dharma Sastras tended to do, and as modern Hindu Law has succeeded in perpetuating her inferiority.

(10) Buddha's treatment of caste has given rise to conflicting opinions. Sir Charles Eliot permits himself to make a surprising

[1] Quoted on p. 162 in Coomarswamy's *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism.*

statement: "And though he (Buddha) denied that the Brahmans were superior by birth to others, he did not preach against caste, partly because it then existed in a rudimentary form."[1] This is a double-edged argument, for if in Buddha's time caste had not developed its evil tendencies, there was indeed no reason why he should raise his voice against it, but it does not follow that he believed in, or countenanced, caste. In fact the whole tendency of his teaching, explicitly and implicitly, militated against caste. It was his glory to say: "As in the ocean all the great rivers lose their name and being, so in my doctrine all the castes merge."[2] In a similar strain he once said: "My doctrine is like the sky. There is room for all without exception: men, women, boys and girls, poor and rich." In the *Dhammapada* he gives an ethical interpretation of the Brahmin in the same strain as Yuddhiṣṭhira in the *Mahābhārata*:

> "He who is thoughtful, blameless, settled, dutiful, without passions, and who has attained the highest end, him I call indeed a Brāhmana. . . .
>
> Him I call a Brāhmana who does not offend by body, word or thought, and is controlled on these three points.
>
> A man does not become a Brāhmana by his plaited hair, by his family or by birth; in whom there is truth and righteousness, he is blessed, he is a Brāhmana.
>
> What is the use of plaited hair, O fool! What of the raiment of goat-skins? Within thee there is ravening, but the outside thou makest clean.
>
> I do not call a man a Brāhmana because of his origin or of his mother. He is indeed arrogant and he is wealthy. But the poor who is free from all attachments, him I call indeed a Brāhmana."[3]

In the *Āmagandha Sutta* of the *Sutta Nipāta* it is stated that defilement does not come from eating this or that, prepared or given by this or that person, but from evil deeds and words and thoughts.

In the face of such explicit passages it would be futile to argue that Buddha countenanced caste in the sense in which it has become a fetish with the orthodox Hindus during the last thousand years and more. Rhys Davids in his Introduction to the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* points out how Buddha's Order contained people of all castes: Upāli was a barber, Sunīta was of a low tribe, Sati belonged to the fisherfolk, Nanda was a cowherd, and the list could be multiplied. Thus it is clear that Buddha was the first rebel against the tyranny

[1] *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. i, p. xxii.
[2] Dahlke's *Buddhist Essays*, p. 59.
[3] *Dhammapada*, translated by Max Müller, pp. 62–3.

of caste, even though in his time caste was much more fluid than it has since become. If his message of human equality had taken root in the Indian soil, Indian history might have been a record of great patriotic victories instead of defeats at the hands of every foreigner who has tried his luck at gathering the gold of India. The ugly truth has to be accepted that the whole organization of the Hindu society has been built up on the unabashed recognition of the aristocratic principle. Every Hindu must belong to a caste, not of his choosing, but the one in which he happens to be born. Every caste except of course the highest, the Brahmins, admits the superiority of some other caste, but it as scrupulously regards itself as superior to some other caste, an excellent exemplification of the simultaneous working of the superiority and inferiority complexes, so much so that even the most despised outcastes have developed their own aristocracy in the form of the Right Hand people and the Left Hand people, each priding itself on its own superiority. Buddhism was far too democratic for such a society. Whatever the precept and the example of Buddha himself his followers failed to eschew caste completely, and in the subsequent centuries caste corroded the Buddhist society as much as it has succeeded in corroding the life of the Christian Churches in recent times; even Islam, the most democratic religion, has allowed itself to be influenced by caste so far at least as Islam in India is concerned. This perhaps explains the paradox that Buddhism found a more congenial soil wherein to flourish in China and Japan than in aristocratic India.

II

It is a fascinating historical problem to find out why Buddhism was ultimately driven out of India. One or the other of three reasons has usually been assigned for this, and it would be interesting to examine the cogency of each of them.

(1) The Rev. Anagārika Dharmapāla of the Mahābodhi Society does not hesitate to lay the chief blame at the door of Muslim fanaticism and writes categorically: "In the eleventh century Buddhism found its dread foe in Baktiar Khilji, the great Vandal, who destroyed the libraries of Nalanda and Odantapuri."[1] Sir Charles Eliot is more cautious in his judgment: "There is thus every reason to suppose that in the twelfth century Buddhism still flourished in Bihar, that its clergy numbered several thousands and its learning was held in esteem. The blow which destroyed its power was struck by a Mohammedan invasion in 1193. In that year, Ikhtiyar-ud-Din Muhammad, a general of Kutb-ud-Din, invaded Bihar with a band of only two hundred men and with amazing audacity seized the capital, which,

[1] *The Life and Teachings of Buddha* (G. A. Natesan & Co.), p. 7.

consisting chiefly of palaces and monasteries, collapsed without a blow. The monks were massacred to a man."[1] But he denies that the Muslim conqueror had any special animus against Buddhism, and goes on to explain why Buddhism did suffer so much: "But whereas Hinduism was spread over the country, Buddhism was concentrated in the great monasteries and when these were destroyed there remained nothing outside them capable of withstanding either the violence of the Moslims or the assimilative influence of the Brahmins. Hence Buddhism suffered far more from these invasions than Hinduism."[2] This is palpably as bad as it could have been, but he refuses to assert that persecution was the main cause of the decadence of Buddhism, and does not look upon it even as "very important among the accessory causes."[3] He diagnoses the case admirably when he says about Buddhism that "when its temples and monasteries were demolished it did not live on in the hearts of the people, as did Hinduism with all its faults."[4]

Muslim fanaticism in open defiance of the noble teachings of the Prophet Mahomed has indeed been a recurrent feature of Muslim conquests in all lands. But nowhere has it succeeded in totally rooting out rival religions of a really high order. In Iran Zoroastrianism has persisted right down till the present day, and this in spite of frequent persecutions and endless religious and political disabilities. In India, too, Hinduism after centuries of Muslim rule still continues the dominant religion. Persecution has often had in human history exactly the opposite effect of fanning the smouldering embers of some ancient or new faith. The history of early Christianity in the Roman Empire abundantly proves this and so does the history of Sikhism in India.

On the whole we have to reject categorically the theory of Muslim persecution as the cause of the Buddhist exile from India.

(2) A far more satisfactory explanation of the decay of Buddhism in India is to be found in the steady deterioration of the Buddhist morals and morale. It is very sad to reflect that this process set in almost immediately after the death of Buddha, when his ashes and bones were distributed among the faithful, and over each of them arose a stupa, magnificent from the standpoint of archaeology, but ruinous from the standpoint of the life-work of Buddha himself. He had foreseen the decay of his teaching through ceremonialism, as every other religion too has decayed through the cunning machinations of unscrupulous priests. Even the Buddhist monks failed to live up to the ideal laid down by their Master. They were originally brought into being as missionaries, but as the piety of the laity brought them magnificent viharas to live in and plenty of food, they

[1] *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. ii, pp. 112–13.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 119. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 120. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

degenerated into idlers. Sir Charles Eliot points out how Buddhism was affected even by the eroticism of Tantric Śaktism. As the worship of the Bodhisattva Avalokita came more and more into vogue, the worship of *Tārā* as female deity also became fashionable. "The Buddha or Bodhisattva is represented as enjoying nirvāna because he is united to his spouse. . . . The devotee may imagine that he enters into *Tārā* as the embryo and is born of her as a Buddha. More often the argument is that since the bliss of the Buddha consists in union with *Tārā*, nirvāna can be obtained by sexual union here and we find many of the Tantric wizards represented as accompanied by female companions. The adept should avoid all action, but he is beyond good and evil and the dangerous doctrine that he can do evil with impunity, which the more respectable sects repudiate, is expressly taught."[1]

One can see in this a parallel to the history of the Roman Catholic Church in medieval Europe, but with a characteristic difference. The immorality of the popes and monks in Europe produced a Wycliffe and a Luther. There was an open revolt which was the means of reasserting the purity of Christian morals. The Protestant Reformation incited a Counter-Reformation within the Catholic Church itself, and this partly accounts for the interesting fact that even to-day the Roman Church is the most compact and the most well-organized religious organization in the whole world, and it claims the largest number of followers within Christendom itself.

Buddhism failed to produce a Luther, though it did not fail to produce a host of metaphysicians. Buddhism lived true to the type of the Hindu philosopher, and like Hinduism it lost its moral vigour. Subtleties in verbal logic came to be the order of the day and the relative importance of morality and metaphysics came to be reversed in the Buddhism of the Buddhists as distinguished from the Buddhism of the Buddha himself. This double lapse into barren metaphysics and dangerous religious ritualism undoubtedly offers a plausible explanation for the decay of Buddhism, but not for its total disappearance from India. After all the history of every religion shows an almost inevitable decay sooner or later, for the heights of the prophets cannot be maintained by an organized or hereditary priesthood for whom religion has become a profession, and not a mission. But such a decay does not imply a total eradication, and therefore in the history of Indian Buddhism its ultimate extinction has to find some other explanation.

(3) It has been suggested that Buddhism performed its historic mission but its atheism was not based upon a sound metaphysics, and therefore as soon as a great philosophic genius like Śankara arose, the best in Buddha's teaching was absorbed by him and all its

[1] Sir Charles Eliot's *Hinduism and Buddhism*, vol. ii, p. 123.

angularities rounded off into a smooth, logically perfect, metaphysics, which the world has come to know as Advaita Vedānta. Śankara himself has been sarcastically described by his opponents as Prachanna[1]-Buddha, and behind this sarcasm lies a great amount of truth. Logically Śankara was as much a confirmed agnostic as Buddha himself, but he had the Hindu astuteness to conceal it from the masses under the guise of countenancing every practice as suited to the ill-developed brain capacity of different individuals. It has been said of a follower of Śankara to-day that he confirms each man in his stupidity. The expression is not inapt in the case of Śankara himself, and that is why we find that while Śankara's brilliant intellect helped to rout the Buddhist metaphysics, and succeeded in giving a fillip to the worship of Shiva and the observances of caste practices, he failed to give his generation that moral vigour which was the supreme service of Buddha to his generation.

It is a common popular idea that Śankara drove Buddhism out of India. But it would be far truer to say that Śankara freely adopted what he liked from the armoury of Buddha, including *ahiṁsā* (non-violence) and vegetarianism. And so, in a sense, Buddhism still lives in India, though in a new garb, but only at the cost of its soul; for Advaita, as Neo-Buddhism, failed to tackle the problem of caste and untouchability, or to weld together the teeming castes of India, though Śankara gave a certain semblance of religious unity to Hinduism by establishing his Mutts in the four corners of India. That Śankara the agnostic should have done this is as much a paradox of history as the extinction of Buddhism in India. Śaṅkara's triumph was indeed at the expense of Buddhism, but it would be bad history to credit Śankara alone with the conquest of Buddhism. He was but a mirror of India's soul. He had the genius to grasp the psychology of the ignorant masses and adapted himself to their needs by trotting out the *paramārthika*[2] and the *vyavahārika*[3] like a practised dialectician to suit the nature of differing audiences. It is a supreme irony in India that in succeeding centuries right down till our own times Śankara has been revered and worshipped as a man of religion, while the keen logic of his thought effectually exposed the pretensions of *Īśvara*[4] as nothing more than a fragment of the world of *māyā*.[5]

(4) The reasons dealt with above are generally advanced to explain the disappearance of Buddhism from India, but we have tried to show that none of them is completely satisfactory. The real reason lies much deeper and is really to be found in the psychology of the Hindus. We have tried to show in the first part of this essay how every important teaching of Buddha was through and through

1 Concealed. 2 Relating to the ultimate soul.
3 Relating to the world. 4 Personal God. 5 Appearance.

revolutionary and more or less repugnant to the Hindu mind. The extreme emphasis on pure morality without its roots in the divinity of gods failed to make a lasting appeal, and that is why the Buddhists deified him, and the Hindus made him an avatar[1] of Vishnu and laid the flattering unction to their soul that thereby they had done all for Buddha that they could be reasonably expected to do. Similarly in the matter of caste neither the teaching nor the example of Buddha had any appreciable effect. If it be true, as asserted by some, that in his time caste had not developed into a rigid institution, it is all the more distressing that even its tendency to rigidity failed to be checked. As a matter of mere history we cannot but come to the conclusion, disappointing though it be, that Buddhism as Buddha conceived it almost died with Buddha, and the Buddhism that lived a chequered career in India for a millennium and a half was not so much a way of life as a creed. As a force against the traditional Hinduism it had to be itself transformed into metaphysics or religion: just the two things that Buddha was most suspicious about and did his best to avoid.

But if Buddha failed in India he succeeded in China, for China with her simple and direct emphasis on morality and her freedom from the subtleties of metaphysics offered a genial soil for the growth of Buddhism. The Chinaman is a hard-headed, hard-working, practical man, devoted to his good earth and rooted in his soil. He knows no artificial divisions of society. The Chinese society is essentially democratic. In the worst days of imperial absolutism entrance to public services was controlled through a rigorous system of public examinations. Ability, not birth, opened the gates of public service. In a country so fond of children as China ascetic celibacy could hardly be expected to flourish. But, after all, even Buddha had aimed not at producing recluses, but active missionaries free from the trammels of family life. He did not want them to be self-centred, self-mortifying ascetics. A monk after Buddha's pattern required just a certain amount of discipline to heighten his moral energy, and the practical Chinaman could take up the role of a Buddhist monk.

Chinese Buddhism has deviated from the teaching of Buddha only in one respect predominantly, and that is in the direction of theism. But even this has been done so beautifully and so logically that Buddhist theism in China stands self-justified. In one of his last discourses to his favourite follower, Ānanda, Buddha related how on a previous occasion he had resisted the temptation to enter into Nirvāna, and narrated his reply to Māra:

> "I shall not go into Nirvāna, thou evil one, before I have monks as hearers, wise, disciplined, experienced, well-informed, who

[1] Rebirth.

possess the doctrine of salvation, who have the calm corresponding to the doctrine of salvation; not until these themselves, after commencing their teaching office, impart, proclaim, teach, determine, explain, expound, correct; not until they proclaim the doctrine of salvation with tokens of wonder, after having suppressed the protests of others which can be suppressed by the aid of the doctrine of salvation. . . .

I shall not go into Nirvāna, thou evil one, until this irreproachable conduct of mine has succeeded and bloomed widespread, known to many and richly multiplied, so that it has been beautifully manifested to men."[1]

The development of the doctrine of the Bodhisattva is perfectly consistent with the spirit of this passage, though not with the teaching of Buddha as the gospel of self-help. In one of the Mahāyāna books we come across the following resolve and vow of the Bodhisattva to save all beings:

"I take upon myself the burden of all sufferings, I am resolved to do so, to bear them. I turn not back, I do not flee, I quake not, neither do I tremble. I fear not, I yield not, nor do I hesitate. And why? Because I must take upon me the burden of all beings. It is not my free will. The deliverance of all beings is my solemn vow; all beings will have to be delivered by me. By me must the whole world of living creatures be delivered. From the wilderness of birth, from the wilderness of age, from the wilderness of sickness, from the wilderness of death, from the wilderness of all kinds of misfortune, from the wilderness of the evil forms of existence, from the wilderness of the entire circulation of rebirths, from the wilderness of all heresies, from the wilderness of the loss of the good religion, from the wilderness arising out of uncertainty, from all these wildernesses I must save all beings. . . .

I work for the establishment of the incomparable kingdom of knowledge for all beings. I take pains not only for my own redemption. For all these beings must be brought by me from the river of Samsāra (earthly existence) in the boat of thought to omniscience. From the great abyss I must raise them, from all calamities I must deliver them, I must lead them out from the river of Samsāra. I must take upon myself the whole burden of the sufferings of all beings. As far as I am able, I will taste all the sufferings of all the evil forms of existence, as they are borne in all parts of the world. And no being must be deceived by me as to the root of the good. I have resolved to live in every single evil form of existence for countless millions of ages. And as in one evil form of existence, so there is reason for me to deliver all beings in all the evil forms of

[1] Quoted in Söderblom's *The Living God*, p. 145.

existence without exception in whatever part of the world they occur. And why? It is surely better that I alone suffer than that all beings should come to the places of evil existence."[1]

It would be difficult to hunt for a more exalted passage than this one, and if any being deserves to be deified, it is surely such a Bodhisattva. No wonder that this conception, though of Indian origin, found a more congenial soil for its acceptance and development in China. If such a view has detracted from the manliness of self-help, it has at least tended to give a broad catholic basis and held out a hope to all that they need not despair, and in China through the ages has gone up the cry: "Reverently and confidently I take refuge in Amitābha."

III

Western critics of Indian life and thought are fond of dwelling on the tone of pessimism they find in India. Hindu thinkers resent this charge and fondly dwell on the joyousness of the Rigvedic hymns and the serenity of the Upanishadic speculations. If they plead guilty to the charge of pessimism at all they trace it to the influence of Buddha almost as an alien force in the history of Hindu culture. For the millions of Hindu masses the antics and loves of Krishna have had a far greater fascination than the sombre life of Buddha, who gave up power to go about with the beggar's bowl. Even the legendary myths of Shiva and Pārvatī have a sway over the Hindu mind which the gentle love of Yaśodhara for Buddha has never had. As in metaphysics, so in popular religion in India, Buddha and his message failed to impress themselves. That is the story of the past. Is the future likely to tell a different tale?

What really are the chances of a Buddhist revival in the India of to-day? The establishment of the Mahābodhi Society in Calcutta, the consecration of the beautiful new temple at Sarnath, and the attempts persistently made in recent years by the Buddhists to regain possession of the temple at *Gayā*, all undoubtedly bear witness to a revival of interest in Buddhism in India. Whether all this will bear fruit on any vast scale remains to be seen. The psychology of the people, which has been so markedly anti-Buddhistic, has not changed materially. But modern conditions have affected at least the life of the educated sections to an appreciable extent. The political situation has created a sympathy for the untouchables among the political-minded Hindus, as neither ethics nor religion ever succeeded in doing in the past. Western education has certainly and profoundly affected the religious outlook of the educated youth, whether in the direction of an honest agnosticism or of a purified

[1] Quoted in Söderblom's *The Living God*, pp. 151–2.

monotheism. Pure theism is not having an unchallenged existence in India any more than in Europe or America, and if spiritual values are not to disappear under the pressure of materialistic thought, some substitute must be found which could mitigate the effects of a naked materialism, and such a substitute may reasonably be found in Buddhism. Sixty millions of untouchables labelled as Buddhists may not solve all our political problems. But if they could be raised to that level of education where they could see in Buddha a great moral uplifter, and not a mere dispenser of ready-made redemption, we can have a new society in India in which the oppressed of yesterday can command recognition and respect of the oppressors themselves. If Buddhism can transform the lives of untouchables it is bound to have a most healthy reaction on all sections of Indian society. Perhaps even the caste-ridden Hinduism may succeed in capturing the moral vigour of Buddha, and then the mission of Buddha will have been truly fulfilled, whether his image is worshipped or not in a million temples. Perhaps after twenty-five centuries of political humiliations and the crudities of caste, and soul-killing superstitions and ignorance, Indians may yet learn that life is much more than religious ceremonials and ideas of conventional purity. If there be any truth in the idea that a people's life in the last resort is governed only by their philosophic outlook, there can be hope for India only when every Hindu can extend a hand of fellowship to every other Hindu, be he a Brahmin or an untouchable, and when every Indian can see a brother in every other Indian, whether he be from the North or the South. Buddha showed the way. It is for the Indians to accept the way.

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY: THE WORLD AS *PROCESS*[1]

SYDNEY E. HOOPER, M.A.

THIS paper will endeavour to present an outline of the Organic Philosophy associated with the name of Whitehead. Whitehead resembles Spinoza and Leibniz in that he is a philosopher who has tried to construct a world-outlook that will do justice to science and to the other aspects of life and knowledge. Moreover, just as in his day Leibniz was an eminent mathematician and scientist, so Whitehead in our day enjoys the same distinction. But Whitehead's philosophy differs both from that of Spinoza and from that of Leibniz. Spinoza based his philosophy upon the monistic substance, of which the actual events in the world are the inferior modes. Whitehead bases his philosophy upon the actual events themselves and derives the solidarity of the world as a whole from their mutual interplay. Thus the organic philosophy is pluralistic in contrast with Spinoza's monism. In comparing Whitehead's philosophy with that of Leibniz, we find that they agree in both being pluralistic, but they differ in the emphasis placed upon the notion of mentality. Leibniz's monads are best conceived as generalizations of the notion of mentality, and the conception of physical bodies only enters into his philosophy subordinately and derivatively. Whitehead, however, in his philosophy of organism endeavours to hold the balance between the physical and mental more evenly, and thus does justice to both aspects of reality.

The exposition of Whitehead's philosophy given in this paper is derived for the most part from the four books, *Concept of Nature*, *Science and the Modern World*, *Process and Reality*, and *Adventures of Ideas*.

The fundamental ideas of the organic philosophy are "Creativity," "Actual Entity," "Eternal Objects" and "God." At the outset I wish to emphasize the importance of a clear understanding that the four ideas to be discussed presuppose each other, so that in isolation they are meaningless. That is to say, the fundamental notions of the organic philosophy are not capable of abstraction from each other. This does not mean that the separate ideas are definable in terms of each other; it means that what is *indefinable* in any one of the ideas cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other ideas. The pre-supposition of the scheme of thought at the base of the organic philosophy is that no entity can be conceived in complete

[1] Series, *Contemporary World-Outlooks* (IV).

abstraction from the system of the universe as a whole. Consequently the fundamental ideas employed in the description of the universe pre-suppose each other. It will be observed that in this scheme of ideas, the "substance-quality" concept is avoided, being replaced by the description of the world as dynamic process. I will first consider the notion of "creativity."

Creativity

In introducing the notion of "Creativity," the author of the organic philosophy reminds us that in all philosophical theory there is an ultimate which is only capable of characterization through its *embodiment*, and apart from these embodiments is devoid of actuality. That is to say, there is no pure or "eminent" activity (as some theologians have thought), but only activity embodied in the events of the world. In the organic philosophy this ultimate is termed "Creativity." Later on we shall learn that the ultimate has a primordial non-temporal character which is termed "God" and that in respect of the individual facts or "creatures" of nature, defined by certain forms, Creativity is the ultimate behind all forms and is itself inexplicable by forms.

The Organic Philosophy at the outset emphasizes a fundamental principle of the universe, namely, that it is of the innermost nature of things for the "many" to enter into complex unity. (We find, for example, that atoms are components of molecules, and that separate cells are components of organic bodies.) On the abstract level of philosophic thought, the "many" are the universe regarded as a multiplicity of discrete things, and it lies in the nature of these many things to come together to form a new sort of unity. "Creativity" is the ultimate principle by which the many discrete things, which are the universe disjunctively, become through a process of synthesis, a new individual actual entity which is the universe conjunctively. The phrase "the universe conjunctively" means that the novel actual entity, which creativity has brought into being, unifies all the separate entities of the universe into a "togetherness" from its own perspective or point of view. It is to be noted that, by unifying the many separate entities of the universe into a new creature, creativity produces a novel actual entity different from any of the entities which it unifies. That is to say, by the function of creativity the many discrete entities of the universe are synthesized into a new individual, and are therefore increased by one. Whitehead expresses this "growth" of the universe in these words: "the novel entity or synthetic unity, is at once the togetherness of the many which it finds, and also 'one' among the disjunctive many which it leaves."[1] Creativity thus

[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 29.

discloses itself as the principle of novelty responsible for the creative advance of nature.

Perhaps the most vivid way of conceiving the notion of "Creativity" is to think of it as the pure notion of the activity of the universe conditioned by what Whitehead calls the "objective immortality" of the actual world. The world is always changing, though at the same time it possesses a certain stable element of divine ordering. The changing world, which is never the same twice, we experience as the "passage" of nature. Now in physical science, there are certain quantities called "vectors," i.e. quantities that are "passed on." These are more fundamental than "scaler" quantities, which are constructs derivative from vectors. In the Organic Philosophy the notion of "passing on" or vectors employed in physical science becomes "creativity," bearing the meaning "to bring forth," "to beget," "to produce." No actual entity in the world can be divorced from the notion of Creativity. Indeed, as we shall see later, every actual entity must be thought of as a "mode" of the ultimate creativity which it conditions by its own unique achievement.

"Creativity" is thus the ultimate notion of highest generality at the base of actuality. It is the universal of universals. It cannot be characterized because all characters are more special than itself. If we wish to learn anything further concerning creativity, we must pay regard to its "creatures," since it is they which constitute its shifting character. This transcendent Creativity is, as we have said, conditioned in its activity by the occasions of the actual world. It is also qualified by God, who is at once the outcome of creativity, the foundation of the world's order, and the goal towards novelty. Its two attributes are (1) that of pluralizing itself into a multiplicity of finite individual actual entities, and (2) the realm of possibility, which we shall see later is the realm of eternal objects corresponding to Plato's realm of "Ideas."

Actual Entities

We now turn to consider the idea of an "Actual Entity" and its place in the system of the Organic Philosophy. What is an actual entity? At the outset it is well to be put on our guard against the temptation to think of actual entities, in the Philosophy with which we are concerned, as "substances" such as silk or wood or iron. They are not static substances with certain qualities, but "processes." Another name for an actual entity is an "occasion of experience," and an occasion of experience is described as being a "prehensive unity." It will, therefore, help us to understand the nature of an actual entity, if we can give an example which shows how an "occasion of experience" is also a "prehensive unity." Briefly it may

be said that "prehension" is a way of experiencing other things as *constitutive* of the actual experience of an occasion.

Imagine two young men, John and William, on a walking tour in the English counties bordering on Wales. John knows the district well, to William it is novel. On reaching the summit of a hill, John points to a distant building visible from where the two are standing, and asks William how the building appears to him. William replies that, at the distance he is from it, the building indicated seems only a small round tower. John then tells William that he knows the building, and has many times visited it; that, in reality, it is no small round tower, but a large square building with battlements and turrets, which apparently William does not see. The two young men begin to discuss the disparity between what the building is in its own "place" or separate setting, several miles away, and what it is from the place where they are now standing. They come to the conclusion that the object which William strictly and properly perceives by sight cannot be the thing which is several miles distant because "a small round tower" is one thing, and "a large square building with battlements and turrets" another.

The illustration I have just given is one example of an "occasion of experience" which is also a "prehensive unity." We can see at once that William's perception is an occasion of experience, since it is one of the events in his life-history. But the occasion of experience is also a "prehensive unity." The "small, round tower" which William sees from the hill where he is standing is a unity, *from a certain standpoint,* of "aspects" of *other* things in *other* places. That is to say, it is a prehensive unity of aspects of the "large square building with battlements and turrets" situate some miles from William's place of vision. Such an "occasion of experience" is what is meant by an "actual entity" in the Organic Philosophy. It will be observed that the notion stands for a unit of experience mirroring other aspects of the world from its own unique point of view. When, for example, a person is looking at a distant castle, or cloud, or planet, the things which are grasped into a realized unity, here and now, are not the distant castle, cloud, or planet in themselves, in their own separate settings, but rather "perspectives" of the castle, cloud, or planet from the standpoint of the prehensive unification.[1] A prehensive occasion of experience is, thus, a process of unification of aspects of other things, and such a process is an actual entity. Every actual entity "takes account of" the essential character of other things, and this "taking account of" is its

[1] "Prehension" is a technical term which can most simply be explained as meaning "apprehension" without the "ap-," i.e. without awareness. Whitehead points out that Bacon regarded objects as all "perceiving" one another to the extent that they affected each other.

prehension of aspects of other entities as constituents of its own becoming.

At this point we may call attention to the assumption that has dominated the philosophy of science throughout the modern era, called by Whitehead "the fallacy of simple location." It is the view that a piece of matter is in a definite region of space and throughout a definite duration of time, apart from any essential reference of the relation of that thing or quality to other regions of space and to other durations of time. This view is based on the error of considering space and time as the "loci of simple locations." But space and time are simply abstractions from the totality of prehensive unifications, mutually patterned in each other. If, as we have seen, an actual occasion of experience is a prehensive unity of *perspectives*, the things that are prehended into a realised unity *here and now* are aspects of things in other places *from the special point of view of the percipient occasion.* That is to say, the notion of the primitive entities of Nature being "prehensive unities" shows that the assumption of 'simple' location is a fallacy.

Perhaps an illustration will make this clear. Imagine you are perceiving a single *sense-object* "green" in a blade of grass. Now the theory of prehensions implies that the green is not simply at the place where you are perceiving it, nor in the blade where it is seen, but must be regarded as *at the point of view of the percipient occasion* (i.e. yourself), with its mode of location in the blade.[1]

Actual entities, then, are processes prehending aspects of other things into novel occasions of experience.[2] The example we gave of William on the brow of the hill prehending the distant castle in the form of a small, round tower as one of the occasions constituting his life history, was from the high-grade organism we call "Man." Can we say that the actual entities constituting nature as a whole are also occasions of experiencing? The Philosophy of Organism asserts that we can. It contends that all natural entities, forming star systems, planets, rocks, molecules or atoms are generically of the same kind. All the actual entities constituting the varied universe are ultimately occasions of experience, although comparatively few of them are "conscious." They are prehensive unities, the gathering of aspects of other things into the unity of an individual atomic

[1] Consider a percipient event (P) at region A. Now the *mode* of a sense-object "green" at A (abstracted from the sense-object whose relationship to region A the mode is conditioning) is the aspect from A of some other region B. The sense-object "green" relates region A to region B. That is to say, the *mode* of the sense-object "green" at A is expressible as location elsewhere.

[2] Whitehead maintains (as did Leibniz) that, while consciousness is a rare character in the universe, only found in association with high-grade organisms, "experience" is universal, because all actual entities prehend one another.

experience. The realization of natural entities is a process of synthesizing into the unity of a prehension, perspectives of other things from the standpoint of a novel creative synthesis. According to this line of thought natural entities are processes of prehension culminating in individual unities of experience. Each prehensive unity mirrors the universe from its own unique standpoint.

We may here ask how this view of nature, as a whole of individual prehensive occasions of experience, is reached by the Organic Philosophy? The answer is as follows. Whitehead starts from our own psychological field. He takes our psychological experience to be the self-knowledge of the total event we call our body. That "self-knowledge" he affirms, discloses itself as a prehensive unification of prescences of entities *beyond* self-awareness. He now makes a generalization, and employs the principle that the total bodily event is, as far as nature is concerned, on the same level as all other events "except for an unusual complexity and stability of inherent pattern." Whitehead considers that this method avoids an arbitrary break in nature. It implies a principle of continuity from the level of human consciousness down the scale to inorganic matter, and leads to the "organic" conception of nature. Thus, in the Organic Philosophy, nature is conceived as a structure of evolving processes.

Before we come to an end of this section on actual entities, we shall have to ask some such question as this. If the Organic Philosophy asserts that "reality is the process," how are we to think of those things in the world which have the character of "endurance," for there certainly are enduring things? We shall return to this question later. In the meantime, let us learn a little more detail concerning actual entities.

"Actual entities" or "actual occasions" are said to be the real things of which the world is made. They are atomic and individual in their nature, not substances but processes. The process is a growth from phase to phase ending in a definite achievement. It is a way of bringing various elements into a real unity, and this is accomplished by a genuine creative synthesis. An actual entity "mirrors" the whole world from its special standpoint as a unity of experience, though not necessarily as a "conscious" experience. Aspects of all the other occasions of the world are synthesized according to the "principle of relevance" in every new occasion, and the synthesis of perspectives of the world from the standpoint of the given novel occasion *is* the new actual entity or new atomic creature. The means whereby other actual occasions are brought together into a novel unity, is through the functioning of eternal objects (to be discussed later). It is they that relate one occasion to another, thus effecting a new synthesis.

Actual entities as understood by Whitehead are fundamentally teleological, that is, they all seek goals. In this aspect they are called

by Whitehead "subjects"; but when their goal is reached they still retain their efficacy although of a different kind, and in this aspect are called "objects." As objects, they exercise efficient causation in the form of data offered to a new occasion as material for a fresh synthesis. That is to say, the new occasion prehends these data, and from this it follows that prehensions are intermediate phases between the data and the final unity of the process which is the subject. This view is reminiscent of Leibniz's attempt to show how both final and efficient causes operate without being inconsistent one with the other, and his view that all monads have perceptions. For Whitehead, as for Leibniz, the world of actual entities is a world of subjects enjoying experiences.

These experiences are called "prehensions" or "feelings" (as has already been briefly indicated). The term "feeling" does not necessarily imply consciousness, but it does imply the logically prior concept of experience. "Feeling" or "prehension" is a neutral term used for the operation of passing from the objectivity of the data presented for the synthesis, to the subjective immediacy of the actual entity—from publicity to privacy. A prehension, then, is an operation whereby aspects of *other* actual occasions are absorbed as components of a novel self-creating actual entity. Consequently an analysis of any given actual entity discloses it to consist of prehensions. But these prehensions which are components of an actual entity, are not independent entities, since they are all prehensions of one "subject" to which they belong and from which they cannot be torn.

Actual entities are "modes" of the ultimate creativity of the universe. They are units of experience mirroring the universe from their unique points of view. Since they aim at mirroring the universe from their own special standpoints, they must be regarded as "self-creative." In achieving the "ends" or "satisfactions" at which they aim, each actual entity attains a value which none other can share. Thus an actual entity can be analysed into (1) activity, (2) conditioned potentialities there for synthesis, and (3) an aesthetic value representing the outcome of the synthesis. Whitehead informs us that "the unity of all occasions forbids the analysis of activities into *independent* entities. Each individualized activity is nothing but the mode in which the general activity is individualized amid the imposed conditions. . . . The general activity is not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are entities. It is a general metaphysical character which underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each occasion. Its attributes are its character of individualization into a multiplicity of modes, and the realm of eternal objects, which are synthesized in these modes."[1] It will be obvious

[1] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 245.

that there is nothing in the temporal world with which we can compare the ultimate general activity, since all activities in the actual world must necessarily be more special than the ultimate activity.

There are two types of feeling in an actual entity, "physical" and "conceptual." Its "physical" feelings are its prehensions of other actual entities functioning as potential data for its synthesis: its "conceptual" feelings are derived from its prehensions of eternal objects functioning as forms of definiteness. In consequence of these two types of feeling, every actual entity is said to have a "physical pole" and a "mental pole." The potential data offered to a novel actual occasion for synthesis, function as "efficient" causes, whereas the "end" at which the concrescent actual occasion aims is the "final" cause. Thus an actual entity both suffers efficient causation and enjoys final causation.

From this description of an actual entity, it will be readily discerned that its nature is essentially "social." Its very being consists of prehensions of occasions other than itself as components. An actual entity has "concern" for other occasions both in the present and in the past. It mirrors within itself modes of its contemporaries as a display of immediate achievement; and it also mirrors modes of its predecessors as "memories" within its own present. It also reflects within itself such aspects as the future throws back into its present as "anticipation." Thus an actual entity has commerce with the past, present, and future.

Summing up this account of actual entities, we can say that it discloses nature to be a structure of evolving processes. The most ultimate universal is "Creativity," the notion which stands for the underlying activity of realization, individualizing itself into an interlocked plurality of modes. Each actual entity is a finite achievement, a definite matter of fact, issuing from the individualizing of the ultimate underlying activity of nature as a whole, into a system of interlocking concrescent processes, each realizing its own appropriate value. Space and Time exhibit the general scheme of interlocked relations of this system of prehensions, no one of which can be torn from its context. Nevertheless, each occasion or actual entity has within its context genuine reality, for each occasion, from its own standpoint, unifies the modalities belonging to the whole universe. Moreover, since each actual entity mirrors within itself the past, present, and future, we must think of the world as containing memory of the past and anticipation of the future as well as immediacy of realization of the present.

Enduring Things

The time has come to deal with the question raised earlier as to the way in which we are to think of enduring things. If nature is

a structure of processes, how comes it about that there are things, such as molecules and mountains, which last for a very long time? The answer to this question given by the Organic Philosophy is as follows:

An enduring thing, such as a molecule or a mountain, is really a *society* of actual occasions or actual entities, enjoying a special type of "order." First of all let us be clear in our minds as to the meaning of the term "society" of actual occasions. A "society" of actual occasions is a nexus of occasions with a common element of form, the common element of form being the "defining characteristic" of the society. This form is really a complex eternal object, illustrated in each member of the nexus, each member inheriting it from those other members genetically preceding its own concrescence. A "society," then, is a group of actual entities, each member of which participates in a common form. Now an enduring object is a society of actual occasions enjoying a specific type of order termed "personal." "Personal" order means that the genetic relatedness of the members of a society of occasions imposes a "serial order" upon them. This "serial order" enjoyed by certain societies of occasions has an important effect. It secures that there is one single line of inheritance of the defining characteristic of the nexus from one occasion to the other. A society, enjoying "personal" order as defined above, is an enduring object.

It should be observed that the characteristic of an enduring object is that it sustains a certain character by reason of the special genetic relations subsisting among the members of the society. It can be said that "Endurance" is a device by which each actual occasion in a society is bound by a line of physical ancestry. The "likeness" between the successive occasions of an historic route or chain of events procures an identity in respect of their contributions to the chain, and this emphasizes the imposition of conformity. In other words, an historic route of occasions with personal order tends to prolong itself into the future in consequence of the weight of uniform inheritance derived from its members. The result is an enduring object, which is nothing else but a route of occasions or chain of actual entities propagating the same "form" throughout the route or chain. For example, a corpuscle is an enduring object, constituted by a chain of antecedent and subsequent occasions, throughout which a permanent form is propagated from one atomic occasion to another —rather in the same way as a stick of sugar-rock, which children love, has the same pattern reiterated in every part of the stick.

The conception of an "enduring object" is, therefore, bound up with the notion of the reiteration of a pattern of shape and value throughout a route of occasions forming a society enjoying personal order. The shape of value is, as we have seen, the reflection of a

complex eternal object. The reiteration of a particular shape of value occurs when the event as a whole (say a mountain) repeats some shape which is also exhibited in each of a succession of its parts, i.e. in the succession of occasions constituting the life-history of the mountain. The point to make clear is this. The mountain throughout a thousand or a hundred years of its history, throughout a year, throughout a day, throughout a minute, throughout a second and so on, exhibits the same pattern or defining characteristic. That is to say, the mountain, in realizing itself under the guise of an "enduring thing," lasting it may be for thousands of years, displays in the total event the same pattern as is exhibited in each of the occasions constituting its life-history. Consequently in the total event which *is* the mountain, there is a "memory" of the pattern dominating its antecedent life-history as having formed an element of value in its genetic environment.

The conception of an "enduring object" as a serial route of occasions forming a society with a common "form" or pattern amongst its members, is analysable into two abstractions, namely: (1) the enduring society which has emerged as a real matter of fact to be taken account of by other things, and (2) an underlying eternal energy in whose nature there stands an envisagement of the realm of all eternal objects. Whitehead wishes us to understand that this *envisagement* is the growth of the individualized "thoughts" or "ideas" which emerge as "aspects" grasped within the life-history of the subtler and more complex enduring patterns.

This mention of an eternal energy envisaging the realm of eternal objects, leads us to the second part of our lecture dealing with the eternal aspect of the universe.

Eternal Objects

Any scheme of thought purporting to be an analysis of Nature must face the two facts of "change" and "endurance." This has been done by the Organic Philosophy in its treatment of actual entities and enduring things. But there is a third fact to be taken account of in the analysis of Nature which we may call "eternality," and this fact now claims our attention.

"Eternal Objects" are described as "pure potentials for the specific determination of fact" or "forms of definiteness." That is to say, eternal objects are forms which determine the *kind* of feeling the subject of any occasion experiences. Occasions or actual entities are, as we have seen, "processes": Eternal Objects constitute the "howness" of the process, and this "howness" of the concrescence determines the "whatness" of the actual entity. Consequently as Whitehead says, "the things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal."

An example of something that is eternal is colour. Contrast a colour with a physical existent such as a mountain. The latter may endure for ages, but given a sufficient lapse of time, it gradually wears away and finally disappears. A colour, on the other hand, say a specific shade of blue, is not a physical event like a mountain, and therefore, is exempt from the ravages of time. A colour is something that transcends physical events. It "ingresses" into nature to lend its quality to any event that may require it for a period, but when its function for the time being is over, it disappears, to return when its presence is again relevant. But, when it returns, it is the *same* colour. Once more, consider the shapes we call "round" and "oval" or other geometrical forms. These forms do not emerge from nature, although nature requires them to give definiteness to its processes. They "ingress" into nature to give their forms to transitory events. When the events which they characterize have passed away and perished, the specific shapes also disappear, but the *same* shapes "roundness" and "ovalness" reappear when they are again required by nature. It is, therefore, clear that such entities as colour and shape are different from temporal things. They are not processes and consequently belong to a realm different from the temporal. They are, in fact, pure "potentials," or in other words eternal "forms."

We can discern the "transcendence" of eternal objects in this way. Suppose an eternal object—say a definite shade of red—is in a certain actual entity the colour found with a round shape (another eternal object). The actual occasion in which the shade of red and the spherical shape are mutually implicated does not prevent the same colour and the same shape from characterizing *other* occasions either together or separately at different times. That is to say, many occasions may be both red and spheroid, or, again, many occasions may be informed of a spherical shape, but not be red. This being so, it is clear that an eternal object is not exhausted by its ingression into any particular occasion. It can ingress into a multitude of occasions at the same time, or at different times and different places, as it is required. This means that eternal objects are transcendent in respect of particular spatio-temporal events. Now it will be apparent that what transcends particular processes must be quite different from specific matter of fact. The mode of being of eternal objects is such as to be unaffected by the flux of events which come and go. Although they determine the "forms" of events, they, themselves, are not events. They are potentials determining the "howness" of occasions constituting matters of fact, but they, themselves, are not matters of fact. Indeed the defining characteristic of an eternal object is that it is an entity that does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world. In brief, entities of this kind are "eternal."

Eternal objects, then, are such entities as colours, sounds, tastes, touches, geometrical characters. When conscious feeling is concerned, they define the varying kinds of emotion and intensities of feeling, and the different sorts of pleasures and pains. In their function as determinants of feeling, they indicate "how" feeling is felt, and consequently "what" the feeling is. As an example of an eternal object functioning in the realm of emotion, we may mention "pity." In the sphere of moral conduct the term "goodness" stands for an eternal object; and "justice" is another eternal object applicable to a society whose behaviour is equitable. Both the latter are patterns of human values informing the behaviour of persons or of a society.

Eternal objects also come to light in untrue but *significant* propositions. For example, if I assert of this blue lupin that it is yellow, I am saying something untrue, but significant, significant because lupins *can* be yellow. That is to say, untrue propositions, provided they are predicated *significantly* of a given occasion "A," are alternative suggestions, and such alternative suggestions inform us that the occasion "A" is set within a realm of alternative interconnected entities. All the untrue, significant propositions concerning an actual occasion, reveal to us this wider interconnected system in which "A" has its place. But this means that the understanding of *actuality* requires a reference to *ideality* and this ideality is the realm of alternative suggestions disclosed by untrue but significant propositions. Now the realm of alternative suggestions is the realm of eternal objects—it is the realm of possibility contrasted with the realm of actuality. Both realms are intrinsically inherent in the total metaphysical situation in which any given actual entity is involved.

The realm of eternal objects is called a "realm" because each eternal object not only has an *individual* essence, i.e. its being a specific shape, colour, sound or feeling—but also a "relational" essence. By "relational" essence it is meant that an eternal object, considered as an abstract entity, cannot be divorced from its "internal" relationships to all other eternal objects. A part of its very nature, i.e. its relational character is constituted by this system of relations. Because of this inter-relatedness of eternal objects, any actual entity prehends, either positively or negatively, either as being or non-being, the whole realm of eternality.

If we are seeking to know "what" a given actual entity is, we must be able to say "how" a selection of eternal objects ingress into the actual occasion and how this selection is graded. The principle governing the realization of eternal objects is called "the principle of the degrees of relevance," which operates thus. In a given occasion some eternal objects will be realized in respect of their full essence, others will be realized in respect of some only of the relations that constitute their essence, whilst others may be entirely

excluded. In the latter extreme case, the relations which constitute the relational essences of the excluded eternal objects, may still be thought of as ingredient in the actual occasion, though in a negative way. They are ingredient as "unfulfilled alternatives." They do not contribute to the aesthetic synthesis of the actual occasion, but they do contribute features to its final emotional tone. These "unfulfilled" possibilities "might" have been realized, but in fact, in the given occasion are not. But, like those citizens excluded from sharing in the wealth of the state, they, nevertheless, by their very exclusion, exercise an influence on the minds of the privileged, even if only that of self-reproach.

There are certain distinctions among eternal objects themselves which I may mention but not elaborate. Some eternal objects are "simple" as, for example, the specific shade of Cambridge Blue, or the form of a circle; whilst others are of various grades of complexity. A complex eternal object of a low grade can be conceived in the following way. Let A, B, C, be three definite colours (red, orange, and green) with the spatio-temporal relatedness to each other of a regular tetrahedron *any where at any time*. Then R (A, B, C,) is an eternal object of the lowest complex grade. It will be obvious that there will be eternal objects of successively higher grades, since the possible combinations of eternal objects with each other are infinite. There are also two distinct *classes* of eternal objects, (1) the "objective," (2) the "subjective" class. The "objective" species are limited in their function to supplying forms of definiteness to data. By a necessity of its nature, an eternal object of the objective class is an *agent of relation*. It links the old occasions of the world, which have attained their ends, with new occasions which are in process of self-creation. Whitehead says, "the solidarity of the world rests upon the incurable objectivity of this species of eternal objects," and he identifies them with the mathematical platonic forms. The "subjective" species of eternal objects may enjoy a two-fold rôle. Primarily they supply the forms of the subjective feelings of actual entities. But an eternal object of the subjective species can also function as an agent of *relation* by objectifying a subjective feeling of an actual occasion A, as a datum for the feeling of a subsequent occasion B. The second class of eternal objects thus functions not only subjectively but also relationally.

Physical Science, in its analysis of nature, seems unable to deal satisfactorily with the "subjective" species of eternal objects, though competent to handle eternal objects of the "objective" species. The reason is this. Physical science is concerned not with the concrescent *subject* in the phases of its growth, but only with the *achievement* of the process, namely, "matter of fact." It is not concerned with the "genetic becoming" of an actual entity in which final causation is

operating; it merely analyses its complexity in its function of efficient cause. But an actual entity, as a subject reaching out after an end, must be credited with final as well as efficient causation. Because of this, there is elbow room in the universe for freedom.

The description given above of the realm of eternality will, we hope, bring home the truth that actuality is in essential relation to an unfathomable possibility. Eternal objects inform actual occasions with hierarchic patterns, included and excluded in every variety of discrimination. Every occasion is a synthesis of all eternal objects *under the limitations of gradations of actuality*, and because actuality is through and through "togetherness," every actual entity is likewise a synthesis of all occasions under the limitations of gradations of types of entry. Thus each occasion synthesises the totality of content under its own limitation of "mode."[1] This "graded envisagement" of the full sweep of eternal relations which each actual occasion prehends in its synthesis, involves the acknowledgement that (in one sense) *non-being* (i.e. the realm of eternal forms) is a positive factor in the achievement of every actual entity. In the language of Whitehead "it is the source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics and religion. By it fact is confronted with alternatives."[2]

It follows from what has been said, that in order to understand the spatio-temporal world, it is necessary to take account of the realm of eternality. It is this realm which provides what is permanent in the general flux of events. The universe is both a passage and something that is permanent. The passage is the interlocked system of processes which we have called "occasions of experience." Its permanent features are the "eternal" forms which ingress into the flux of events and give them a definite and determinate character. Apart from them, the world would be "without form and void," and *value* would be non-existent. Hence the things that are temporal need for their being the things that are eternal, and a metaphysic of the universe must include, as complementary facets, both the realm of the actual and the realm of the ideal.

God

Before proceeding to an exposition of the line of argument by which Whitehead arrives at the conception of "God," I wish to warn the reader that Whitehead's conception differs from the traditional view of Western theology. In the organic philosophy, God is not the omnipotent creator of the universe, but rather its infinite ground of rationality, and the supreme principle persuasive of ultimate unity. In other words, God is not *before* all creation, but *with* all creation. He must not be identified with the Creativity

[1] Cf. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 245. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

of the universe which transcends, not only any actual entity in the world, but also God. Whitehead reminds us that if, in accordance with traditional Western theological thought, God is regarded as the creator of the world, then, as the supreme author of the play, we must ascribe to Him the origin of all evil as of all good. But if He is conceived, not as the world's creator, but as the supreme ground for limitation, the principle of rational order, and the ultimate conservator of values, then it follows that it stands in His very nature to divide the good from the evil, to establish the supremacy of reason within her own domain, and to be persuasive of ultimate harmonious unity through the patient operation of His own invincible rationality.

I will first explain the notion of God as the principle of limitation, treated by Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World*. This will be followed by an account of his development of the idea of God in *Process and Reality*, as the non-temporal actual being endowing the realm of eternal forms with effectiveness and an order of relevance for realization in the temporal world. And, finally, I will attempt to show how Whitehead conceives the multiplicity of values achieved in the world of rugged existence as being received into God's eternal nature and there co-ordinated into a harmonious unity.

In the section dealing with "Creativity," we learnt that eternal possibility and modal differentiation into individual multiplicity, are its two attributes. Now, in the general metaphysical situation it is disclosed that Creativity, in its attribute of modality, is *limited* in two distinct ways. In the first place, Creativity is embodied in an actual course of events which might be otherwise as far as eternal possibility is concerned. This limitation takes the three forms of (*a*) conformation to logical relations, (*b*) the selection of causal relations, and (*c*) the "particularity" of events. Hence the first limitation is one of selection from an indefinite range of possibilities. Metaphysically speaking, there might have been an indiscriminate pluralism without logical or other limitation. But in that case there would not have been the modes that there are, "for each mode represents a synthesis limited to conform to a standard."[1] It can be said that limitation has been imposed as the price of *value*. That which is merely possible and unlimited has no value. Value arises only with the actualization into finite entities. This factor of "value" leads to the second limitation. There cannot be value without antecedent *standards* to enable the envisaging activity to discriminate, for acceptance or rejection of what is before it. Thus, there is also a limitation and selection among possible values based upon certain standards. There is, therefore, a metaphysical need for a principle of limitation.

[1] *Science and the Modern World*, p. 249.

The principle of limitation in the general metaphysical situation is one aspect of what is subsequently called "The Primordial Nature of God." It is an element in the attribute of the ultimate activity. This element provides the limitation "for which no reason can be given, as all reason flows from it"—the ultimate irrational ground of rationality. Such briefly is Whitehead's account of God as the principle of limitation.

Let us now consider the "eternal" aspect of God's nature, and its function in the scheme of things. The "ontological principle," fundamental to the organic philosophy, asserts that the only *reasons* for things are actual entities. In the previous section we learnt that the realm of eternal objects is the general potentiality of the universe. What actuality, then, is the reason for this general potentiality? Whitehead's reply to this question is that it is "the primordial nature of God," who must be regarded from the abstract point of view of our present approach, as a non-temporal actual entity. "The things that are temporal arise by their participation in the things that are eternal," and the two sets of entities, (1) actual occasions, and (2) eternal objects, are *mediated* by a unique entity combining the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This non-temporal actual entity[1] is both the principle of concrescence in the universe, "the principle whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation otherwise riddled with ambiguity," as well as the effective source of its potentiality.

Whitehead reminds us that the plurality of eternal objects, regarded in their bare isolated multiplicity, lack any *existent* character. They are only possibilities. Consequently to be "efficacious" they require to be related to the primordial nature of God as the non-temporal actual entity "conceptually" realizing them as an efficacious function in the multiple unifications of the universe by self-creative actual entities. We may say that "the primordial nature of God" is the acquisition by the ultimate activity of the universe, of a primordial character functioning as the unlimited conceptual realization of the wealth of potentiality. In this aspect "He is not *before* all creation, but *with* all creation." Moreover, in this abstract aspect He is deficient in actuality in two ways. In the first place, as "primordial," His feelings are *conceptual* only. In the second place, He is devoid of consciousness, since "conceptual" feelings (i.e. feelings of eternal objects), apart from integration with physical feelings, are not accompanied by consciousness.

The "primordial nature of God" is thus the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feelings at the base of things, providing an "order"

[1] The most fruitful way of conceiving God's "eternal" nature is to think of it as a vision and "valuation" of the realm of eternal forms, accompanied by an urge for their actualization in an orderly way in finite things.

in the relevance of eternal objects to the process of creation. It is to be noted that God's unity of conceptual operations is untrammelled by reference to any *particular* course of things. "He is deflected neither by love nor by hate from what in fact comes to pass. The particularity of the actual world presupposes it: while it merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance. . . . The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by Creativity of a primordial character."[1] As the "envisager of relevance" of the creative advance of the world, the primordial nature of God establishes the *initial* phase of the subjective aspect of each actual entity. But the initial phase *only*, since in respect of the subsequent phases of concrescence the actual entity is self-creative. The primordial nature of God also constitutes the metaphysical stability of the universe. He is the "ground" enabling the actual processes of the temporal world to exemplify general principles of metaphysics, and to attain the ends congruent with specific types of emergent order. Were it not for God's primordial valuation, there would be a complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the temporal world, and novelty would be inconceivable.

We are now in a position to proceed to an understanding of God in His complete nature.

The "consequent" nature of God

In the Organic Philosophy, the "primordial nature of God" is only one aspect of His full being. The other aspect is termed the "consequent nature of God," which is the notion of God as receiver and co-ordinator of values. It is explained thus. By reason of the relativity of all things, there is said to be a reaction of the temporal, physical world upon God's primordial nature, completing it by the addition of physical feelings derived from the actual world. The temporal world, constituted of occasions or processes, is "objectified" in God as His physical feelings. "This prehension into God of each creature is directed with the subjective aim, and clothed with the subjective form wholly derivative from His all-inclusive valuation."[2] Although God's "conceptual nature" is unchanged by this weaving of physical feelings upon His primordial concepts, the reception of feelings from the temporal world endows Him with full actuality and consciousness. Moreover, God's "consequent nature" links Him with the temporal world, since this is derivative from the creative advance of the world.

It is important to realize that the "consequent nature" of God implies that although God and the world may be opposed in our thought, they cannot in reality be torn apart. The following quotation will drive this truth home.

[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 487. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 468.

"God and the world stand over against each other, expressing the final metaphysical truth that appetitive vision and physical enjoyment have equal claim to priority in creation. But no two actualities can be torn apart: each is all in all. Thus each temporal occasion embodies God, and is embodied in God. In God's nature, permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the World: in the World's nature, flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God; also the World's nature is a primordial datum for God, and God's nature is a primordial datum for the World. Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux when it has reached its final term which is everlastingness—the apotheosis of the World."[1]

Let us pause for a moment and consider the meaning of this passage. In the first place it declares that the world is as necessary for God, as God is for the world, and that both God and the world are necessary for Creativity. Apart from God and the realm of eternal forms, the world is meaningless; apart from Creativity and the world of actual entities, God is meaningless; and apart from God and the turbulent active world, Creativity is meaningless. This mutual interdependence of the various aspects of the universe is the reason why the fundamental ideas employed in the description of the universe presuppose each other. In the second place, we are told that Creation achieves an ultimate reconciliation of permanence and flux in a state of unity called "everlastingness." Now this state of unity which is the final term achieved by the movement of Creation, is what is meant by the Consequent Nature of God. So that the Consequent Nature of God is the notion of the completion of the ideal unity of vision of the realm of eternal forms seeking realization in physical multiplicity, by the prehension into God of the actual entitles of the real world. This reception of the world into God's eternal nature and its unification with that nature, is what is meant by the phrase "the apotheosis of the World." In the third place, we learn that there is no final static completion of the universe. Both God and the world are in the grip of the fundamental metaphysical ground—the creative advance into novelty. That is to say, the world is ever expanding by the becoming of novel actual entities, and God is likewise ever enlarging His heaven by the reception of the new values which these actual entities achieve.

The notion of "everlastingness," which is the property of combining creative advance with the retention of mutual immediacy, involves the view that every actuality is prehended into a perfected system. All the events of the turbulent, physical world, with their sufferings, failures, and triumphs, are ultimately woven into a

[1] *Process and Reality*, pp. 493–4.

harmony of universal feelings which is "always many, always one, always with novel advance, moving onwards and never perishing."[1] Destructive evil, purely self-regarding, is dismissed by the supreme harmonizer into the triviality of mere individual facts. But all the values in the world of occasions which can be saved from perishing, are woven into a whole of harmonious feeling enriched by the variety of contrasts. This is the judgement of tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. Thus God, from this point of view, may be regarded as the "poet" of the world, saving it by His vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.[2] God does not create the world, but saves it. He is persuasive of ultimate harmonious unity through the patient operation of His over-powering rationality.

At this stage, it is pertinent to ask what exactly is the status of the individual on being prehended into God. Does he continue, an "end" for himself, or is his status only that of a "means" for the enrichment of God's experience? This is how Whitehead answers this question. In the ultimate whole of harmonized feeling which is "everlastingness," the function of being a "means" is not disjoined from the function of being an "end." We are told that "the sense of worth beyond itself is immediately enjoyed as an overpowering element in the individual self-attainment,"[3] so that sorrow and pain are transformed into an element of triumph, very much as discords in art contribute to the aesthetic value of a great work. Moreover, in the perfected actuality in which the many are everlastingly one, there is no loss "either of individual identity, or of completeness of unity." We learn that the temporal actuality, on its reception into God's nature, does not "pass away," but is transmuted into an ever-present fact. The element in God's nature corresponding to each temporal actuality is not temporal actuality, but the *transmutation* of that temporal actuality into a living immediacy. If we ask how it is possible that the past survives in God's nature in full immediacy, Whitehead suggests that it occurs in somewhat the same way as a person's past survives, not in mere memory, but as summed up in a person as he is *now*: "This element in God's nature inherits from the temporal counterpart according to the same principle as in the temporal world, the future inherits from the past. Thus in the sense in which the present occasion is the person *now* and yet with his own past, so this counterpart in God is that person in God."[4]

Conclusion

Our exposition of the Organic Philosophy has disclosed three creative phases in the universe. The first phase is that of "conceptual origination," infinite in the adjustment of valuation but

[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 489.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 490.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 495.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 496.

deficient in actuality, which has been described as the "primordial nature of God." The second phase is the self-creation of actual entities, fully actual, but lacking in the harmony of individuals with each other. The third phase is the "consequent nature of God," in which the many actual occasions are one everlastingly, without loss of individual identity or of completeness of unity. But there is a fourth and final phase. In consequence of the relativity of all things, the "consequent nature of God" floods back again into the temporal world as the special providence for each occasion. This is the view of Him as "the great companion, the fellow sufferer who understands."

One final word. The doctrine of the objective immortality of actual occasions as "potentials" for the creation of novel actual entities is fundamental in the Organic Philosophy. But the final application of this doctrine in the speculation that the occasions in the life of each creature, though perishing in the temporal world, nevertheless, albeit transformed, live everlastingly in the being of God, is bound, in the writer's view, to be a matter of acute criticism. The question will no doubt be asked, whether the principle of relativity can be made so all-embracing. Whitehead admits that in his discussion of what the metaphysical principles of the Organic Philosophy require, there is nothing of the character of "proof." He says, "there is merely the confrontation of the theoretical system with a certain rendering of the facts." But, seeing that the report upon the facts, and the system itself, is confessedly inadequate, the deductions from it as to the nature of God should not be regarded as more than "suggestions as to how the problem is transformed in the light of that system."[1] It is frankly acknowledged that whatever cogency the argument may have, depends upon certain exceptional experiences usually classed as moral and religious intuitions. But whether moral and religious intuitions can be made to bear the weight of the metaphysical claim of the immortality of perishing temporal occasions in the being of God, is a question that many will find hard to answer in the affirmative with confidence. In support of the doctrine Whitehead reminds us of "the insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by the ever-present, unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live for evermore."[2] Is the nature of Reality such as to justify this insistent craving? In other words is God not only the "reservoir of potentiality" and the source of ideals, but also the "co-ordinator of achievement" as the doctrine suggests? It is around this question of the ultimate unity of the world of temporal occasions in the being of God, that the debate will be most concentrated. In this debate it must never

[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 486. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 496.

be forgotten that "existence, in its own nature, is the upholding of value-intensity." Every pulsation of actuality has some value. But since no unit exists in isolation, every actuality not only has value for itself but for others and the whole of which it is a perspective. Consequently, as Whitehead says—"Everything that in any sense exists has two sides, namely, its individual self and its significance in the universe; either of these factors is a factor of the other."[1] The understanding of the universe requires that both the eternal world and the temporal world should exhibit the impress of the other.

I have now reached the end of my exposition of Whitehead's philosophy of the world as process. You will have gathered from this exposition that the universe is both a passage and something that is permanent, both temporal and eternal. On the one hand there is the general flux of events; on the other hand there are the eternal forms (the source of qualities and values) which ingress into the flux of events and provide them with a definite and determinate character. Also at the root of things, there is God, the ground of whatever rationality there is in things. Hence the things that are temporal need for their being the things that are eternal, and a Metaphysic of the universe must include as complementary facets both the realm of the actual and the realm of the ideal.

[1] Lecture on "Immortality" in *The Philosophy of Alfred Frank Whitehead* (North-Western University Press, 1941).

NEW BOOKS

Space and Spirit: Theories of the universe and the arguments for the existence of God. By Sir Edmund Whittaker, F.R.S. (Nelson, 1946. 6/–.)

There are two strands of thought and intention in this book, unequally developed. To begin with it is a clear historical account of Hellenic, Hellenistic, and medieval concepts of matter, substance, space, etc., with some contemporary theological associations Christian and non-Christian but not including the theologies of other great institutional religions. The account is carried forward into an equally clear history of some more modern aspects of the concept of causality, down to the present day. Sir Edmund's skill in drawing examples from his unrivalled mathematical experience blends curiously with his vigorous dislike of Neoplatonists, possibly because he suspects them of indecisive segregation of their empirical from their mystical interests concerning numbers, and of missing a genuine logical treatment between these. Neoplatonists were not alone in this vice, to which many of Sir Edmund's theological heroes were also addicted. He is not fair to the Neoplatonists, many of whom, such as Nicholas of Cusa, played as honourable a part in pre-modern science and philosophy as the names rescued by this book and introduced so intriguingly to a wider than specialist public.

Beyond the clarity in expounding this early history itself, a feat of considerable originality for which the book will be widely read, the most distinctive individuality is the rewriting of the famous medieval "proofs" of theism into modern language: this will be universally welcomed. But at numerous places the author goes so far as to hint that concepts in modern physics can turn this "re-translating" into a genuine "reinforcing": that will not be at all universally agreed. For the symbolic and provisional validity claimed by the fluctuating concepts under which an external world is regarded today accord ill with the frozen and inflexible certainties of medieval thought, and it does not come readily to most contemporary scientific philosophers to flatter themselves that they have proved anything at all beyond the forms of their knowledge. To leap from this form to theorems of the existence of the somewhat anthropomorphic deity argued by medieval ecclesiastics is a mental athleticism which feels acrobatic and strained. The attempt to graft today's cosmological physics, of whatever school, upon the curiously artificial intricacies of the Aquinean logic, is as if a painter were to try to reproduce the exquisite Dutch interiors of the seventeenth century under a post-impressionist, cubist, or even surrealist manner. The approach is foreign and the result bizarre, and any theological apologist inclined to hail this gift from science may well pause and fear the aliens *et dona ferentes*. The misfit is inevitable: today "proof" is not a desideratum so much as a horrendum in the philosophy of religion. For a thinking majority now recognize that personal or even mystical conviction comes home to the modern scientist and non-scientist more vividly than any argued "natural theology," whereas it is natural theology, not personal theology, with which Sir Edmund is exclusively concerned. We believe in something that we each cherish as sacred, but "belief" today is not a logically directed act of intellectual assent: whether we symbolize our individual conviction of the sacred by embodying it in spatial concepts or not, few now derive those concepts from any of corresponding name in the physical sciences. In fact, the question of what kind of spatial concepts are required, by the

epistemology of a physical or of any other external world-model, is apt to be answered on grounds aesthetic rather than rigidly binding as were the proofs in which the medieval theologians framed their neat and tidy but imprisoning foundations of theism. It would seem a gallant but unavailing effort to retell those proofs except as items of anthropological interest, and definitely repugnant to associate them with the very different meanings assigned in modern physics to "space," "matter," and other terms which merely sum up definite measurement rather than describe "things."

Strangely enough, in sections 32–36, where Sir Edmund offers a very readable and brilliantly compressed account of "the observable," "the measurable," and other terms dissecting the concepts of indeterminacy and causality in recent physics, there can be discovered the very reasons why there is no analogy between the cosmology of today and that of the medieval mind: the old theologian took his cosmology from a science which he supposed was a description of entities only differing in size from objects of perception, whereas today, as Sir Edmund himself so ably shows, the rational is symbolic rather than descriptive. What Whitehead called the "scientific object" has not the same epistemological or metaphysical status as the "perceived world" from which the medieval mind built its "natural theology," and it is doubtful whether Aquinas could have utilised our world of physics at all.

This is why we suspect that the second topic of this book, the modernization of medieval theistic arguments, will not have the lasting value of its first topic or the brilliant historical survey of what the medieval actually thought in his day before there was any modern philosophy or science.

MARTIN JOHNSON.

Ethical and Political Thinking. By E. F. CARRITT. (Oxford University Press. Pp. 186. Price 10s. net.)

The nature and purpose of the ethical thinking, which is described in this work and which occupied a prominent place in the studies of teachers and pupils in Oxford in the inter-war years, might, I think, be briefly summed up: clarity the end, analysis the means, and "definition and discrimination" of ethical terms the method. To-day doubts are being expressed in many quarters as to the adequacy of this programme. Its scope is believed to be too narrow and its objective too limited. We are told that "clarity is not enough," that "analysis should be supplemented by synopsis and synthesis," that we should move "towards a new moral philosophy." Whether or not these doubts are well grounded, the time is opportune for a clear and concise statement of the scope, method and problems of these enquiries and of their considerable achievements in analysis and clarification. No one is better qualified to do this than Mr. Carritt who, as he tells us, has, during nearly fifty years, spent some 15,000 hours discussing these problems with pupils and colleagues. The main conclusions at which he has arrived as the result of these discussions are presented in this work with freshness and vigour, as well as subtlety and ingenuity.

The main lines of the argument are familiar to students of moral philosophy from the author's earlier writings, especially his *Theory of Morals*, as well as from those of Ross and Prichard—to mention only the senior members of the New Intuitionist School; and no attempt will be made to summarize them here. Indeed, as the chief merit of the work is the analysis and clarification of what are largely matters of detail, any summary statement of the conclusions arrived at would be, and would be regarded by the author as being, bound to be misleading. It should, however, be added that though

much of the ground covered is familiar the work is no mere repetition of previous arguments. It is rather a fresh rethinking of the whole position and shows some important changes in the author's views, as well as differences between him and other members of the school.

The work is divided into three parts. Part I, which covers more than three-quarters of the total, is concerned with pure ethics, its purpose being to clarify our moral thinking or our use of ethical terms. Part II deals with political thinking or the application of ethical principles to problems of government; and its main contention is that "our duties to our state do not differ in kind but only in degree of complexity from most of our other duties to our neighbours."[1] Part III, consisting of 12 pages, deals with "morals and aesthetics" and is concerned to refute the argument, sometimes used against Intuitionists, that by admitting the subjectivity of beauty they have given away the case for the objectivity of moral judgement.

Part I traces the development of the moral thinking of the reflective moral agent, and the account of this development is based on two assumptions: that we cannot understand the rightness of the right solution until we have seen the wrongness of the wrong solutions, and that the thinking of the student of morals passes through the same stages, though not necessarily in the same order, as the historical development of ethical theories. Following this plan, Mr. Carritt divides ethical theories other than those of his own school into two kinds, which he discusses in turn. Under the title "Non-moral theories of conduct" he deals with theories which "deny the reality of obligation." The ethical views of Professor Ayer and the different varieties of psychological hedonism are regarded as the main representatives of this class and discussed at some length. All other moral theories are classed under the dyslogistic heading of "Crude moral theories," though it is admitted that some are more crude, others less so. Considering that this title covers not only some contemporary ethical theories but all or almost all held before the present century, it seems as inaccurate as it is dyslogistic. False in whole or in part all of them may be, but crude some of them are not. They seem to suffer rather from over-subtlety and refinement. The account given of many of them is so brief as to be misleading; and I cannot help feeling that it might have been better to omit it altogether and to refer the reader to the fuller, if not more sympathetic, treatment of them in the author's *Theory of Morals*. But this would no doubt be inconsistent with the assumptions regarding the development of ethical thinking on which the plan of the book is based.

In the light of the conclusions which emerge from the discussion of wrong theories, Mr. Carritt gives a classification of types of good and types of obligation and an account of the relation of goodness and obligation to desire. There are also chapters on punishment and freedom, but they differ little from the corresponding chapters in the *Theory of Morals*.

In the last sentence of his *Theory of Morals* Mr. Carritt tells us "my opinions upon these matters have suffered a pretty constant development, and I have no reason to fear that this has ceased." What main developments in his views, then, have taken place since this was written?

(1) More subtle analyses have resulted in further distinctions, with corresponding changes in terminology. To give only one instance, he now distinguishes not only between objective and subjective duty, but within the latter, as the term is used, e.g. by Ross and Broad, he draws a further distinction between subjective duty (by which he means what a morally infallible being would regard a situation as he believes it to be as demanding)

[1] P. 172.

and putative duty which is what I with my fallible moral insight believe the situation, as I think it, to demand. I am not sure that this distinction has added much to the clarity of the discussion. Its only merit, so far as I can see, is that it calls attention to the double dose of subjectivity in what is usually called subjective duty.

(2) Having made this distinction, Mr. Carritt, though with some hesitation, takes the view, contrary to other members of the school, that "real" duty is objective duty. Whether by "real" duty he here means what he formerly[1] called "paramount" or "actual" duty or, as he sometimes prefers to call it, simply duty is not clear. He admits that it is only in respect of doing his putative duty that a person is subject to praise or blame; that we can never know our objective duty, and that we can only do it by accident or luck. Is it not paradoxical to say that it is my "real" duty to do an act which I do not believe to be my duty, an act for not doing which I incur neither remorse nor censure and for the doing of which I may incur both? Having carefully distinguished different senses of duty, all of them normal and legitimate, as Mr. Carritt is at pains to do, why assume that one of these is its "real" meaning and that in all our use of it it has this "real" meaning? May it not be that when I am trying to discover my duty I am thinking of objective duty, that is, trying by a careful survey of the situation and the exercise of my moral reason to get as near as I can to what is objectively right; while when I ask myself whether I have done my duty, that is, all that was morally required of me, I am thinking of putative duty?

(3) More important is a change in terminology which, though he admits that it is a departure from normal usage, enables Mr. Carritt to give a much neater analysis of both right and duty and to state his position with greater ease and clarity. He uses the term obligation to mean what Ross calls *prima facie* duty and Prichard calls claim; and he confines the term claim to the "right" of the person to whom the obligation is due to have his "claim" considered. Duty in any situation, then, becomes the strongest obligation to which that situation gives rise; and corresponding to a duty we have, on the part of the person to whom the strongest obligation is due, a right. According to this terminology, we have two pairs of correlatives, obligations and claims, duties and rights. An obligation as such is not a duty: only the strongest obligation is. A claim is not a right, except in the sense of a "right" to have one's claim considered and weighed against other and, it may be, stronger claims.

(4) Using this terminology I shall try to state the most important change in Mr. Carritt's ethical doctrines since he wrote his *Theory of Morals*, a change which brings him much nearer to the position of Ross and Prichard. In 1928 he wrote: "I cannot persuade myself that I first morally apprehend the obligation of several rules (i.e. rules of *prima facie* duties or what he now calls simply obligations), then intellectually apprehend one of the alternative actions to be an instance of one and the other of another. . . . I rather think that I morally apprehend that I ought now to do this act and then intellectually generalize rules."[2] In other words, he then held that obligations are not immediately apprehended but are generalizations from particular concrete actions our duty to do which is so apprehended. Now he tells us that "our reason immediately apprehends that what is assumed to be the situation gives rise to obligations."[3] These obligations are "as self-evident as the axioms of mathematics, the law of causation, or the principles of logic."[4] However hard we try, we cannot doubt them.[5] We see their necessity.[6]

[1] *Theory of Morals*, p. 114. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 116, cf. pp. 30–1, 70, 138.
[3] P. 4. [4] P. 3. [5] P. 43. [6] P. 44.

Mr. Carritt offers no explanation of how he came to apprehend immediately the necessity of the obligations of which he was unable to persuade himself in 1928. Perhaps in a case like this where the apprehension is immediate and no process is involved we should not ask for an explanation. All we can have is testimony that the necessity is immediately apprehended. Those of us who are still unable to see the necessity may console ourselves that Mr. Carritt also was in our condition in 1928. We may even dare to hope that if we continue to meditate on these problems for 15,000 hours the light may dawn. Meantime, I think we have a right to expect rather more tolerance from Mr. Carritt for "our deficiency of moral reason."

So far the account is quite clear, whether or not we find it acceptable. It is the account of what happens when we are trying to discover our duty in a particular situation, what was formerly described as a process of immediate apprehension, but is now regarded as a weighing of the comparative strength of obligations, that I find difficult to follow. Obligations may and do conflict and then our duty is the strongest obligation. What are we to understand by the strength of an obligation, and by what principle or standard are we to measure it? The difficulty is that while reason immediately apprehends the obligation, its apprehension of it seems to be only partial. It apprehends its necessity, but apparently not its strength or at least its comparative strength when measured against another obligation. The comparative strength of obligations does not seem to be determined by their grounds; for while all obligations have grounds, the grounds of different obligations are different, and have nothing in common which could provide a basis of comparison. It is not determined by their degree of necessity; for necessity does not seem to admit of degrees. It is not determined by the urgency of the feelings they produce in us; for it is regarded as an objective characteristic of obligations. It is not determined by the goodness of that which we are obliged to do; for the results of some actions which we are obliged to do are not good.[1] We are told that in moral reflection, in trying to discover what our duty in a particular situation is, it is on the obligations to which the assumed situation gives rise that we reflect.[2] We are also told that in this process we are liable to make mistakes,[3] but about the basis of comparison we are told nothing. Yet the point seems crucial; for if there is no principle or standard of measurement for this work of comparison on which we are engaged in moral reflection, what is the value of such reflection, and is there any guarantee that the more we reflect the more likely we are to discover our duty?

There is another point on which I find it difficult to be sure that I understand Mr. Carritt's argument. He devotes a good deal of attention to the nature of moral philosophy and the relation of ethical theory to moral practice. His general contention is that while ethical theory originates in the perplexities of moral practice, the hopes of practical solutions with which many students embark on it are doomed to disappointment, and they continue it, if they continue it at all, out of intellectual curiosity. The real business of moral philosophy is to clarify our ethical or moral thinking (sometimes the one term is used, sometimes the other) and particularly our use of ethical terms. But the term moral thinking is capable of being used in two different senses, and I am not sure that Mr. Carritt always distinguishes clearly between them. Moral thinking may mean the thinking of the moral agent trying to discover what his duty is or it may mean (though in this case ethical thinking seems the more appropriate term) the thinking of the ethical

[1] P. 93. But inconsistently with this position, Mr. Carritt infers the goodness of pure aesthetic experience from the fact that we feel an obligation to cultivate it (p. 87).
[2] P. 56.
[3] P. 60.

theorist trying to understand or explain what the moral agent is doing or thinking. The moral thinking of the moral agent especially, as Mr. Carritt puts it, his "more considered judgements are the moral philosopher's only data;" and like other scientists the ethical theorist "must not juggle with his facts"[1] or data. But it would appear that the facts or data of the moral philosopher are not so definite as those of other scientists; for Mr. Carritt thinks that the moral philosopher "may contradict them . . . by still more careful analysis of their meaning."[2] Now if the ethical theorist can under any circumstances contradict the more considered moral judgements of the moral agent and tell him that he is wrong, this looks more like clarifying the moral thinking of the moral agent than the ethical thinking of the theorist. What this suggests is that the data of ethics are not so definite or at least so easily accessible as many moral theorists seem to assume, and that it is more difficult to draw a clear line of distinction between ethical theory and the reflective thinking of the moral agent in his more considered and critical efforts to discover his duty than Mr. Carritt at times suggests. The point seems to me a difficult one, and I do not find Mr. Carritt's position in regard to it free from ambiguity.

If in this review I have dealt largely with points where I find Mr. Carritt's argument difficult to follow, this must not be taken to mean that I do not fully appreciate the careful and critical analysis of a work which it would be presumption on my part to praise and which every student of moral philosophy should read and master for himself. A. MACBEATH.

[1] P. 6. [2] *Ibid.*

Morals and the New Theology. By H. D. LEWIS. (Gollancz. London. 1947. Pp. 160. Price 7s. 6d.)

It may be doubted whether philosophers today pay much heed to what theologians are thinking or writing; not only have they problems enough of their own to occupy their attention, but they have a profound and possibly well founded suspicion that the modern theologian is still trying to live in a traditionalist Paradise, while making one or two wholly inadequate concessions to the changed modes of thinking on religious problems which the growth of psychology, anthropology and sociology, and the all-round expansion of scientific horizons, have fostered among a large, and increasing, number of intelligent men and women. Nevertheless, many would no doubt agree with Dr. Pringle-Pattison that "it is the proper office of philosophy, or let us say of the critical reason generally, to purify religious belief and practice by teaching men to discard intellectually untenable or morally unworthy conceptions of the divine." And it is to an important aspect of this task laid on philosophers that Mr. H. D. Lewis has addressed himself, with clarity and vigour, in the book under review.

Now philosophers, it seems reasonable to hold, need not necessarily be worried when a theologian produces apparently naive or even irrational doctrines, since it is generally taken for granted that he is appealing to his own particular sources of knowledge, namely, revelation and authority. And though these sources have no attraction for philosophers as such, there is frequently a disposition to admit that they have some validity in the sphere of religion. Unfortunately, however, many of the fine-spun arguments of theologians have immense consequences for both metaphysics and morals, and it is when such arguments set out deliberately to challenge rational speculation, or to menace the foundations of morality, that philosophers are apt to register a sharp protest.

Certainly some philosophical correction seems called for in connection with the remarkable orgy of pessimism in which many theologians have been lately indulging. Thus Mr. Lewis quotes from the recent *Report of the Oxford Conference* where it is maintained that the war against evil in society represents a struggle "against a destructive principle in the universe itself, and against superhuman powers of evil," and that in this conflict, "we cannot in our own strength contend successfully against satanic powers." (p. 116). Even worse is the invitation to self-vilification which Mr. Lewis has noted in a book warmly commended in a Foreword by the Bishop of Hull (*Divine Judgment in Human History*, by D. R. Davies). Here all human endeavour is implied to be futile, and the claim is made that "whatever originates from the will of man remains self-destructive." (p. 117). "That crudities of this sort," comments Mr. Lewis, "so utterly lacking in historical or philosophical analysis, should have won for the writer a high place in the esteem of religious leaders and, as I understand, a large following among humbler ranks, is a sobering thought. It should give us pause before we assume that the theories which isolate religion from life will be slow to ally themselves effectively with the forces of reaction in the more democratic and liberal countries." (p. 118).

The chief offenders in Mr. Lewis's eyes, however, are the leading representatives of the "New Theology" such as Brunner, Barth, and Niebuhr. It is these theologians, with their apparently wide audiences, who wish to trample on reason, foist on man a sort of spiritual masochism and undermine the whole basis of ethics by insisting that "the freedom which we normally associate with the idea of obligation must be straight way identified with bondage to sin', that "all men are *equally* sinful" and that other no less distasteful paradoxes which play havoc with the deliverances of a normal conscience must be unreservedly accepted. But if they *are* accepted, then, says Mr. Lewis, "the very springs of individual responsibility are dried up in an apathetic surrender to oppressive doctrinal fictions" (pp. 70–71).

Thus Mr. Lewis's theme is that the "New Theology," in its desire to make a sensational appeal to those who have lost faith in reason, has tried to distort ethics for its own fell purposes, without realizing that it is cutting the ground from under its own feet—since it is *only* a theologically independent ethic that will provide the basis on which theology may build up its own superstructure. In short, Mr. Lewis is pleading for the autonomy of ethics, and for theologians to realize that "mature persons have a proper awareness of moral distinctions quite independently of their adoption of any religious faith." (p. 24).

So far as philosophers are concerned (with the possible exception of neo-Thomists), Mr. Lewis is talking to the converted; but perhaps some theologians—and especially those who jump into the philosophical arena without the necessary training and knowledge—will profit by his lessons, and be saved from themselves. Nevertheless, one feels that theologians are deserving of our sympathy, as well as our censure, due to a basic difficulty which has bedevilled so much theological argument and may well account, in part at least, for the present aberrations which Mr. Lewis has so ably castigated.

Briefly put, the difficulty is this. Encouraged by the apparent success of the Thomist synthesis, theologians have, understandably enough, tried to obtain the best of two worlds—the world of doctrinal orthodoxy, and the world of rational speculation—without realizing that the chasm between them cannot be bridged, that dogmas erected on primitive behaviour compulsions (to borrow a term from Dr. Thouless) cannot be rationalized and fitted into some coherent philosophical system. But—and here is the great

dilemma—if they were entirely to cease hankering after incompatibles and follow the path laid down for them by Scotus and (more particularly) Occam, if they were to withdraw all religious truths from the sphere of reason and rely on their own evidential guarantee of revelation mediated by authority (a policy that would at least be consistent and, if cautiously pursued, render them invulnerable to philosophical attack)—they would at once lose the support of more intelligent mortals who demand at least some rational basis for the dogmas they are asked to accept and who cannot follow Tertullian's (and Pascal's) advice to believe them *because* they are absurd. Unwilling, therefore, to relinquish the advantages of either world, theologians have incessantly fallen between two stools, and have earned the inevitable reward of those who cannot make up their minds to which side of human nature—the rational or irrational—they will appeal. Liberal Protestantism, putting its money more on the rational side, has sought to discard as much as possible of the more "anti-scientific" and mythological aspects of the cultus, in a desperate endeavour to attract intelligent minds back to the fold. But this appeasement has apparently not gone far enough—either because the hold of traditionalism is still too strong, or (what is more likely) because it is realized that too many concessions to modernist views will emasculate Christianity and reduce it to a mere lesson in morality. Hence it seems that, as a reaction against this well-intentioned if unsuccessful attempt to reconquer lost territory by sweet reason, the New Theologians have gone to the other extreme and appealed to man's irrational side, and in such a way as to offer a direct challenge to philosophy on its own ground. This has for some, we must suppose, a certain dynamic attraction: they feel that, with the approbation and encouragement of religious leaders, they may vindicate their right to treat reason with contempt. All credit, then, to Mr. Lewis for exposing some of these theologians' most palpable errors within the brief compass of 160 pages.

J. Hartland-Swann

The Moral Sense. By D. Daiches Raphael. (Oxford University Press: London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1947. Pp. 201. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book is, in the words of its author, "concerned with the views of four eighteenth-century philosophers on the epistemology of morals" (p. 1). The writers selected for discussion, "as those of the British moralists who were most affected one way or the other by the empiricist theory of knowledge" (p. 2), are Hutcheson, Hume, Price and Reid. The author's interest is not solely historical. He is impressed with the degree to which the eighteenth-century controversy between the advocates of "sense" and "reason" in morals resembles the present-day debate between emotionalists and intuitionists; and it is from the standpoint of his own, intuitionist, position, briefly summarized in his concluding chapter, that he criticizes the views of the four writers mentioned.

Mr. Raphael's first chapter is largely concerned with pointing out that the "exercise of the moral faculty" does not resemble smelling, hearing and tasting in the ways in which smelling, tasting and hearing both (i) resemble one another (and touching and seeing) and (ii) differ from other types of experience. In this he is plainly right, but I do not know (nor does Mr. Raphael tell us) of any philosopher who held a "moral sense" theory which entailed a contrary view. To hold a "moral sense" theory is not to believe that moral qualities are sensible qualities.

Mr. Raphael then turns to Hutcheson, whom he charges, I think justly,

with defining the word "sense" so widely that it would be not incorrect to speak, say, of a "logical sense" (p. 19). He also charges him, I think unjustly, with confusing the *discernment* of rightness and the *motives* to it (p. 22); but surely the absence of a rigid distinction between them is no confusion on a view such as Hutcheson's, which might fairly be summarized in modern terms as the insistence that there occur disinterested desires and impulses ("benevolence") whose fulfilment (by the self or others) produces the feeling of approbation (of the self or others) and whose frustration induces the feeling of disapprobation (of the self or others). Mr. Raphael is clearly right, however, in saying that Hutcheson's main concern in the *Inquiry* is to refute the psychological egoist (p. 30). In his later *Illustrations on the Moral Sense* Hutcheson recognizes the existence of "rationalist ethics" and, against equating rightness with "conformity to reason" or "fittingness," takes the usual line that, while it is proper to speak of actions as being "fitting" in the sense "well adapted to achieve their end," the ultimate choice of ends, and the ultimate ground of approbation, must be non-rational. This calls forth a strong reaction from Mr. Raphael, who wants to base "ultimate approvals" on the rational intuition of a necessary connection between non-moral and moral (relational) characteristics. He complains that Hutcheson "never considers the possibility that reason may be a faculty of immediate apprehension" (p. 34); and adds that the fundamental moral relation (obligation, fittingness) is "logically entailed" by the situation in which it is manifested (p. 41).

Phrases such as these let us know where Mr. Raphael stands. Naturally, he is unmoved by Hume's arguments against reason as the source of moral judgments; and concludes that "Hume has not shown that in moral reasoning we . . . cannot start from self-evident axioms about goodness and obligation" (p. 71). He does more justice than some commentators have done to the subtleties of Hume's general analysis; and seems right in maintaining that Hume's account of obligation is unsatisfactory, though he does not give any valid reason for supposing that feeling-theories could not accommodate a unique, introspectible *feeling* of obligation. From this chapter on Hume, it is clear once again that the author rests his case against "feeling-theories" mainly on his belief that we know certain synthetic entailments concerning moral concepts (p. 84).

Turning from Hutcheson and Hume to Price and Reid, Mr. Raphael finds himself among philosophical allies; and, though he perhaps at times strains his author's meaning to stress the bonds of alliance, these two chapters are, on the whole, the best in the book. The work of Price is easily shown to contain striking anticipations of arguments and distinctions familiar to readers of Moore and Ross. Any definition of "right," for example, Price rejects on the ground that it is always significant to predicate the word of the proffered definition (p. 111). Price goes yet further in the desired (intuitionist) direction by claiming for rational intuition the function of perceiving universal and necessary truths. Yet Mr. Raphael finds his final arguments inconclusive and his theory "insufficiently worked out." Why did Price not clinch the question by declaring that general moral principles are "apprehended by the understanding as necessarily true"? This final illumination was denied him, according to Mr. Raphael, because, lacking the modern "solution" of "prima facie obligations," he was daunted by the problem of conflicting duties and the consequent apparent lack of universality of ethical principles (pp. 144–5).

From the firm ground of ordinary language and common sense, Thomas Reid attacks both the theorists of feeling and the extremes of rationalist ethics. Mr. Raphael presents this part of his case with admirable clarity;

though he might have made it plainer that Reid, in defending a "reasoned" choice of ends as well as of means, was not drawing attention to any facts which Hume had overlooked. His main criticism of Reid is that he fails to maintain consistently the epistemological distinction between the necessary axioms (general truths) of morality, and the particular judgments of "instantiation" of moral characteristics (p. 173); and consequently fails to arrive at Mr. Raphael's distinction between the act of rational intuition by which we apprehend the former, and the particular moral judgment which, while presupposing the apprehension of the relevant general truth, does not generally involve any explicit reference to it unless the particular judgment itself comes to be questioned (pp. 189–93).

The theory of moral judgment of which the outlines emerge from Mr. Raphael's criticism of his four chosen philosophers is all too briefly summarized in the concluding chapter. The fundamental moral concept is taken to be that of obligation (an unanalysable relation); and Mr. Raphael makes great, but not (for me) very illuminating use of the familiar distinction between a "prima facie obligation" (which I shall write "obligation") and a duty proper or actual obligation (which I shall write "Obligation"). One would have thought that "prima facie obligation" (obligation) would be definable in terms of "obligation" (Obligation); and that some knowledge of the latter would be the pre-condition of any knowledge of the former. For Mr. Raphael the converse is the case, at least as regards knowledge. I know I have an Obligation to do X only if I know both that I have an obligation to do X and that this is my only or preponderant obligation. I judge that I have an obligation to do X only if I see (intuit) now or have previously seen (intuited) that the existence of circumstances of such-and-such a kind entails the existence of an obligation of this kind. From circumstances I can (deductively) infer obligations; and from obligations I can infer Obligations (deductively if there is only one obligation, inductively if there are more). And this is the only way in which I can come to know either obligations or Obligations; for these are "consequential relations" (derivative concepts), not to be known except as synthetically entailed by other characteristics. Mr. Raphael modifies the fabulous intellectualism of this account by allowing that ordinary particular moral judgments generally involve, not explicit intuitions of entailment, but an unreflective "taking for granted" that, say, an action is Obligatory as falling under a previously intuited rule about the obligatoriness of actions of that type. Habit helps us to make the transition from circumstances to Obligations without the mediating intuitions. But the intuitions must have occurred at one time, as the pre-conditions of moral judgment, as the foundations of the habit. (It is not quite clear whether they are also the pre-condition of moral emotion.)

The objections, both of a general and of a detailed nature, to this account, seem to me overwhelming. It commits the prima facie absurdity of making the concept of "obligation" derivative from that of "prima facie obligation" instead of conversely—an absurdity perhaps always implicit in this deceptively "helpful" notion. It raises for Mr. Raphael the problem of how we know, in the case of conflict, which of our obligations is our Obligation; a problem which he conspicuously fails to solve by the suggestion that we know it by induction. I could, in a given case, pick out my Obligation from my conflicting obligations inductively, only if there had occurred other cases of conflicting obligations in which I had known my Obligation independently of my knowledge of my obligations. But, in the first place, this would be an instance of a non-inductive picking out of an Obligation from conflicting obligations; and, in the second place, this hypothesis contradicts Mr. Raphael's

thesis that knowledge of Obligations is always mediated or preceded by the intuition of obligations as entailed by circumstances.

Both critics and defenders of intuitionism in morals, however, will find Mr. Raphael's attempt to solve the "epistemological problem" instructive. Nor do the interest and stimulus of his book depend upon this attempt alone, but owe most to the care and skill which Mr. Raphael gives to the detailed presentation and criticism of his authors' arguments and points of view. To these features of the book I have not been able to do anything approaching justice in a short notice. P. F. STRAWSON.

Causation and the Foundations of Science. By J. O. WISDOM. (Hermann & Co., Paris. 1946. Pp. 54.)

This work is interesting as an attempt to find a *via media* in regard to causation between the empiricism of the regularity view and thoroughgoing rationalism and also for its discussion of the possible philosophical bearings of the principle of indeterminacy. The author is not satisfied with the fashionable empiricism which reduces causality to regular sequence, but insists on the need for necessity. The strongest argument against the former view is, he thinks, that on such a view "the cause has no bearing on the production of the effect, since the regular recurrence has a merely *de facto* basis. Thus when hydrogen and oxygen are united by a spark, the proportions of the gases and the spark contribute in no way to the fact that they lose their independent existence and are succeeded by water. The action of a cause has" [on the regularity view] "to be thought of as *an action that does nothing*" (p. 41). Dr. Wisdom is also influenced by the difficulty of defending induction on the regularity view, but he failed to make it clear how this difficulty is to be met on his own view. Fundamental for him is the distinction between macroscopic and miscroscopic causation, the regularity view being true of the former but not of the latter. He is a believer in causal necessity but he refuses to regard this as involving logical necessity. The difficulty about that in my mind is to arrive at any clear conception of a necessity that is not logical or at the very least to avoid admitting features which make it so analogous to logical necessity that an important truth is expressed by calling it "entailment," and I cannot say that the account given has helped here. But in other respects it is very interesting and suggestive especially in the criticism of the rival regularity and entailment views and the use of the distinction between microscopic and macroscopic. The length of the work is naturally not sufficient to deal adequately with the very thorny and complicated problem of induction. The account of the philosophical bearings of the indeterminacy principle is very interesting and the analysis of the relevant points given is highly instructive. The author, however, seems to waver somewhat on this point so that it is difficult to obtain a consistent view of his account. Sometimes it would seem that he regards the principle as very relevant, sometimes as largely irrelevant to philosophy.

Dr. Wisdom has produced a very interesting and stimulating little manual, the 54 pages of which are crammed with material. The work must also have an interesting history, though this is only alluded to very briefly at the end. It was printed and published in France; and the proofs having been corrected in 1940, the type remained in being in Paris all through the occupation apparently undisturbed to bear its belated fruit now (subject to a few alterations). However this circumstance can hardly excuse the large number of minor misprints. The book could with profit be read both by elementary and advanced students of the subject. A. C. EWING.

The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy. By H. J. Paton, F.B.A. (Hutchinson's University Library. London. 1947. Pp. 283. Price 21s.)

This book, I must say at once, is a contribution of the greatest importance to the understanding of Kant's ethics, and is certainly the best and fairest account I have read of the subject. It will not appeal to those who prefer to regard Kant as a man of straw in overthrowing whom they may display a facile dialectical skill; but without any unfair whitewashing it provides an admirable exposition and defence of the main principles of the *Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals* and of the ethical as distinct from the theological part of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It certainly does for these works what *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience* by the same author did for the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and helped by a less intractable subject-matter it surpasses Prof. Paton's former book in terseness and lucidity, while not inferior to it in power of thought and judicial balance.

The main stock criticisms directed against Kant's ethics are largely due to its very formal character, but, Prof. Paton insists, we cannot blame Kant here for being too formal, because he was just concerned here with the form of ethical judgments, and not with the matter, which he leaves to the *Metaphysic of Ethics*. We cannot blame Kant for studying the form even if we happen not to be interested in it ourselves, and we must remember that he has also written a book in which he deals with the non-formal aspects of ethics. Prof. Paton vigorously and very rightly opposes the interpretations according to which Kant's ethics is vitiated by taking no account of consequences. "Kant makes it clear that there is no question of deducing particular duties merely from the empty form of universal law. On the contrary, we have to consider the *matter* which has to be fitted into this empty form. The matter consists of our ordinary material maxims based on inclination for definite objects; and what we have to do is to accept or reject these maxims by the principle of universality."[1] Similarly, he rejects the interpretation according to which Kant is supposed to have held that no actions which accord with our desires could have moral worth.[2] And he ably defends Kant's doctrine that the good will and the good will alone has unconditional value, while leaving some conditional value for other parts of our nature. He leaves in the reader's mind a kindlier and humaner picture than has been fashionable of Kant's ethics, and incidentally of Kant's personality.[3]

The most widely known feature of Kant's ethical doctrine is perhaps his conception of moral laws as strictly universal and his use of this conception as a criterion of what is right. Prof. Paton dispels the idea that this is more than a negative criterion, failure to comply with which makes an action wrong.[4] Any action which complies with it, he thinks, Kant would have regarded as permissible, thus leaving scope for a decision according to our desires provided we did not transgress the assigned limits. But he lays most stress on the sense in which universality is implied by any rational ethical judgment, i.e. if it is right at one time or for one man, it must under the same conditions be right at any time and for any man. The principle will seem to some too formal to be of any value, but it is yet presupposed in the most simple ethical reasoning from one case to another (c.f. science and the uniformity of nature), so Paton does right to emphasize it; but he should, I think, have also given a thorough discussion of the less defensible sense of universality in ethics which led Kant to maintain that it was wrong to tell a lie even in order to mislead a would-be murderer. His views of universality

[1] P. 73. [2] Chap. III. [3] Pp. 197-8 [4] Pp. 141-2.

as a criterion are summed up as follows: "Kant's solution is that the actions which can and ought to be willed in obedience to moral law are those whose maxims, if conceived as a law of nature, would further a systematic harmony of purposes among men, or at least would do nothing to destroy such a systematic harmony. . . . Indeed it may well be doubted whether it is possible to work out a systematic moral philosophy on any other basis, even although we may hold that Kant's own attempt to work it out is in many respects faulty."[1] Prof. Paton, to me very surprisingly, insists that Kant made the good prior to the ought, not vice versa.[2] I think this interpretation requires much more justification than is given.

The most difficult part of Kant's ethics is his discussion of the connection between moral obligation and freedom and his half-hearted attempt to justify ethics by an argument from outside. Prof. Paton rejects the latter argument and holds that by the time he wrote the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant had reached the view that the moral law must be accepted as an object of immediate insight.[3] But he draws an illuminating parallel between theoretical and ethical knowledge which perhaps expresses what was predominant in Kant's thought when he discussed these topics. If we are to think rationally, our thought must be determined not just by previous events but by timeless logical principles, and similarly if we are to act rationally in the full sense—which for Kant means acting morally—our action must be determined by a timeless moral law, and not by the natural causation which connects it with earlier events.[4] This, Prof. Paton insists, does not prove ethics or freedom, but it helps us towards accepting our moral insight as we accept our theoretical insight. He thinks that Kant should have stopped here with a timeless law and not introduced the nation of timeless acts on our part, a view with which most readers will no doubt agree. While his account deals admirably with most of the subtleties involved, I must confess that on two points I feel dissatisfied: 1. his discussion of the antithesis between analytic and synthetic propositions; 2. the rather too cursory way in which he deals with Kant's identification of free and moral action, which presents perhaps the acutest and most long-standing problem in the whole of Kantian ethics.

I conclude by mentioning two omissions. It seems to me that in the present climate of thought the book would have been more useful if it had brought out more the exact nature of the opposition between Kant's view and the views which are nowadays expounded under the headings of naturalism and subjectivism. In this connection it is unfortunate that the author seems to commit the mistake of assuming that any naturalist view must reduce moral judgments to judgments about pleasure and pain.[5] Secondly, I am surprised that he makes no apparent use of Kant's published *Lectures on Ethics*. No doubt he has read the work but there are no references to it, and though he might say that it is concerned rather with applied ethics than with the form of ethics it is difficult to believe that no citations from it would have been helpful. But in any case we may congratulate Prof. Paton on his excellent book and recommend it very heartily as essential to all serious students of Kant's ethics.

A. C. EWING.

[1] P. 163. [2] P. 104. [3] P. 203. [4] P. 217 ff. [5] P. 20.

Language, Truth and Logic. By A. J. AYER. (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1946. Pp. 160. Price 9s.)

This book, first published in 1936, is now issued in more austere form, with no alteration of text, but with a new introduction of 21 pages, in which Mr. Ayer discusses some questions arising out of his views, and notes some changes

in his views during the interval. The two main topics he deals with in this introduction are the principle of verification, and the nature of philosophical analysis; and there are briefer notes on *a priori* propositions, on propositions about the past and about other minds, and on the emotive theory of values.

Most of his discussion of the principle of verification is concerned with technical details designed to improve the exposition of the argument and the expression of the principle itself; but he now makes it clear that he does not expect it to be accepted as a self-evident proposition about the only possible conditions under which any statement could be said to have meaning. He now describes it as a definition of one proper use of the word "meaning"; and even if metaphysical statements have no meaning in this sense, he no longer expects metaphysicians to admit straightway that what they are saying is altogether senseless. "Although," he says, "I should still defend the criterion of verifiability as a methodological principle, I realize that for the effective elimination of metaphysics it needs to be supported by detailed analyses of particular metaphysical arguments" (p. 16).

I should prefer to express what Mr. Ayer is now saying by describing the principle of verifiability not as a proposition but as a proposal: as an attempt to persuade investigators who wish their work to be fruitful, to consider only certain types of statement and not waste time on other types. Proposals can be argued for or against, though they cannot be shown to be true or false. Proposals do not invalidate propositions, though if you can get people to accept certain proposals you can get them to reject certain arguments. And this it seems to me is all that can be hoped for from the principle of verifiability.

It should be noted that, as Mr. Ayer expressed it, the principle of verifiability did not result in an explicit definition of the meaning of a statement, but merely showed under what conditions a statement could be said to have meaning. A statement has meaning (of the approved kind) only if it is capable of being verified or falsified by a procedure of a particular kind. This does not, so far, identify the meaning of a statement with the procedure for its verification. It leaves open the question of how the meaning of a statement is to be determined. The methods of determining whether it is true or not that there is a chair in the next room are not, so far, regarded as furnishing an account of what it means to say that there is a chair in the room. A distinction is still left possible between the conditions which must be satisfied if a statement is to have meaning, and the procedure for determining what the meaning of the statement is.

This latter procedure was indicated in Mr. Ayer's account of the nature of philosophical analysis. In the text of 1936 this account resulted in a very close connexion being made between the conditions necessary for a statement to have meaning and the procedure for determining that meaning. The new account of philosophical analysis seems to make this connexion much less close. In 1936 he held that it was the function of philosophical analysis to show how statements containing certain types of expression can be replaced by equivalent statements not containing these types of expression; to show, e.g. that statements about material objects, such as tables, trees, etc., could be replaced by equivalent statements containing no reference to such material objects, but referring only to actual or possible observations. He expressed this by saying that "the philosopher is primarily concerned with the provision, not of *explicit* definitions, but of definitions *in use*" (p. 60). The effect of this account was that the meaning of statements about material objects would be expressible entirely in terms of actual or possible verificatory statements. He would now prefer to speak not of replacing statements of one sort by *equivalent*

statements of another sort, but rather of showing how the statements of one sort are *related to* statements of another sort.

This is a significant difference; as is indicated by the fact that he now thinks that it is impossible to define what we mean by the phrase "a material thing" in terms of observation statements. "What one can do, however, is to construct a scheme which shows what sort of relations must hold between sense contents for it to be true, in any case, that a material thing exists" (24).

It would be possible to take this new account as indicating a move away from phenomenalism. The new account would prevent anyone from saying that material things are nothing but sets of sense-contents, or that making statements referring to material objects is only a compendious way of making statements about actual or possible sense-experiences. To say that a material thing exists would be to say something different from what can be said by speaking about sense-experiences. The latter would be evidence for the former, but not part of its meaning. Thus the new account of the nature of philosophical analysis would justify and exploit the gap left in the statement of the principle of verification between the conditions under which a statement can be said to have meaning and the determination of that meaning.

There is, however, a paragraph on pp. 14–15 with a contrary tendency. In this paragraph Mr. Ayer does make it clear that he thinks that the principle of verification allows us, in our theories, to introduce terms which do not "designate something observable." He insists that statements which confirm a hypothesis need not be part of the meaning of the hypothesis. While this is so, however, he holds that it is a necessary consequence of the principle of verification that a statement "does not have any other factual meaning than what is contained in at least some of the relevant empirical propositions" (p. 15). In the case of a statement about a material thing, "although its generality may prevent any finite set of observation-statements from exhausting its meaning, it does not contain anything as part of its meaning that cannot be represented as an observation-statement" (p. 15).

It is true that in this paragraph it is Mr. Ayer's primary intention to make clear that not all the evidence for a statement is part of the meaning of the statement. But it seems to result from the paragraph that there can be no part of the factual meaning of a statement which "cannot be represented as an observation statement." And this seems to be different from what he said in the passage already quoted from p. 24. While not necessarily inconsistent with that passage, it considerably diminishes the significance I suggested that passage might have. There is at least a certain tension between the two passages. They pull in opposite directions.

This tension seems to be evidenced by Mr. Ayer's discussion of other minds, brief as it is. He accepts the evidence of linguistic usage as decisive for the conclusion that it is a necessary proposition that two persons do not own the same experience. If this is so, then the statement "P is owning experience E" would have to mean something different from any set of observation-statements capable of being made by persons other than P, if they were to be able to make it at all. One half of Mr. Ayer's doctrine as I have presented it would allow for such difference, while leaving it possible that the observation-statements could be confirmatory evidence justifying them in making the statement about P. The other half of his doctrine would rule out any possible difference, and would thus make it meaningless for anyone to say that another person was owning an experience. In the conclusion he reaches tentatively the latter half seems to prevail. "I am inclined," he concludes, "to revert to a 'behaviouristic' interpretation of propositions about other people's experiences." "But," he adds, "I own that it has an air of paradox which prevents

me from being wholly confident that it is true" (p. 20), which seems to show that the former half of his doctrine is not completely forgotten.

But this kind of tension is a good augury for future progress.

I have no space to discuss the remaining points in the introduction. The re-issue of the volume is to be welcomed, and the new introduction enables Mr. Ayer to pick up the threads of the argument as they were left before the war, and tidy them up in the process. What was noteworthy before was the vigour with which the doctrines were expressed, the swiftness and economy of the writing, the sureness with which Mr. Ayer could pack his sentences with content, without making them unwieldy. The new introduction shows that while Mr. Ayer has matured, he has lost none of his old skill.

L. J. Russell.

Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil. By Thomas Hobbes. Edited with an introduction by Michael Oakeshott. (Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 1946. Price 8s. 6d. (cloth), 7s. 6d. (paper).)

Hobbes's "opponents divide themselves into two classes: the emotional and the intellectual," says Mr. Michael Oakeshott in his introduction (p. *l*) to this fine edition of the *Leviathan*. The present reviewer must confess himself to belong to the first class, although he has tried hard to graduate into the second. It is not an exaggeration to say, however, that Mr. Oakeshott's introduction has enabled one to make what is almost completely a fresh start in trying to understand Hobbes. In about seventy pages of lucid, arresting, and epigrammatic English he has expounded the essential facts of Hobbes's life, the context of the *Leviathan*, the characteristics of Hobbes's thought, and the argument of his book. There is a freshness about the whole thing which enables the reader coming to the *Leviathan* again to enter with enthusiasm and a sense of direction upon the task of following and appreciating the long and difficult argument of the author. And perhaps the greatest tribute to Mr. Oakeshott's introduction is that it leads one on to the reading of the book; it does not give that false sense of knowing already what is to come, which is so often the effect of introductions. "The argument is finished: but let no one mistake it for the book," says Mr. Oakeshott at the end of one section of his introduction. It is good to be able to say that at no time does the introduction produce that false impression and result. It succeeds admirably in what it sets out to do—it introduces.

To say this is to say that Mr. Oakeshott has achieved his purpose brilliantly. He may hope to do a little more—to meet the criticisms of the opponents of the second class, and to make some amends for the fact that Hobbes's few defenders are, as he says, "not conspicuous for their insight into his meaning." But this is harder work, and it is difficult to attempt it in the few pages of an introduction. And, to quote his own words once more, "it is not to be expected that it can be accomplished quickly or all at once." (p. lii). What Mr. Oakeshott has to say in defence of Hobbes is always cogent and clear. It will lead the student to see that there is much more in Hobbes than he thought. Whether it will take him further than that, whether it will lead him to exclaim as Mr. Oakeshott does (p. viii) that "the *Leviathan* is the greatest, perhaps the sole, masterpiece of political philosophy written in the English language" is less certain. Let us hope that before he takes a final decision on this question the student will look at two companion volumes in this series of Mr. Blackwell's political texts—Mr. Gough's edition of Locke's *Second Treatise* and *A Letter concerning Toleration*, and Mr.

McCallum's edition of Mill's *Liberty* and *Representative Government*. May the reviewer be permitted to go beyond the confines of the volume he is considering and offer a word of thanks and appreciation to Mr. McCallum and his colleague as general editor of this series, Mr. C. H. Wilson, and to Basil Blackwell for their courage and enterprise in making available to students these great texts, so fit for these times. Mr. Oakeshott's volume sets the highest of standards.

K. C. WHEARE.

Between Man and Man. By MARTIN BUBER. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. (Kegan Paul. 1947. Pp. 208. 12s. 6d.)

Martin Buber's *I and Thou* was published in Germany in 1923 (English translation 1937). *Between Man and Man* contains five subsequent essays, written 1925–38, which develop the same leading thoughts into fuller expression, bearing more distinctly on contemporary problems. To appreciate this volume a reader need not be acquainted with the earlier work; and in many respects the fuller treatment provides an easier introduction to the subject, in spite of the greater proportion here of technical and historical discussions of philosophy.

"Dialogue" (*Zwiesprache*), which stands first in the book, comes nearest to *I and Thou* in its compressed and mystical language. It is a study of the heart that is "open" to all things and events, and to men, and to God; and that meets the "word" said to it everywhere in return. The next essay, "The Question to the Single One" (*Die Frage an den Einzelnen*) contains a sympathetic but critical exposition of Kierkegaard and a more decided criticism of some related writers; and this historical survey is enlarged and extended (ranging now from Kant to Scheler) in the final section of the book. This section, "What is Man?", consists of the author's inaugural course of lectures (1938) as Professor of Social Philosophy in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. It is preceded by two addresses on education given to conferences of teachers; one in 1925 at Heidelberg, the other in 1939 at Tel-Aviv.

It is impressive to see how well the general doctrine bears expansion; and Professor Buber's gift of illustration, and his subtlety and sanity of thought, appear still more clearly now that more space is allowed them. Mr. Gregor Smith's translation (so far as I can judge without having seen the original) seems altogether admirable, and the author and translator together supply us with some memorable passages.

A few quotations may help most to give an idea of what the book offers.

"Kant's question *What is man?* whose history and effects I have discussed . . . can never be answered on the basis of a consideration of the human person as such, but (so far as an answer is possible at all) only on the basis of a consideration of it in the wholeness of its essential relations to what is. Only the man who realizes in his whole life with his whole being the relations possible to him helps us to know man truly. And since, as we have seen, the depths of the question about man's being are revealed only to the man who has become solitary, the way to the answer lies through the man who overcomes his solitude without forfeiting its questioning power" (p. 199).

"Individualism understands only a part of man, collectivism understands man only as a part; neither advances to the wholeness of man, to man as a whole. . . . With the former man's face is distorted, with the latter it is masked" (p. 200).

"The body politic, which is sometimes also called the 'world,' that is, the human world, seeks, knowingly or unknowingly, to realize in its genuine formations men's turning to one another in the context of creation. The false

formations distort but they cannot eliminate the eternal origin. Kierkegaard in his horror of malformation turns away" (p. 60).

"Kierkegaard behaves in our sight like a schizophrenist, who tries to win over the beloved individual into 'his' world as if it were the true one. But it is not the true one. We, ourselves wandering on the narrow ridge, must not shrink from the sight of the jutting rock on which he stands over the abyss; nor may we step on it. We have much to learn from him, but not the final lesson" (p. 55).

"Good and evil, then, cannot be a pair of opposites like right and left or above and beneath. 'Good' is the movement in the direction of home, 'evil' is the aimless whirl of human potentialities without which nothing can be achieved and by which, if they take no direction but remain trapped in themselves, everything goes awry. . . . As a condition of the individual soul evil is the convulsive shirking of direction, of the total orientation of the soul by which it stands up to personal responsibility before God. . . . The passionate man refuses by his passion, the indolent man by his indolence. . . . The real historical daemonias are the exploiting by historical powers of this shirking" (pp. 78–9).

"Lyric poetry is . . . the tremendous refusal of the soul to be satisfied with self-commerce. Poetry is the soul's announcement that even when it is alone with itself on the narrowest ridge it is thinking not of itself but of the Being which is not itself, and that this Being which is not itself is visiting it there, perplexing and blessing it" (p. 180).

"In my thoughts about the life of dialogue I have had to choose the examples as 'purely' and as much in the form of paradigm as memory presented them to me in order to make myself intelligible. . . . But I am not concerned with the pure; I am concerned with the turbid, the repressed, the pedestrian, with toil and dull contrariness . . . in which the man, whom I pluck at random out of the tumult, is living and out of which he can and at times does break through. Whither? into nothing exalted, heroic, or holy, into no Either and no Or, only into this tiny strictness and grace of every day, where I have to do with just the very same 'reality' with whose duty and business I am taken up. . . . And now, in all the clanking of routine that I called my reality, there appears to me, homely and glorious, the effective reality, creaturely and given to me in trust and responsibility. We do not find meaning lying in things nor do we put it into things, but between us and things it can happen" (pp. 35–6).

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

The Second Treatise on Civil Government and *A Letter concerning Toleration.* By JOHN LOCKE. Edited with an Introduction by J. W. GOUGH. (Basil Blackwell. Oxford. 1946. Pp. xxxix + 165. 8s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Gough has given us an excellent edition of a political classic which a generation familiar with totalitarianism in practice should esteem more highly than the complacent later nineteenth century. For to that generation in England Locke was too often a solemn propounder of commonplaces and shallow half-truths, who had had in the eighteenth century far more than his due measure of reputation as a political thinker and whom it was meet to contrast to his disadvantage with the "far more coherent logic" (the phrase is Bosanquet's) and the far more brilliant writing of Hobbes. Nowadays perhaps we are not too much impressed by a political logic that leads straight to despotism, and we merely regret that such a pungent style was put at the service of so disastrous a doctrine as Hobbes expounded.

With Locke at least we are safe—and sound as well as safe. He is whole-

some even in his hesitancies, and when he evades an issue (as that of the limits of toleration) it is often because he refuses to slash drastically through a knot that no one has to this day unravelled. Perhaps it is just as well that some (not all) of the fundamentals of liberal democracy should have been first authoritatively stated with so little sparkle of paradox, but soberly, tentatively, unpontifically.

Mr. Gough's estimate of Locke is likewise sober. He shows us his weaknesses as well as his merits. He brings out well the special significance of Locke's conception of government in *fiduciary* rather than traditional contractual terms. The reader has also the great advantage of seeing where the later editions of the Treatise, which Locke preferred, differ from the first version of it. But on the whole one is struck by the constancy of Locke's ideas. As Mr. Gough points out the essence of the doctrine of 1690 is in the early draft of the "Essay Concerning Toleration" of 1667.

There appears to be a slip on p. xxxv. Speaking of Locke's not very satisfactory discussion of the problem of how the citizen is to act if the civil government enjoins something that conflicts with his conscience, Mr. Gough says: "Locke simply recommends passive obedience," when it is clear that passive *dis*obedience is intended. The citizen should refuse to obey, but accept the duly authorized punishment for disobedience. After 250 years we have not got far beyond that.

One question which must occur to the readers of Locke remains unanswered by his latest editor. Why does Locke never refer openly to Hobbes? That he has the doctrine of *The Leviathan* repeatedly in mind is, as Mr. Gough says, clear enough. Why then no overt reference to it?

If this curious reticence is to be explained by a decision not to present his own constructive theory in a way that would suggest a piece of topical polemics, then he succeeded to perfection in writing what within a generation had become the standing and accepted exposition of the Whig political faith.

I should like to quarrel with one of Mr. Gough's critical comments. He complains (xxxi) of the "artificiality" of Locke's theory. Certainly Locke had, no more than any of his contemporaries, a conception of social or political evolution or growth. But he does recognize that constitutional government is at any rate "natural" in the sense of being an expression of human need finding its normal expression in the satisfaction of natural faculty. Ordered government *is* after all an artifice: the important thing to stress is that it is not a violent *tour de force* for which nothing in raw human nature would have prepared us, but an inevitable contrivance in which human nature finds itself. "Man is born free as he is born rational," etc. Burke was at any rate faithful to Locke's thought when he wrote that "Art *is* man's nature."

J. W. HARVEY.

The Nature of Art or The Shield of Pallas. By ARTHUR LITTLE, S.J. (Longmans Green & Co. Pp. 264. 8s. 6d.)

It is an intriguing experience, chastening and perhaps salutary, to read a book with whose main conclusion on the nature of artistic experience (though not on the nature of beauty) one agrees while finding none of its arguments for that conclusion at all convincing. This main conclusion is that our experience of significant art is the contemplation of the volitional activities of the human soul (p. 75), it is "emotion recollected in tranquillity" (p. 83).

The main arguments are of the kind once profanely called "high priori." As Lord Russell has said of the vaunted French "logicality," it develops with

impressive demonstration the implications of premises merely assumed to be acceptable. To take a crucial instance: the beauty of significant art consists in its expressiveness of the emotions of the human soul. But this is referred to the alleged fact that the human soul is the most "beautiful" object with which we are directly acquainted. Everything that is real is said to be beautiful (though human beings are incapable of perceiving the beauty of most things) since everything real is orderly or self-consistent, and such order *is* beauty. Surely the force of reason could no further go, To make things such she just defined them so. From this it follows that the beauty of significant art is a very different kind of beauty from that of reality, for its beauty consists in its expressiveness of the imperceptible and inexpressive beauty of reality. But what is expressive or significant to one man may easily not be so to another who speaks a different language and has a different culture or a different coloured skin (pp. 126, 150). Yet all beauty is said to be objective, a quality of things not an experience of ours. Manifestly here is a difficulty calling for serious discussion: is the beauty of art a quality of the work or only a capacity to stimulate a valuable activity (acquaintance with the human heart) in people of a certain character, while one equally valuable might only be stimulated in others by other means? And if the latter, may not the same be true of all beauty, say (to take the author's example) that of an amphora? May not its curves be expressive of human feeling to some persons who are insensitive to those of a Chinese bronze, and *vice versa*? No doubt when we call things beautiful we unreflectively *mean* to attribute a quality to them, as when we call them pleasant, but are we justified? This real difficulty is passed over with surprising levity. We are referred to "the devastating criticism" of subjectivism in ethics in Dr. C. E. M. Joad's *Guide to Philosophy*. There is no discussion of the contrary opinions of Richard Price, Coleridge, Rashdall, Ross or of Croce whose account of beauty agrees so closely with the account of "significant art" for which the author claims originality. Indeed, in spite of the claim upon the wrapper that "all the main theories are outlined and debated," the only one adequately discussed is that of Maretain; Kant is touched but, I think, misinterpreted. There is no discussion of whether the value of aesthetic experience—goodness of taste—may not depend upon its frequency, vividness and purity rather than upon the stimulus; as innocence and peace of mind depend upon having done what we honestly thought our duty in what we supposed to be the situation and not upon what we ignorantly did.

When the author discusses the "unsignificant beauty" of an amphora (and I suppose the same would apply to nature) we are told that its beauty is objective, consisting in the mutual necessitation of its lines. But since the alleged necessitation is neither causal nor logical it must, I suppose, be aesthetic; there must be these curves *if* this particular beauty is to be achieved: the argument, once more, is circular.

The sub-title is explained by a rather obscure apologue of Perseus. The author has not remarked upon the striking resemblance, as well as difference, of his conclusions with those of Ruskin's *The Lance of Pallas*.

The book is developed from lectures; some pedagogical puns and facetiousness, suitable enough for its first purpose, might perhaps have been dropped.

The definition attributed to Blackstone on p. 48 is in fact quoted by him from Sir Thomas Smith some two centuries earlier.

The main effect of the book is that by its insistence on the "objectivity" of beauty, which seems to me extremely dubious, it tends to revive, as in logical positivism, the analogy between beauty and goodness drawn by Hutcheson and Hume, which has led alike to an unfounded scepticism of morality and to an unjustifiable dogmatism in taste.

E. F. Carritt.

God, Man, and the Absolute. By F. H. Cleobury, Ph.D. (Hutchinson. Pp. 148. Price 15s.)

Bertrand Russell has said that perhaps the chief service of philosophy today is to enable us to live effectively without certainty. That may rather be the function of faith—not confined to philosophers. But one service it does render is to prevent us taking the latest cult in thought for the last and ascribing finality to a contemporary fashion. Thought has its dialectical movement, in which by putting down the right foot and then again the left, it maintains constant motion if not assured progress. Our own day has put down the mighty Rationalisms and Idealisms of the nineteenth century from their seats and exalted various schools of Realism and Irrationalism to high degree. "Whirl" has become king in the realms of art, poetry, life, and thought. Lately, however, tender shoots have appeared which may be the presage of a returning Spring for ancient Reason and that "out-moded" Idealism which once availed to nourish spiritual faith and social enthusiasm with Hegelian juices particularly in Oxford and Glasgow.

Many may get from the very title of this book by Dr. Cleobury a creepy feeling that Hegel and his English prophets, long believed to be dead and buried, are again walking and speaking like gibbering ghosts in their unknown tongue, and they may think that anything which can now be said from that platform must be flat, stale, and unprofitable. In the present instance such a prejudice would itself be batty. True it is Hegel, Bradley, and Bosanquet who walk the ramparts; but Dr. Cleobury views the apparition with eyes in which there is speculation and alert critical faculty. Besides, a philosophy like a wine may be none the worse, if it is freshly decanted, for having lain a generation or two in the cellar so that the bottles smell musty and look cobwebby. Why prefer to sport with Minerva on raw spirit distilled earlier the same day? Dr. Cleobury informs us that this book is "the result of a conviction that the time is now ripe for a re-consideration and defence of the outmoded Oxford Idealism," and his enterprise should command the wistful interest of philosophers and thinking people at a time when Scientific Humanism and Logical Positivism are contracting the whole alphabet of cosmic utterance within the alpha and omega of time, ending, as they must, in nihilism redeemed only by the stoic dignity with which final despair is to be defied.

He reaffirms, supported by revised arguments, the cardinal theses and principles of Absolute Idealism, holding that Reality is experience and that "the notion of an existent or a subsistent or a real which no one, God or man, is conscious of" is one to which he can attach no meaning (p. 10). As all the motley of existence is not relative to finite percipience it must be present in an Infinite or Absolute experience and to the *explicit cognisance* of God, (p. 13) who has no subconscious. Absolute Reality is one eternal, all-embracing, perfect, and harmonious Whole, a rational, systematic, self-consistent Unity, into which all phenomena enter, including finite selves, and of which they are parts, and nothing can fall outside it (p. 15).

The succeeding chapters offer a closely reasoned theory, based on acute and penetrating analysis, of Finite Selfhood, of the Moral Consciousness, Human Freedom, Error and Appearance, with a discussion in the last Chapter of the main doctrines of Christian theology such as Incarnation, Sin, Responsibility—a treatment designed to show how the integrity of all our temporal values and particularities can be preserved in the Idealistic conception of the Absolute as here interpreted and expounded. In Bradley's Absolute all "appearances" are transmuted so that their peculiar "as suchness" in time and space disappears in the total context. In Dr. Cleobury's Absolute every

characteristic of phenomena is there; it remains, as such, a constituent of the Absolute. The dilemma is that with Bradley the finite peculiarities cannot squeeze in without losing their shape and so wander like displaced persons in an inconceivable limbo, while with Cleobury the network of completed relations in the Absolute leaves the particular "appearances" intact. This, though necessary if nothing whatever is to be left outside, seems impossible on the Idealistic theory of things and relations. Cleobury wrestles with the problem and seeks its solution in a special handling of that hardy principle of the Idealistic Logic, "Identity-in-Difference." Selfhood is of course the most obstinate stickler for its own inviolable rights and here he manfully tries to wangle out of the bunker by his doctrine of the "concrete ego" (p. 31), which he illustrates by the analogy of a circle with its centre, area, circumference (34, 36). But does the analogy do its job, where the centre is just an abstract part of the circle, in the same plane with it, whereas the ego is a living agent *appropriating* its experience like a trade-union imposing a "closed shop?" And moreover we find in Chapter II, and in Chapter IV, where human freedom is the issue, that the ego is assigned a transcendental character and status above the general process of nature, history and its own experience, where causality and determinism reigns (p. 144). This point is crucial, in our opinion, and we cannot see, in spite of the elaborate argument of Chapter II, that the "separateness" of finite selves from each other and from the divine spirit is expressible in terms of "dissimilarity of content" merely (p. 144), and "similarity of content" is not the same thing as numerical identity. I enjoy an uninfringed monopoly of my own toothache.

Space makes it impossible to set forth all Dr. Cleobury's applications of "Identity-in-Difference" as interpreted by him to the solution of inveterate Idealistic problems, nor his argument in various connexions for a realistic acceptance of the total inclusiveness of the Absolute, of such sort as explains why man can literally become *one* with God and his consciousness part of the Infinite or Universal Consciousness, so that It actually thinks and acts and lives in us and we in It, in the measure in which our thoughts, acts, and lives deepen and widen to embrace God's and express our own truest selves. Such conception and speech are indeed the current coin of religion and have profound meaning and value but whether we can exchange it into hard ontological cash is perhaps another story. The last Chapter on Christian theism and theology in relation to the Philosophy of the Absolute strikes us as in parts the weakest and least satisfactory. There is the author's authentic touch in his remarks on Kant's moral argument for man's immortality (137, 138) and the argument from values is, we believe, valid in a general way, but his doctrine of the good and bad man in respect of survival of death is left with sore obscurities, and on p. 141 it is given an intellectualist twist which rather makes us rub our eyes. But in the old Christian tradition, the difference between sheep and goats was itself a pretty subtle one on which to apportion destiny. Most questionable of all is the equation throughout of the metaphysical Absolute with the God of Theism, quite a different Being answering to very different human needs and with temporal activities and functions, which appear to be impossible for the Absolute though Dr. Cleobury speaks of it as an *active* Absolute. His identification of them requires more elucidation and justification than it gets.

In any case, the real value of the book, challenging attention, consists not only in its revision, in certain respects original, of the classic presentments of Absolute Idealism and the effort to put right some of its assumed implications, but in the author's clear-sighted appreciation of the difficulties raised by his own arguments and his honest refusal to dodge them in a strife for triumph

more than truth. We may congratulate him on a work which embodies intense persistent thinking and on the clear sinuous style in which it is written. No German professor could thus have made the crooked straight and the rough places plain.

R. Nicol Cross.

The Medieval idea of law as represented by Lucas de Penna. A Study in Fourteenth-Century Legal Scholarship. By Walter Ullmann.

At the end of the last century the study of both the Common Law and the Canon Law in the Middle Ages was revolutionized for English scholars by the great work of F. W. Maitland. His books are still studied and he laid foundations upon which Holdsworth, Z. N. Brooke, and others in England and America have built. In comparison the Civil Law has been badly neglected. We have the articles in the *Cambridge Medieval History* and *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, we have Vinogradoff's *Roman Law in Medieval Europe*, and, more recently, Kantorowicz's *Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law*. Dr. Ullmann's book is therefore a welcome help in the cultivation of a neglected field. It is prefaced by an introduction on "The Legal and Political Ideas of the Post-Glossators" by Professor Hazeltine who summarizes many of the points which the author later develops more fully in connexion with the work of Lucas de Penna. The importance of the Civilians for political theory has already been demonstrated in the Carlyles' great work, but it is useful to have it developed in more detail as expounded by one particular lawyer. Dr. Ullmann emphasizes strongly Lucas's moral outlook. At the end of his discussion of the foundations and nature of law he writes: "Lucas's main idea is that law cannot serve as a means to cover unjust, evil intentions. Rights are granted only for a specific purpose, and the bearer of a right cannot plead the cause of law and right when his intentions are in opposition to those of the legislator. This fundamental thesis reveals a mind which is permeated with the spirit of morality rarely—if ever—to be found among jurists. The hypocritical idea of an "objective nature" of law, a slogan of modern jurisprudence, is plainly rejected. Lucas would certainly not have justified the coinage of the trite dictum "Juristen sind böse Christen." Nor would Shylock have found any support from our jurist." One wonders whether in all this Lucas is quite so distinctive among the medieval civilians as Dr. Ullmann seems to imply. Further it must be emphasized that although the civilians were definitely Christian lawyers yet their outlook is markedly different from that of the canonists. The two laws were, for example, in contradiction over the performance of certain kinds of contract. Guido de Baisio (1313) explains the difference by saying that Canon Law tends to apply equity in relations between individuals and does not occupy itself with the subtleties of Roman Law. Antony de Butrio (1338–1408) puts the case more precisely: *Dico quod ideo, quia ius civile principaliter non insequitur finem iuris divini sed finem publicae utilitatis.* The English lawyer and the ecclesiastic may, by a perusal of Dr. Ullmann's book, be strengthened in their conviction of the superiority of their respective systems of the Roman Civil Law, but they will be none the less grateful to him for helping them to understand wherein this superiority lies.

Eric Kemp.

Old Age. Its Compensations and Rewards. By A. L. VISCHER. Translated by Bernard Miall. (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1947. Pp. 200. 12s. 6d. net.)

In this book little is said of the strain and stress of growing old, and not very much directly about the "compensations and rewards" of old age. But then such strain and stress can only be experienced, and may not be told, and reward or compensation is a grace which a man must find as he may. And "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must keep silence."

Too often we tend to forget the inscrutable livingness of both youth and age, and we make of them problems, put them into fast categories, and dogmatize about them. Strangely enough we do not generally dogmatize about middle age, and the middle-aged are suffered to follow their individual pursuits with no gloss from the theorist, though perhaps the modern cult of the "common man" indicates even here a bias towards the abstract. Now it is an outstanding merit of this book that in it Dr. Vischer neither sets himself a problem nor propounds a theory. He is entirely undogmatic on the subject of old age, but what he does—and this is of the utmost value—is to release old age from its categorical fastness and to put it back into the open spaces of ordinary living, to reveal it as continuous with its past, and not as a limit of that past. "How good is our life, the mere living."

Dr. Vischer has seen that there is no definite point in time at which a man becomes old, and he shows old age as a shifting thing, shifting as between man and man, and shifting too within the span of one man's lifetime. We should perhaps say of a man not that he is seventy years of age, but rather that he is seventy years of *his* age. And at seventy he may well be younger in some respects than he was at sixty.

Life does not conform to the measure of years, and Dr. Vischer makes a nice point when he suggests that anniversaries may play a rather sinister role in the clamping down upon him of a man's age.

Life is organic, and old age is part of the close-knit involution of the physical, psychical, social and spiritual elements in the whole of life. As a scientist Dr. Vischer investigates the symptoms and causes of physical decline in the ageing man, but he maintains that such symptoms and causes do not form a closed system, that there is ingression and interference by all the circumambient elements, psychical, social and spiritual, and that the result of this interpenetration is something which is not susceptible to scientific analysis.

Dr. Vischer is a scientist, but he has the eye of an artist, and his work is imbued with something of the active passivity of those who seek not to prove but to see. "Il faut être voyant, toujours voyant."

And he makes a very wide survey, observing old age horizontally in all parts of the world, and vertically down the centuries of time. There is the pre-eminence of youth in ancient Greece, and the cult of age in China now; there is old age in the remote past of Judaism and old age in the Vatican to-day. And, in the passage, from one country to another, from one century to another, many curious and interesting things are brought to light. There is Metschnikoff's method of rejuvenation from Bulgaria, there is a table giving the ages of German rulers from the year 800 to the present time, there is a chapter on old age and longevity in the animal world, there is a consideration of old age in primitive peoples, and there is a record of the incidence of centenarianism.

Many strange facts emerge, but there is a constant transition from the factual to the meditative, and the interludes of meditation are both helpful and illuminating. About memory in old age Dr. Vischer says "It does not simply become worse; it becomes more fastidious. What is actually essential

comes to the fore, what is unimportant is not retained, is indeed barely remarked. In the thought of the old man the substance of what is perceived fades from view, while the conceptual acquires greater significance. Thought becomes less ample, but more economical. The world is seen with a different vision; it appears poorer in colour and tone, but for that very reason clearer and more transparent." And on the question of old age and its sense of the future we have: "In old age we find that the awareness of the future and with it the sense of life, undergoes all kinds of changes. It may be directed forwards, in undiminished hope, and assurance of new experiences. But if there is no such forward orientation, or if no compensation for it exists, the concrete structure of time that serves as a frame for the anticipation of life collapses, and amid the débris of this structural decay there remains, as the sole temporal fabric, the banal division of time into days, and the discharge of the animal functions."

One would like to linger over this question of the relation and aspect of time to old age, one would like to linger over many other such passages in this book, but with his sure instinct for the individual and the personal the author beckons us on to the survey of a long gallery of portraits, portraits of men and women who, full of years, were still able to serve their generations, and in many instances to do outstanding work in their latter days.

In this gallery are Titian, Renoir, Goethe, Voltaire, Fontane, Verdi, and Ninon de Lenclos—and to such a list of honour we ourselves may well add names illustrious "in England now."

There is no retiring age for the creative artist or for the leader of a salon, but it is otherwise with the majority of men, and when we give up our job not only do we cease to contribute useful work to the community, but too often we suffer diminishment of personal being. The curse of old age, Dr. Vischer says, is boredom, *d'ennui mortel*. Old people so often feel bored, but a boredom which is unacknowledged and even unrecognized may surely yet also sap a man's vitality, and increase the drag of the years!

This problem of boredom is a specific one, and Dr. Vischer points to a solution. He would have not only a Bernard Shaw producing works of art at the age of seventy or eighty or ninety, but an old woman in a home for the aged engaged upon some work within her powers, and which she feels to be useful—helping, say, in a neighbouring hospital or infirmary.

With the increase in numbers in the higher age-groups which is a feature of the modern world it may well be that older—and yet older—men may find work in industry or administration, work in which their qualities of experience, disinterestedness and responsibility may supplement the quicker reactions, the larger adaptability and the greater physical strength, of younger colleagues.

Dr. Vischer gives interesting examples of such experiments in adapting work to the powers of older men, to the great benefit of the men themselves and to the business in which they engage. Such a method means material gain in that it constitutes an increase in man-power for a nation, but more than this is its spiritual value, for it may mean an extension to many of a chance of securing that serenity of mind which should be the dower of age. "For every stage of life has its own psychic modality, its own beauty, its own right to exist, and is a section of life full of a significance of its own."

E. M. Rowell.

The Vision of Asia. By L. Cranmer Byng. With a Foreword by the Rt. Hon. R. A. Butler. (Pocket edition.) (John Murray. Pp. 306. 6s. with index.)

It is not easy to review this book for philosophers. To begin with, Mr. Cranmer Byng's generation, now passing on, is under a real debt to him for the vision he had of a "Wisdom of the East" series and for translating that vision into fact at so moderate a cost to the purchaser. In 1932 the editor of the series appeared in *propria persona* to give his own reactions to the study of Eastern philosophy; to him Asia is essentially the home of the mystic wisdom. He comes, therefore, under the suspicion of being an escapist. But he roundly affirms that he is not. What he dislikes in the West is the tyranny of technical science with the life of the individual sunk in the gelatinous existence of the mass, herded as it is in tenements and stream-lined production shops. He has found what he looked for in the Upanishads, in the Buddha, in Confucius and Lao Tzu. The last-named would appear to be the most congenial to his soul. From these writers he went on to consider the part played by artistic intuition in China and Japan, particularly in the great flowering periods of the T'ang and Sung eras.

It is to Mr. Cranmer Byng's credit that he has tried to put his theories to the test of history. The trouble here is that, having a better knowledge of Western history he looks at it with jaundiced eyes, having a less knowledge of Chinese history he sees it through rose-coloured spectacles. Further, I cannot believe that he uses the same uncritical judgment for the early legends of European history as he uses for those of China's cultural origins. He accepts all that the scholars of the old tradition believed about sage kings back in the 4th millennium B.C. without any reference to modern criticism or archaeological discoveries.

Altogether, therefore, though the book has its charm with its mannered prose style, it is not to be recommended to the analytically minded philosopher. But then of course that is not what Mr. Cranmer Byng sets out to be. His aim is to show how faith in the eternal verities can be revivified by sipping at these Asiatic springs; and this he does in a way which readers of his Wisdom of the East series will appreciate. E. R. Hughes.

La Pensée de Ghazzālī. By A. J. Wensinck, professeur à l'université de Leiden. (Adrien-Maisonneuve, Paris VIe. 1940. Pp. ii + 201. Price not stated.) 11 Rue St. Sulpice.

For the sake of convenience (the printer's as well as my own) I propose to call the subject of this book Algazel, the name by which he was known to the medievals. He lived from 1058–1111 A.D. and represented a reaction against the rationalising tendencies introduced into the Mohammedan world by Alfarabi and Avicenna. Having exposed the opinions of these two philosophers in a work which was mistaken by the medievals for an exposition of his own ideas, he proceeded to a *Destruction of the Philosophers*, to which Averroes later replied with a *Destruction of the Destruction*. His chief work was the *Renewal of the Religious Sciences*.

Professor Wensinck (who died in 1939) gives us a study of Algazel's thought in regard to God, man, cosmology, angels, faith and certainty, asceticism and mysticism, death and the future life, omitting any biographical sketch and not really discussing Algazel's relation to his predecessors. The author of a book is, of course, fully entitled to delimit his subject matter as he chooses; but the second omission is perhaps to be regretted, since one of the chief points of interest in regard to Arab philosophy is the tension between theolo-

gian and philosopher, between the Coran on the one hand and Aristotle in Neo-platonic vestments on the other. It is interesting to compare the changing relations between theology and philosophy in the medieval Arab world and the medieval Christian world. However, the author has given a careful and systematic account of Algazel's thought, with many quotations (in French happily) and references, though he might well have had compassion on those of us who know no Arabic by supplying the French translation of the Arabic titles of Algazel's works as mentioned in the bibliography.

Professor Wensinck contends that Algazel was first of all a Mohammedan. This is undoubtedly true. Algazel insisted on creation, on the divine omnicausality and on predestination, thus upholding Mohammedan orthodoxy against what he considered to be the dangerous tendencies of the followers of Aristotle. On the other hand there are obvious Neo-platonic elements in Algazel's thought, which might appear strange in the case of a destroyer of the philosophers. But Algazel was not simply a critic of the unorthodox; he was a mystic, a Sufi, and Sufism incorporated Neo-platonic and also Christian elements. In other words, Algazel the mystic softened the harshness of Mohammedan orthodoxy by fusing it with a mysticism and moral doctrine drawn from Neo-platonism and from Christianity. (Algazel quotes directly from the New Testament.) Neoplatonism was thus enlisted in the service of mysticism rather than in that of speculation. In regard to purely philosophic speculation Algazel was critical and even somewhat sceptical; but a large dose of scepticism in philosophy is by no means incompatible with mysticism.

The mystical teaching of Algazel led him to use expressions which savour of pantheism, though, as an orthodox Mohammedan, he certainly did not mean to deny the divine transcendence. That he approximated to pantheism, in expression at least (perhaps it would be better to speak of panentheism) is really no matter for surprise, since the doctrines of strict predestination and divine omnicausality, especially when fused with a mystical doctrine strongly emphasised, can hardly lead to anything else. (The stress laid on love, however, as in Christian mysticism, prevents complete pantheism.) Professor Wensinck puts the matter as follows. "For pantheism God exists only by the universe; for Algazel the universe scarcely exists, God being the only existence. The doctrine of Algazel is the Semitic monotheism seen through Neo-platonism." Yet did not Hegel say that Spinoza was an acosmist rather than a pantheist, although few would wish to deny that the system of Spinoza is a pantheistic system? One should not, however, be lavish with accusations of pantheism; Algazel's motto was really "God versus Aristotle," and by God he did not mean the world, nor did he deny creation. The Neo-platonic elements in his thought were seen in the light of his own experience, which postulated distinction from God as well as union with God. (I do not mean to imply that one can justly call Plotinus, for example, a pantheist, even if there are elements in his system which would seem to lead to pantheism.) The thought of Algazel was thus not simply a theological reaction to philosophy; it was also the protest of religious mysticism against rationalism. Parallel phenomena can be seen in the history of Christian medieval thought.

F. C. Copleston, S.J.

Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. By GERSHOM G. SCHOLEM. (Schoken Books, New York. 454 pp. $5.50.)

Professor Scholem of Jerusalem has issued a revised edition of his monumental work—approximately 200,000 words—on Jewish mysticism. He wishes to remove a common impression that Judaism, the religion of a book, of formalism and legalism, has always been alien to mysticism, using the word as defined by Thomas Aquinas, *Cognitio Dei experimentalis.* In Judaism, as in Islam, which Westcott called petrified Judaism, the transcendent God blazes in solitary splendour, like the sun over the desert, as Christopher Dawson says. Can such a God be known as an experience?

The author is certainly right, as regards prophetic Judaism, which transformed the older Bedouin religion about the same time that a great spiritual awakening took place in China, India, Persia, and Greece. Jeremiah's hope of universal personal inspiration, the second Isaiah's visions, Ezekiel's ecstasies, above all many of the Psalms, belong to the literature of mysticism.

Persian influence, so often underestimated, was not decidedly mystical. But the potent influx of Hellenistic thought, Platonic and Gnostic, left a strong and enduring effect on Judaism from Philo to the Spanish Jew Ibn Gebirol (Avicebron), whose *Fons Vitae*, a Neoplatonic treatise, was greatly admired by Duns Scotus. I am surprised that Scholem hardly mentions him.

Jewish religion has always been cramped by excessive reverence for the Torah, which has been commented on with fantastic disregard of the obvious meaning of the text. Scholem distinguishes between allegorism and symbolism. The latter, he says, gives a sacramental value to the symbol, which not only suggests a spiritual truth but in a sense enshrines and effectuates it. God Himself, it was said, studies the Torah. The author recognizes that with sacramentalism the danger of magic is not far off.

What are the distinctive features of Jewish mysticism? In the first place it has been almost exclusively masculine. This differentiates it from Catholic mysticism, in which the names of women are as prominent as those of men. Autobiographical and personal experiences are not common in the writings of Jewish mystics, and they are comparatively free from the *Schwärmerei* and sublimated eroticism of many female contemplatives.

And yet sex has intruded even here. In the Talmud there is no hint that the Shekhinah represents a feminine element in God. But this idea is prominent in Kabbalism. It is a Gnostic fantasy, strictly incompatible with Jewish monotheism, and rightly rejected by the Christian Church; but in Catholicism as in the Kabbala the popular desire for a feminine object of worship established itself. In the symbolic world of the Zohar the Shekhinah becomes a symbol of the eternal womanhood, and embodies the mystical idea of afflicted Israel, Rachel weeping for her children.

The Shekhinah in the world is an "exile," in consequence of Adam's fall, which broke the unity of heaven and earth. There is here something like the Platonic picture of life in time as a moving image of eternity. The divine Shekhinah is mystically present in history, in part banished from union with God.

The Zohar, Scholem says, for the first time in rabbinical Judaism, glorifies the state of poverty, as the Old Testament often does. Asceticism in Judaism differs from Catholic asceticism in that while it inculcates chastity, like that of Joseph, who resisted Potiphar's wife, it does not exalt celibacy or virginity. Marriage is not a concession to human weakness, but one of the most sacred mysteries, "a symbolical realization of the union of God and the Shekhinah."

Scholem's words that mysticism is a "phase" in the history of religion do not satisfy me. If we take the word in the sense of the definition of Aquinas,

quoted above, it is both the beginning and the end of personal religion. As such, it is almost identical in all deeply religious persons, irrespective of time, place, and creed. It may be doubted whether a stubbornly institutionalist religion like Judaism is favourable to the independent and sometimes rebellious spirit of mysticism. There has not been much persecution of heretical mystics in Judaism, but there has been some, and we may remember the furious curse with which Spinoza was expelled from the community. Still, Professor Scholem has amply vindicated his thesis. W. R. INGE.

Books also received:

LEON CHWISTEK, Ph.D. *The Limits of Science.* Outline of Logic and of the Methodology of the Exact Sciences. With an Introduction and Appendix by Helen Charlotte Brodie, M.A. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. (for the International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method). 1948. Pp. lvii and 347. 30s. net.

JANKO LAVRIN. *Nietzsche: An Approach.* London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1948. Pp. v + 146. 7s. 6d. net.

A. H. SMITH. *Horace William Brindley Joseph,* 1867–1943. From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume XXXI. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. Pp. 24. 5s. net.

M. MERLEAU-PONTY. *Humanisme et Terreur—essai sur le problème communiste.* Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1947. Pp. 208. 325 fr.

S. DE BEAUVOIR. *Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguité.* Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1947. Pp. 223. 245 fr.

EDGAR DE BRUYNE. *Études d'Ésthetique Mediévale.* 3 vols.: I. De Boèce à Jean Scot Erigène. II. L'Époque Romaine. III. Le XIIIe Siècle. 1946. Pp. xiv + 371; x + 420; x + 400. Published by the University of Ghent. No price quoted.

ROMANO GUARDINI. *The Death of Socrates.* An Interpretation of the Platonic Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo. Translated from the German by Basil Wrighton. London: Sheed & Ward. 1948. Pp. xiii + 177. 10s. 6d. net.

CHARLES MAYER. *Matérialisme Progressiste.* Preface by André Maurois. Paris: Société Française de Presse. 1947. Pp. 176. 150 fr.

GERHARD FUNKE. *Maine de Biran.* Philosophisches und politisches Denken zwischen Ancien Régime und Bürgerkönigtum in Frankreich. Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag. 1947. Pp. vii + 432. Price RM. 22.

HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON. *Philo.* Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1947. Two vols. Pp. xvi + 462; xiv + 531. 10 dollars a set.

PAUL WEISS. *Nature and Man.* New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1946. Pp. xxii + 287. 2 dollars 80 cents.

WILLIAM W. HAMMERSCHMIDT. *Whitehead's Philosophy of Time.* New York: King's Crown Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1947. Pp. ix. + 108. 11s. 6d. net.

The late HAROLD H. JOACHIM. *Logical Studies.* Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1948. Pp. 296. 18s. net.

Editor: VERGILIUS FERM. *Religion in the 20th Century.* New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 1948. Pp. xix + 470. 5 dollars.

Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia promosso dall'Istituto di Studi Filosofici. Vol. I. Il Materialismo Storico. Milan: Castellani & Co. Roma: 1946. 1947. Pp. lix + 453. No price quoted.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Vorträge der aus Anlass seines* 300. *Geburtstages in Hamburg abgehaltenen wissenschaftlichen Tagung. [Herausgegeben von der Redaktion der Hamburger Akademischen Rundschau.* Hamburg: Hansischer Gildenverlag, Joachim Heitmann & Co. 1946. Pp. 418.

Harald Eklund. *Die Würde der Menschheit* (Über die erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen der Religionsphilosophie bei Kant). Upsala Universitets Arsskrift: A. B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln. (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz.) 1947–8. Pp. 144.

Sebastian J. Day, O.F.M., Ph.D. *Intuitive Cognition. A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics.* New York: The Franciscan Institute. 1947. Pp. xlii + 216.

INSTITUTE NOTES

In accordance with the powers granted by the Extraordinary General Meeting of the Institute on February 11, 1948, the Council has passed a Resolution raising the annual subscription payable by members of the Institute to £1 10s. from April 1, 1948, with the proviso that members may have the option of entering into a Deed of Covenant for seven years in favour of the Institute at the original rate of £1 1s. per annum.

The Council has also passed a Resolution increasing the subscription payable by future Life Members to £15.

Xth INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

It is now possible to give further information concerning the Xth International Congress of Philosophy, to be held at Amsterdam from August 11 to 18, 1948. The Conference will be in accordance with the following scheme: (1) Central Theme: Man, Mankind, Humanity; (2) Metaphysics and General Ontology; (3) Theory of Values (Ethics, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Law, Economics); (4) Logic and General Methodology; (5) Philosophy of Science (Mathematics, Nature, Biology, Psychology, Sociology, etc.); (6) The Age of Spinoza and Leibniz; (7) History of Philosophy; (8) Oriental Philosophy.

Membership.—1. Acting Members (subscription fl. 30) are entitled to read papers and to join in the discussions. They have access to meetings, where they have the right to vote, and they receive a free copy of the Proceedings of the Congress and other publications, if any.

2. Subsidiary Members (subscription fl. 15) have access to all scientific and social meetings on the same footing as acting members.

Acting membership is open to any student of philosophy who agrees with the spirit and tradition of the International Congresses and whose application is accepted by the Committee.

Subsidiary membership is open to (*a*) Relatives of acting members; (*b*) Assistants, secretaries, etc., of acting members; (*c*) University students, in so far as they hold the qualifications necessary for acting membership. Application forms for subsidiary membership should be countersigned, in cases (*a*) and (*b*), by the acting member in question, in case (*c*) by a University professor.

Those persons who would like to have full particulars of the Xth International Congress at Amsterdam sent to them are asked to apply direct to Prof. Dr. E. W. Beth, Bern. Zweerskade 231, Amsterdam-Z., Holland.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The Royal Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented —Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.

These lectures are free to members.

(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).

(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.

(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.

(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

[Suggested]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

CONTENTS

		PAGE
I.	CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGIES. J. D. Mabbott, M.A.	195
II.	THE CHOICE OF A WORLD OUTLOOK. Professor Dorothy M. Emmet	208
III.	PSYCHOLOGY AND THE MORAL PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME. W. J. H. Sprott, M.A.	227
IV.	"THINKING AND MEANING." (Professor Ayer's Inaugural Lecture.) Professor H. H. Price	239
V.	ON THE FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATION OF FINITE CLASSICAL ARITHMETIC. G. J. Whitrow, M.A., D.Phil.	256
VI.	PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY: PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY	262
VII.	NEW BOOKS	264
VIII.	OBITUARY NOTICE: ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD	287
IX.	INSTITUTE NOTES	288

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

APPEAL FOR NEW MEMBERS AND DONATIONS

The Council is willing to receive applications for membership of the Institute from all those who are interested in philosophy.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from annual subscriptions. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
LONDON AND WOKING